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Lorenzo v. SEC
Ruling Below: Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
Overview: Francis Lorenzo, an investment banker, was charged with securities fraud after he sent
potential investors emails containing false statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit ruled that Lorenzo had not violated Rule 10b-5(b) because his boss had
actually made the misleading statements, but it also held that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b-5(a)
by engaging in a fraudulent scheme.
Issue: Whether a misstatement claim that does not meet the elements set forth in Janus Capital
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders can be repackaged and pursued as a fraudulent-scheme
claim.
Francis V. LORENZO, Petitioner
v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION, Respondent
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on September 29, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge:

found to have infringed: Rule 10b-5(b). That
rule bars the making of materially false
statements in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. We conclude that Lorenzo
did not “make” the false statements at issue
for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) because
Lorenzo’s boss, and not Lorenzo himself,
retained “ultimate authority” over the
statements. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142
(2011).

The Securities and Exchange
Commission found that Francis Lorenzo sent
email messages to investors containing
misrepresentations about key features of a
securities offering. The Commission
determined that Lorenzo’s conduct violated
various securities-fraud provisions. We
uphold the Commission’s findings that the
statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false or
misleading and that he possessed the
requisite intent.

While Lorenzo’s boss, and not
Lorenzo, thus was the “maker” of the false
statements under Rule 10b-5(b), Lorenzo
played an active role in perpetrating the fraud
by folding the statements into emails he sent

We cannot sustain, however, the
Commission’s determination that Lorenzo’s
conduct violated one of the provisions he was
244

W2E’s conversion technology never
materialized. In September 2009, W2E
sought to escape financial ruin by offering up
to $15 million in convertible debentures.
(Debentures are “debt secured only by the
debtor’s earning power, not by a lien on any
specific asset.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
486 (10th ed. 2014)). Charles Vista would
serve as the exclusive placement agent for
W2E’s debenture offering.

directly to investors in his capacity as director
of investment banking, and by doing so with
an intent to deceive. Lorenzo’s conduct
therefore infringed the other securities-fraud
provisions he was charged with violating. But
because the Commission’s choice of
sanctions to impose against Lorenzo turned
in some measure on its misimpression that his
conduct violated Rule 10b-5(b), we set aside
the sanctions and remand the matter to enable
the Commission to reassess the appropriate
penalties.

W2E’s most recent SEC filing at the
time, its June 3, 2009 Form 8-K (used to
notify investors of certain specified events),
contained no indication of any possible
devaluation of the company’s intangible
assets. Rather, the form stated that W2E’s
intangibles were worth just over $10 million
as of the end of 2008. On September 9, 2009,
W2E issued a Private Placement
Memorandum as a guidebook for potential
investors in the debentures. That guidebook,
like the June 2009 Form 8-K, included no
mention of any devaluation of the company’s
intangibles.

I.
A.
In February 2009, Francis Lorenzo
became the director of investment banking at
Charles Vista, LLC. Charles Vista was a
registered broker-dealer owned by Gregg
Lorenzo, no relation to Francis. (For clarity
of reference, we will refer to Francis Lorenzo
as “Lorenzo” and will use Gregg Lorenzo’s
first name when referring to him.)
Charles Vista’s biggest client, and
Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at
the time, was a start-up company named
Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc. (W2E). W2E
claimed to have developed a “gasification”
technology that could generate electricity by
converting solid waste to gas. W2E’s
business model relied on the technology’s
living up to its potential. If it failed to do so,
the great majority of W2E’s assets—the
“intangibles,” in balance-sheet lingo—would
have to be written off entirely.

Following a lengthy audit, however,
W2E changed its public tune. On October 1,
2009, the company filed an amended Form 8K in which it reported a total “impairment” of
its intangible assets because “management
made a determination that the value of the
assets acquired were of no value.” J.A. 703.
As of March 31, 2009, W2E now clarified, its
gasification technology should have been
valued at zero, and its total assets at only
$370,552. On the same day it filed its
amended Form 8-K, October 1, 2009, W2E
also filed a quarterly Form 10-Q in which it
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valued its total assets at $660,408 as of June
30, 2009.

both messages with his name and title as
“Vice President – Investment Banking.” Id.

Later on October 1, Lorenzo’s
secretary alerted him (via email) about
W2E’s amended Form 8-K filing. The next
day, Lorenzo emailed all Charles Vista
brokers links to both of W2E’s October 1
filings. On October 5, he received an email
from W2E’s Chief Financial Officer
explaining the reasons for “[t]he accumulated
deficit we have reported.” Id. at 740. The
CFO reiterated that W2E had written off “all
of our intangible assets . . . of about $11
million” due to “our assessment of the value
of what those asset[s] are worth today.” Id.

B.
On February 15, 2013, the
Commission commenced cease-and-desist
proceedings against Lorenzo, Gregg
Lorenzo, and Charles Vista. It charged each
with violating three securities-fraud
provisions: (i) Section 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a)(1); (ii) Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; and
(iii) Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Gregg Lorenzo and
Charles Vista settled the charges against
them, but the claims against Lorenzo
proceeded to resolution before the agency.

On October 14, Lorenzo separately
emailed two potential investors “several key
points” about W2E’s pending debenture
offering. Id. at 794, 796. His emails,
however, omitted any mention of the
wholesale devaluation of W2E’s intangibles.
On the contrary, Lorenzo’s emails assured
both recipients that the offering came with “3
layers of protection: (I) [W2E] has over $10
mm in confirmed assets; (II) [W2E] has
purchase orders and LOI’s for over $43 mm
in orders; (III) Charles Vista has agreed to
raise additional monies to repay these
Debenture holders (if necessary).” Id. One of
Lorenzo’s messages said it had been sent
“[a]t the request of Gregg Lorenzo,” id. at
796, and the other stated it had been sent “[a]t
the request of Adam Spero [a broker with
Charles Vista] and Gregg Lorenzo,” id. at
794. In both messages, Lorenzo urged the
recipients to “[p]lease call [him] with any
questions.” Id. at 794, 796. And he signed

An administrative law judge
concluded that Lorenzo had “willfully
violated the antifraud provisions of the
Securities and Exchange Acts by his material
misrepresentations and omissions concerning
W2E in the emails.” Gregg C. Lorenzo,
Francis V. Lorenzo, and Charles Vista, LLC,
SEC Release No. 544, 107 SEC Docket 5934,
2013 WL 6858820, at *7 (Dec. 31, 2013).
The ALJ deemed “[t]he falsity of the
representations in the emails . . . staggering”
and Lorenzo’s mental state with respect to
those misstatements at least “reckless.” Id.
As a result, the ALJ ordered Lorenzo to: (i)
cease and desist from violating each
securities-fraud provision giving rise to the
charges against him; (ii) forever refrain from
participating in the securities industry in
several enumerated respects; and (iii) pay a
civil monetary penalty of $15,000. Id. at *10.
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Lorenzo petitioned the Commission
for review. Following “an independent
review of the record,” the full Commission
sustained the ALJ’s decision, including her
“imposition of an industry-wide bar, a ceaseand-desist order, and a $15,000 civil
penalty.” Francis V. Lorenzo, SEC Release
No. 9762, 111 SEC Docket 1761, 2015 WL
1927763, at *1 (Apr. 29, 2015) (Lorenzo).
The Commission found that Lorenzo “knew
each of [the emails’ key statements] was false
and/or misleading when he sent them.” Id. It
concluded that the sanctions were “in the
public interest to deter Lorenzo and others in
similar positions from committing future
violations.” Id. at *17. The Commission later
denied Lorenzo’s motion for reconsideration.

the requisite intent with respect to all three of
the statements.
With regard to his intent, establishing
a violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, or Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 “requires
proof of scienter.” Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc.
v. SEC, 512 F.3d 634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
That standard in turn requires demonstrating
“an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.” Id. (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 967
F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The scienter
requirement can be satisfied by a showing of
“[e]xtreme recklessness,” which exists when
“the danger was so obvious that the actor was
aware of it and consciously disregarded it.”
Id.

Lorenzo filed a timely petition for
review in this court. He challenges only the
Commission’s imposition of an industrywide bar and a $15,000 civil penalty, not the
cease-and-desist order.

The question whether Lorenzo acted
with scienter, like the question whether the
statements were false or misleading, is a
question of fact. Id. at 639. The
Commission’s
“factual
findings
are
conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence.” Seghers v. SEC, 548 F.3d 129,
132 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Although “[s]ubstantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla,”
Kornman v. SEC, 592 F.3d 173, 184 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), we have repeatedly described the
standard as a “very deferential” one, e.g.,
Siegel v. SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 155 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Dolphin & Bradbury, 512 F.3d at 639;
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 801 F.2d
1415, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Applying that
standard here, we conclude that the
Commission’s findings as to falsity and
scienter are supported by substantial
evidence with regard to each of the three
pertinent statements in Lorenzo’s emails.

II.
We
first
consider
Lorenzo’s
challenges to the Commission’s findings that
the relevant statements in his email messages
were false or misleading and were made with
the requisite mental state. The three pertinent
statements are the three “layers of protection”
enumerated in both of Lorenzo’s October 14,
2009, email messages to potential investors
about the debenture offering. Lorenzo
challenges he Commission’s determination
that two of the three statements were false or
misleading, and he also challenges the
Commission’s conclusion that he possessed
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disbelieved the Form’s valuation of the
company’s intangible assets at $10 million.
He agreed that the intangibles were a “dead
asset” that would be “hugely discounted,” id.
at 127-28, and that W2E would be “lucky [to]
get a million dollars for that asset,” id. at 12829. He also thought it significant that the $10
million valuation had not been audited,
because without such scrutiny, “there is way
too much risk for investors.” Id. at 126. He
acknowledged that he had warned Gregg
Lorenzo as early as April 2009 to refrain from
collateralizing a debenture offering with
W2E’s intangibles, because those assets
“provided no protection” to investors. Id. at
159. Lorenzo understood that, if a default
occurred, “clients would not be able to recoup
their money based on a liquidation of this
asset.” Id. He instead viewed the debenture
offering as a “toxic convertible debt spiral.”
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *5.

A.
The first of the three statements at
issue advised potential investors that the
“Company has over $10 mm in confirmed
assets.” J.A. 794, 796. Lorenzo does not
directly dispute the falsity of that statement.
Nor could he: by the time Lorenzo sent the
October 14, 2009, email messages containing
that statement, W2E had entirely written off
its intangibles and disclosed that its
remaining assets were worth far less than $1
million. And Lorenzo himself testified that
W2E “would be lucky to get a million” for its
intangibles after they had been marked down.
Id. at 128.
As to the question of scienter,
Lorenzo contends that, when he sent the
emails, he held a good-faith belief that W2E
had over $10 million in confirmed assets. The
Commission concluded otherwise, and its
finding of scienter is supported by substantial
evidence.

Evidence concerning Lorenzo’s state
of mind can also be gleaned from his actions
in helping prepare Charles Vista’s Private
Placement Memorandum for the debenture
offering. On August 26, 2009, he asked
W2E’s principals to value the company’s
intangibles at $10 million in the upcoming
Memorandum. He received no response. He
broached the subject again on September 1,
this time leaving the intangibles’ value blank,
because he “w[asn’t] sure what [it] was worth
anymore.” J.A. 135, 739. The final
Memorandum assigned no concrete value to
W2E’s intangibles; it instead divulged that
the company had experienced “significant
operating losses” and did “not expect to be
profitable for at least the foreseeable future.”
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *3.

One of Lorenzo’s chief duties
involved conducting due diligence on his
clients, including reviewing their financial
statements and public SEC filings. During the
relevant time, W2E was Lorenzo’s sole
investment-banking client. He knew that
W2E’s financial situation was “horrible from
the beginning” and that its gas-conversion
technology had not worked as planned. Id. at
124. He also knew that he stood to gain seven
to nine percent of any funds he raised from
the debenture offering.
The record shows that, when Lorenzo
viewed W2E’s June 2009 Form 8-K, he
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either untrue or extreme recklessness.”
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *9. The
Commission considered it “at least extremely
reckless” for Lorenzo to have sent email
messages claiming that W2E had over $10
million in “confirmed” assets, given his
“longstanding concern about the legitimacy”
of those assets. Id. We perceive no basis for
setting aside the Commission’s conclusions
as unsupported by substantial evidence.

In its October 1 SEC filings, W2E
publicly disclosed the wholesale write-off of
its intangibles. It did so in a tri-column chart
entitled “Goodwill and Technology,” and it
followed that numerical presentation with a
textual explanation for the mark-down.
Lorenzo acknowledged that he read the
amended Form 8-K on October 1 (although,
according to him, “[p]robably not as closely
as I should have”). J.A. 140. And he received
an email from W2E’s CFO on October 5
succinctly contextualizing the massive
devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets.

In resisting that conclusion, Lorenzo
relies in part on a $14 million valuation of
W2E’s assets in a W2E research report
emailed by Charles Vista’s Chief
Compliance Officer to the firm’s brokers on
the same day Lorenzo sent his pertinent
emails (October 14, 2009). The Commission
sensibly reasoned that “the mere fact that, for
whatever unknown reason, a compliance
officer sent an inaccurate research report
internally to the firm’s brokers is neither
analogous to, nor an excuse for, Lorenzo’s
knowingly sending misleading emails to
prospective investors.” Id. at *9 n.23.

The evidence therefore supports
concluding that, at least by October 5,
Lorenzo knew that W2E’s intangibles were
valueless. He gave testimony on the issue as
follows: “Q. So it is fair to say . . . that on
October 5, 200[9], you were aware that the
$10 million asset had been written off by
[W2E]. Correct? A. Okay. I will agree to that.
That’s correct. Q. That is a fair statement? A.
Yes.” Id. at 151. That admission is difficult to
reconcile with Lorenzo’s statement that he
“unintentional[ly] miss[ed]” the import of the
October 5 email. Id. at 148. The Commission
justifiably credited his more inculpatory
rendition of events, especially in light of his
broader, scienter-related concession: “Q.
[D]id you know that those statements were
inaccurate and misleading? A. Yes. Q. You
knew at the time? A. At the time? I can’t sit
here and say that I didn’t know.” Id. at 158.

B.
The second contested statement is the
assertion in Lorenzo’s emails that “[t]he
Company has purchase orders and LOI’s for
over $43 mm in orders.” J.A. 794, 796. He
maintains that the Commission erred in
deeming that statement false or misleading.
He notes that, at one point, Charles Vista did
in fact receive a $43 million letter of intent
from a potential customer in the Caribbean,
and that W2E’s CEO “put a lot of
confidence” in such letters. Id. at 160. But as
the Commission rightly notes, the Caribbean

According to the Commission, “[t]hat
Lorenzo could have looked at [W2E’s]
filings, which was his job, and missed what
was one of the most pertinent facts in them—
the valuation of the company’s assets—is
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“$43 mm in orders” (or any orders) would
actually occur. Substantial evidence therefore
supports the Commission’s finding of
scienter as to that statement.

letter did not obligate its drafter to do
anything, and the transaction proceeded no
further. By the time Lorenzo sent his emails
on October 14, 2009, W2E had no
outstanding purchase orders. Lorenzo’s
emails nonetheless assured the recipients that
W2E had over $43 million in “purchase
orders and LOI’s.” The Commission thus
was fully justified in finding that statement
false or misleading. See Lorenzo, 2015 WL
1927763, at *6.

C.
The third statement at issue is the
assertion in Lorenzo’s email messages that
“Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional
monies to repay these Debenture holders (if
necessary).” Id. at 794, 796. Lorenzo disputes
the Commission’s conclusion that the
statement was false or misleading. He
contends that Gregg Lorenzo could have
made such an agreement for Charles Vista,
had done so on prior occasions for debenture
holders, and had allegedly met with
additional brokers about raising funds for
W2E. The Commission permissibly regarded
those assertions as “establish[ing] only the
theoretical possibility that Charles Vista
could have raised additional money to repay
investors, not that it had agreed to do so (as
Lorenzo’s emails claimed).” Lorenzo, 2015
WL 1927763, at *7.

Lorenzo
also
disputes
the
Commission’s finding of scienter concerning
the extent of W2E’s anticipated cash flow.
Asked whether he knew at the time that the
$43 million figure was misleading, Lorenzo
testified as follows: “I can’t say that with a
hundred percent because they did have LOI’s
for 43 million.” J.A. 160. As his other
testimony revealed, however, Lorenzo
understood that W2E’s sole letter of intent
was “non-binding,” a mere potentiality that
the company “hoped would materialize.” Id.
at 162. And by September 2009, he “didn’t
think that the 43 million LOI was ever going
to turn into purchases.” Id. at 164. Lorenzo
testified repeatedly to that effect. See id. at
163-64 (“Q. And by September 2009 you
didn’t think it was ever going to come
through, right? A. . . . That is correct.”); id. at
164 (“Q. So sometime in September you lost
confidence that this 43 million was ever
going to happen? A. Yes.”).

With regard to scienter, Lorenzo
observes that the Commission included no
specific citations to the record in support of
its finding. It is true that, although the
Commission quoted the evidentiary record at
length, it did not cite the particular page
numbers on which certain arguments and
quotations appeared. But we “uphold a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-

The clear implication of the statement
in Lorenzo’s email messages was that W2E
anticipated a $43 million influx of capital
from past and future orders. Yet the record
reveals grave doubts on Lorenzo’s part that
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Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
That standard is readily satisfied here.

subsections, Rule 10b-5(b). We agree with
Lorenzo that, under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 131 S.Ct.
2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011), he did not
‘‘make’’ the statements at issue for purposes
of Rule 10b-5(b). Even so, we conclude that
his status as a non-‘‘maker’’ of the statements
under Rule 10b-5(b) does not vitiate the
Commission’s conclusion that his actions
violated the other subsections of Rule 10b-5,
as well as Section 17(a)(1).

Lorenzo allowed, at least in hindsight,
that ‘‘you can interpret this [statement] as
being misleading.’’ J.A. 167. Moreover,
according to his own testimony, at the time
he sent the emails, he did not believe Charles
Vista could raise enough money to repay
debenture holders. For instance, he testified
that, as of October 2009, ‘‘it is accurate to say
that Charles Vista would not have the buying
power or the resources to properly fund
[W2E] in order to repay the debentures.’’ Id.
at 172. Given Lorenzo’s knowledge that
Charles Vista could not have repaid
debenture holders, the Commission could
certainly conclude that Lorenzo believed that
no such agreement existed. As a result,
substantial
evidence
supports
the
Commission’s finding that Lorenzo acted
with scienter with regard to the assurance to
investors that Charles Vista had made such a
promise.

A.
Under Rule 10b-5(b), it is unlawful
to ‘‘make any untrue statement of a material
fact TTT in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.’’ 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5(b). In Janus, the Supreme Court explained
what it means to ‘‘make’’ a statement within
the meaning of that prohibition:
For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a
statement is the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to
communicate it. Without control, a person or
entity can merely suggest what to say, not
‘‘make’’ a statement in its own right. One
who prepares or publishes a statement on
behalf of another is not its maker.

III.
The
Commission
found
that
Lorenzo’s actions in connection with his
email messages violated Section (17)(a)(1) of
the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, as implemented by the
Commission’s Rule 10b-5. The Rule contains
three subsections, and the Commission
concluded that Lorenzo had violated all three.

564 U.S. at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296. ‘‘[I]n the
ordinary case,’’ the Court continued,
‘‘attribution within a statement or implicit
from surrounding circumstances is strong
evidence that a statement was made by—and
only by—the party to whom it is attributed.’’
Id. at 142-43.

We now consider Lorenzo’s
argument that he did not ‘‘make’’ the
relevant statements within the meaning of the
express terms of one of Rule 10b-5’s
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The Janus Court held that an
investment adviser that had assisted in
preparing a mutual fund’s prospectuses did
not ‘‘make’’ the statements contained
therein, because the adviser lacked ‘‘ultimate
control’’ over the statements’ content and
dissemination. Id. at 148, 131 S.Ct. 2296. The
investment
adviser
had
merely
‘‘participate[d] in the drafting of a false
statement’’—‘‘an undisclosed act preceding
the decision of an independent entity to make
a public statement.” Id. at 145. The Court
illustrated the operation of its test through the
following analogy: “Even when a
speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is
entirely within the control of the person who
delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes
credit—or blame—for what is ultimately
said.” Id. at 143.

Commission found otherwise, concluding
that Lorenzo “was ultimately responsible for
the emails’ content and dissemination.”
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *10. We
cannot sustain the Commission’s conclusion
that Lorenzo had “ultimate authority” over
the false statements under Janus. 564 U.S. at
142. Gregg Lorenzo, and not Lorenzo,
retained ultimate authority.

Under the Janus test, a person cannot
have “made” a statement if he lacked ultimate
authority over what it said and whether it was
said, including if he prepared or published it
on behalf of another. In light of that
understanding, we find that Lorenzo was not
the “maker” of the pertinent statements set
out in the email messages he sent to potential
investors, even viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the Commission.

Voluminous testimony established
that Lorenzo transmitted statements devised
by Gregg Lorenzo at Gregg Lorenzo’s
direction. For instance, Lorenzo said: “I cut
and paste[d] an e-mail and sent it to
[investors],” J.A. 153; “I was asked to send
these e-mails out by Gregg Lorenzo,” id. at
156; and “I cut and pasted and sent it,” id. at
157. He also stated: “I remember getting—
getting the e-mail address from [Gregg
Lorenzo] and then cut and past[ed] this—this
thing and sent it,” id. at 199; “[Gregg
Lorenzo] gave me the e-mail address, I typed
it into the ‘to’ column and cut and pasted
this—the content and sent it out,” id.; “My
boss asked me to send these e-mails out and I
sent them out,” id. at 200; “[I] sent these
emails out at the request of my superior,” id.
at 208; and “I simply was asked to send the
e-mail out,” id. at 208-09.

Lorenzo contends that he sent the
email messages at the behest of his boss,
Gregg Lorenzo, and that Gregg Lorenzo
supplied the content of the false statements,
which Lorenzo copied and pasted into the
messages before distributing them. As a
result, Lorenzo contends, Gregg Lorenzo
(and not Lorenzo himself) was the “maker”
of the statements under Janus. The

In the face of that consistent
testimony, the Commission anchored its
conclusion almost entirely in the following
remark from Lorenzo: “If memory serves
me—I think I authored it and then it was
approved by Gregg and Mike [Molinaro,
Charles Vista’s Chief Compliance Officer].”
J.A. 155. That assertion, even apart from its
equivocation, must be read alongside the rest
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of Lorenzo’s testimony. Immediately before
and after uttering that line, Lorenzo explained
that “I cut and paste[d] an e-mail and sent it”
and “I cut and pasted and sent it.” Id. at 153,
157. And he consistently testified to the same
effect throughout. In that light, Lorenzo’s
remark that he “authored” the emails cannot
bear the weight given it by the Commission.
Rather, the statement is fully consistent with
Lorenzo’s repeated account that, while he
produced the email messages for final
distribution from himself to the investors—
and in that sense “authored” the messages—
he populated the messages with content sent
by Gregg Lorenzo.

at the end of the emails, and he sent the
emails from his own account.” Lorenzo, 2015
WL 1927763, at *10. That sort of signature
line, however, can often exist when one
person sends an email that “publishes a
statement on behalf of another,” with the
latter person retaining “ultimate authority
over the statement.” Janus, 564 U.S. at 142.
The Commission also referenced
Lorenzo’s testimony that “he did not recall
ever discussing either of the emails or their
subject matter with Gregg Lorenzo.”
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *10. That
comment, however, is consistent with the
understanding that Lorenzo played a minimal
role in devising the emails’ false statements.
And although the email messages said that
the Investment Banking Division—which
Lorenzo headed—was “summariz[ing]
several key points” about the debenture
offering, J.A. 794, 796, the content of those
points evidently had been supplied by Gregg
Lorenzo. The emails, moreover, began by
stating that they were being sent at Gregg
Lorenzo’s request. Lorenzo testified
elsewhere that Gregg Lorenzo had remarked,
“I want this [to] come from our investment
banking division. Can you send this out for
me?” Id. at 217.

In the line of testimony on which the
Commission relies, moreover, Lorenzo stated
that, before he sent the messages, they were
“approved” by Gregg Lorenzo. That
observation reinforces Gregg Lorenzo’s
ultimate authority over the substance and
distribution of the emails: Gregg Lorenzo
asked Lorenzo to send the emails, supplied
the central content, and approved the
messages for distribution. To be sure,
Lorenzo played an active role in perpetrating
the fraud by producing the emails containing
the false statements and sending them from
his account in his capacity as director of
investment banking (and doing so with
scienter). But under the test set forth in Janus,
Gregg Lorenzo, and not Lorenzo, was “the
maker” of the false statements in the emails.
564 U.S. at 142.

Under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Janus, in short, Lorenzo cannot be
considered to have been “the maker” of the
statements in question for purposes of Rule
10b-5(b)—i.e., “the person . . . with ultimate
authority” over them. 564 U.S. at 142. That
person was Gregg Lorenzo, and not (or not
also) Lorenzo.

The
Commission’s
remaining
observations do not alter our conclusion. For
instance, the Commission noted that Lorenzo
“put his own name and direct phone number
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B.

1. Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), along with
Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1)—all unlike Rule
10b-5(b)—do not speak in terms of an
individual’s “making” a false statement.
Indeed, “[t]o make any . . . statement” was the
critical language construed in Janus: what the
Court described as the “phrase at issue.” 564
U.S. at 142 (alteration in original) (quoting
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). That language
appears in Rule 10b-5(b), but not in the other
provisions Lorenzo was found to have
violated.

Lorenzo next argues that, if he was
not “the maker” of the false statements at
issue within the meaning of Rule 10b5(b), his
conduct necessarily also falls outside the
prohibitions of Exchange Act Section 10(b),
Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), and Securities Act
Section 17(a)(1). The Commission concluded
otherwise, incorporating by reference its
reasoning in John P. Flannery & James D.
Hopkins, SEC Release No. 3981, 110 SEC
Docket 2463, 2014 WL 7145625 (Dec. 15,
2014), vacated, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting the Commission’s
key factual determinations on substantialevidence grounds). The Commission
determined that, “[i]ndependently of whether
Lorenzo’s involvement in the emails
amounted to ‘making’ the misstatements for
purposes of Rule 10b-5(b), he knowingly sent
materially misleading language from his own
email account to prospective investors,”
thereby violating those other provisions.
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *11.

In particular, Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits
“employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b5(a). And Rule 10b-5(c) bars
“engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.” Id. § 240.10b-5(c). Consequently,
Rule 10b-5(b) “specifies the making of an
untrue statement of a material fact and the
omission to state a material fact. The first and
third subparagraphs are not so restricted.”
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).

We sustain the Commission’s
conclusion to that effect. At least in the
circumstances of this case, in which Lorenzo
produced email messages containing false
statements and sent them directly to potential
investors expressly in his capacity as head of
the Investment Banking Division—and did
so with scienter—he can be found to have
infringed Section 10(b), Rules 10b-5(a) and
(c), and Section 17(a)(1), regardless of
whether he was the “maker” of the false
statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b).

Nor are Securities Act Section
17(a)(1) and Exchange Act Section 10(b).
Section 17(a)(1) makes it unlawful “to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud” in offering or selling a security. 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1). And Section 10(b)
forbids “us[ing] or employ[ing] . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance” in contravention of rules
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prescribed by the Commission. 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b).

act, within the meaning of Rules 10b-5(a) and
(c), and of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1). But
while Lorenzo argued before the
Commission that he produced and sent the
emails at Gregg Lorenzo’s request without
giving them thought, the Commission found
“implausible” any suggestion that he merely
passed along the messages in his own name
without thinking about their content.
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *9. Lorenzo
does not challenge that finding here.

Here, Lorenzo, acting with scienter
(i.e., an intent to deceive or defraud, or
extreme recklessness to that effect), produced
email messages containing three false
statements about a pending offering, sent the
messages directly to potential investors, and
encouraged them to contact him personally
with any questions. Although Lorenzo does
not qualify as the “maker” of those
statements under Janus because he lacked
ultimate authority over their content and
dissemination, his own active “role in
producing and sending the emails constituted
employing a deceptive ‘device,’ ‘act,’ or
‘artifice to defraud’ for purposes of liability
under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5(a) and (c),
and Section 17(a)(1).” Lorenzo, 2015 WL
1927763, at *11.

We therefore consider the case on the
understanding that Lorenzo, having taken
stock of the emails’ content and having
formed the requisite intent to deceive,
conveyed materially false information to
prospective investors about a pending
securities offering backed by the weight of
his office as director of investment banking.
On that understanding, the language of
Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1), and of Rules
10b5(a) and (c), readily encompasses
Lorenzo’s actions.

Lorenzo’s conduct fits comfortably
within the ordinary understanding of those
terms. Indeed, he presents no argument that
his actions fail to satisfy the statutory and
regulatory language. He does not examine—
or even reference—the text of those
provisions in arguing that they should be
deemed not to apply to his conduct.

2. Instead of presenting any argument
that his conduct falls outside the language of
those provisions, Lorenzo asserts that, if he
could be found to have violated the
provisions, the decision in Janus would
effectively be rendered meaningless. See
SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). He notes the Janus Court’s
interest in interpreting the term “make” in a
manner that would avoid undermining the
Court’s previous holding that private actions
under Rule 10b5 cannot be premised on
conceptions of secondary (i.e., aiding-andabetting) liability. See Janus, 564 U.S. at 143
(discussing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.

Lorenzo does not contend before us,
for instance, that he simply passed along
information supplied by Gregg Lorenzo
without pausing to think about the truth or
falsity of what he was sending to investors. If
those were the facts, he might attempt to
argue that he cannot be considered to have
“employed” any fraudulent device or artifice,
or “engaged” in any fraudulent or deceitful
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First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994)).

undisclosed act preceding the decision of an
independent entity to make a public
statement.” 564 U.S. at 145.

As the Court explained in Janus,
whereas the Commission can bring actions
under Rule 10b-5 based on an aiding-andabetting theory, private parties—after
Central Bank—cannot. Id. The Janus Court
reasoned that a “broader reading of ‘make,’”
encompassing “persons or entities without
ultimate control over the content of a
statement,” could mean that “aiders and
abettors would be almost nonexistent.” Id.
That result, the Court believed, would have
undercut an implicit understanding from
Central Bank: that “there must be some
distinction between those who are primarily
liable . . . and those who are secondarily
liable.” Id. at 143 n.6. The same
considerations, Lorenzo contends, should
weigh in favor of concluding that his conduct
did not violate Section 10(b), Rules 10b-5(a)
and (c), and Section 17(a)(1). We are
unpersuaded.

In this case, by contrast, Lorenzo’s
role was not “undisclosed” to investors. The
recipients were fully alerted to his
involvement: Lorenzo sent the emails from
his account and under his name, in his
capacity as director of investment banking at
Charles Vista. While Gregg Lorenzo
supplied the content of the false statements
for inclusion in Lorenzo’s email messages,
Lorenzo effectively vouched for the emails’
contents and put his reputation on the line by
listing his personal phone number and
inviting the recipients to “call with any
questions.” J.A. 794, 796. Nor did the
dissemination of the false statements to
investors result only from the separate
“decision of an independent entity.” Janus,
564 U.S. at 145. Lorenzo himself
communicated with investors, directly
emailing them misstatements about the
debenture offering.

To the extent the Janus Court’s
concerns about aiding-and-abetting liability
in private actions under Rule 10b-5(b) should
inform our interpretation of those other four
provisions, the conduct at issue in Janus
materially differs from Lorenzo’s actions in
this case. Janus involved an investment
adviser that initially drafted false statements
which an independent entity subsequently
decided to disseminate to investors in its own
name. The investment adviser’s role in
originally devising the statements was
unknown to the investors who ultimately
received them. The Court thus described the
investment adviser’s conduct as “an

Unlike in Janus, therefore, the
recipients of Lorenzo’s emails were not
exposed to the false information only through
the intervening act of “another person.” Id.
For the same reasons, Lorenzo’s conduct also
differs from the actions considered in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
There, the Supreme Court held that parties
who allegedly played a role in a scheme to
make false statements to investors could not
be held liable in a private action under Rule
10b-5. The Court explained that the parties’
acts “were not disclosed to the investing
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public” and they “had no role” in
“disseminating” the misstatements in
question. Id. at 155, 161. Lorenzo, unlike the
defendants in Janus and Stoneridge,
transmitted misinformation directly to
investors, and his involvement was
transparent to them.

(c) (or Section 17(a)(1)). We know of no
blanket reason, however, to treat the various
provisions as occupying mutually exclusive
territory, such that false-statement cases must
reside exclusively within the province of
Rule 10b-5(b). And any suggestion that the
coverage of Rule 10b-5(b) must be distinct
from that of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c)
presumably would mean that each of the
latter two provisions likewise must occupy
entirely separate ground from one another. In
our view, however, the provisions’ coverage
may overlap in certain respects.

As a result, insofar as the Janus Court
declined to bring the investment adviser’s
actions in that case within the fold of Rule
10b-5 because doing so might reach too many
persons fairly considered to be aiders and
abettors, the same is not true of Lorenzo’s
distinct conduct in this case. The Court’s
concern that “aiders and abettors would be
almost nonexistent” if a private action under
Rule 10b-5 reached “an undisclosed act
preceding the decision of an independent
entity to make a public statement,” Janus,
564 U.S. at 143, 145, need not obtain in the
case of a person’s self-attributed
communications sent directly to investors
(and backed by scienter). Lorenzo’s actions
thus can form the basis of a violation of Rules
10b-5(a) and (c) (as well as Sections 10(b)
and 17(a)(1)) while still leaving ample room
for “distinction between those who are
primarily liable . . . and those who are
secondarily liable.” Id. at 143 n.6; see
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he implied
right of action in § 10(b) continues to cover
secondary actors who commit primary
violations.” (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at
191)).

Significantly, the Supreme Court
recently described Rule 10b-5 in a manner
confirming that conduct potentially subject to
Rule 10b-5(b)’s bar against making false
statements can also fall within Rule 10b5(a)’s more general prohibition against
employing fraudulent devices: the Court
explained that “Rule 10b-5 . . . forbids the use
of any ‘device, scheme, or artifice to defraud’
(including the making of any ‘untrue
statement of material fact’ or any similar
‘omi[ssion]’).” Chadbourne & Parke LLP v.
Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1063 (2014)
(emphasis added).
The Court has also held that, although
Section 14 of the Exchange Act establishes “a
complex regulatory scheme covering proxy
solicitations,” the inapplicability of Section
14 to false statements in proxy materials does
not preclude the application of Rule 10b-5 to
the same statements. SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969). “The fact that there
may well be some overlap is neither unusual
nor unfortunate,” the Court explained. Id.
Here, correspondingly, Rules 10b-5(a) and

3. Lorenzo intimates more broadly
that actions involving false statements must
fit within Rule 10b-5(b) and cannot be
brought separately under Rules 10b-5(a) or
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(c), as well as Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1),
may encompass certain conduct involving the
dissemination of false statements even if the
same conduct lies beyond the reach of Rule
10b-5(b).

the content of the statements he sent even
though: he included the statements in
messages he produced for distribution from
his own email account; he sent the statements
in his name and capacity as investment
banking director; and he encouraged the
recipients to contact him personally with
questions about the content. Under our
colleague’s understanding, that is, Lorenzo
offered to answer any questions about his
emails even though he had supposedly paid
no attention to what they said.

In
accordance
with
that
understanding, a number of decisions have
held that securities-fraud allegations
involving misstatements can give rise to
liability under related provisions even if the
conduct in question does not amount to
“making” a statement under Janus. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783
F.3d 786, 795-96 (11th Cir. 2015); SEC v.
Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir.
2014); SEC v. Benger, 931 F. Supp. 2d 904,
905-06 (N.D. Ill. 2013); SEC v. Familant,
910 F. Supp. 2d 83, 93-95 (D.D.C. 2012);
SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464-65
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). We reach the same
conclusion here with respect to the role
played by Lorenzo in disseminating the false
statements in his email messages to investors.

In adopting that understanding, the
dissent relies on a finding by the ALJ that
Lorenzo sent the emails without thinking
about their contents. But the Commission, as
we have noted, rejected the ALJ’s conclusion
to that effect as “implausible” in the
circumstances. Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763,
at *9. In our colleague’s view, the court
should accept the ALJ’s finding,
notwithstanding the Commission’s rejection
of it, because the ALJ could assess Lorenzo’s
credibility as a witness.

4. Our dissenting colleague would
find that Lorenzo’s actions did not violate
Rules 10b-5(a) or (c), or Sections 10(b) or
17(a)(1). He advances two reasons for
reaching that conclusion, each of which, in
our respectful view, is misconceived.

The dissent’s (and ALJ’s) factual
understanding, however, is contradicted by
Lorenzo’s own account of his mental state to
this court. Lorenzo raises no challenge to the
Commission’s rejection of any notion that he
paid no heed to his messages’ content. What
is more, his argument on the issue of scienter
rests on his affirmative contemplation—
indeed, his ratification—of the content of his
emails.

a. The dissent’s central submission is
that Lorenzo acted without any intent to
deceive or defraud. As our colleague sees
things, Lorenzo simply transmitted false
statements supplied by Gregg Lorenzo
without giving any thought to their content.
See infra at 1, 6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
And Lorenzo ostensibly paid no attention to

Unlike in his arguments before the
ALJ and Commission, Lorenzo, in this court,
does not take the position that he simply
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passed along statements supplied by Gregg
Lorenzo without thinking about them. Such a
suggestion appears nowhere in his briefing.
To the contrary, he argues that, “[a]t the time
the email was sent [he] believed the
statements to be true and he did not act with
scienter.” Pet’r Reply Br. 6 (emphasis
added). He further asserts that he “had a good
faith belief in the veracity of the statements
contained in the email that was drafted by
Gregg Lorenzo.” Pet’r Opening Br. 18
(emphasis added); id. at 22 (“Petitioner had a
good faith belief in the accuracy of the
statements contained in the email.”). He then
attempts to explain why he could have
believed the truth of the materially
misleading statements contained in his email
messages, arguments that we have already
rejected in affirming the Commission’s
findings of scienter. See supra Part II.

without-verifying level of confidence in
Gregg Lorenzo’s veracity. Indeed, he
testified that, at least as of November 2009,
“there is no way on God’s green earth [he]
thought Gregg Lorenzo was an honest guy.”
J.A. 176.)
Perhaps Lorenzo concluded he could
not overcome the Commission’s assessment
that it would be implausible to suppose he
had blinded himself to the statements’
content before sending them to investors and
offering to answer any questions about them.
Or perhaps he determined that, insofar as he
did so, he would have difficulty denying that
he had acted with extreme recklessness—and
therefore with scienter—in any event.
Regardless, Lorenzo now takes the position
that he took stock of the content of the
statements, so much so that he formed a
belief as to their truthfulness. And we are in
no position to embrace an understanding of
Lorenzo’s mental state that is disclaimed by
Lorenzo himself.

For present purposes, what matters is
that a person cannot have “believed
statements to be true” at the time he sent
them, or possessed a “good faith belief in
their veracity,” if he had given no thought to
their content in the first place. In that light,
our dissenting colleague relies on an account
of Lorenzo’s state of mind that stands in
opposition to Lorenzo’s account to us of his
own state of mind. (As for our colleague’s
theory that Lorenzo could have formed a
belief about the statements’ truthfulness
without even reading them, based purely on
his trust of Gregg Lorenzo, see infra at 7 n.1
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), even if we
assume that theory were viable as a
conceptual matter, Lorenzo’s arguments to us
about his belief in the statements’ truth rest
solely on their content, not on any trust-

To be clear, the point here is not that
Lorenzo failed to preserve an argument about
scienter. Lorenzo devoted considerable
attention to the issue of scienter in his
briefing. But Lorenzo’s arguments on the
issue contain no suggestion that he sent his
emails without giving thought to their
contents. He instead contends he did think
about the contents (and reasonably believed
them to be truthful). In those circumstances,
we do not so much defer to the Commission’s
assessment of Lorenzo’s state of mind over
the ALJ’s finding that Lorenzo gave no
thought to his emails’ content. Rather, we
accede to Lorenzo’s account of his own
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mental state, which is incompatible with the
finding of the ALJ.

5(a) and (c), and Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1).
See infra at 9 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Our colleague grounds that conclusion in his
agreement with the proposition put forward
by certain other courts of appeals to the effect
that “scheme liability”—i.e., the conduct
prohibited by Rules 10b-5(a) and (c)—
requires something more than false or
misleading statements. See Pub. Pension
Fund Grp. v. KV Pharma. Co., 679 F.3d 972,
987 (8th Cir. 2012); WPP Luxembourg
Gamma Three Sari v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655
F.3d 1039, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2011); Lentell
v. Merill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d
Cir. 2005).

But what if Lorenzo in fact had
sought to argue to us, in concert with the
ALJ’s finding, that he gave no thought to the
content of his email messages when sending
them? In that event—which, again, is not the
situation we face—the issue for us would
have been whether the Commission’s
contrary conclusion is supported by
substantial evidence, not whether the
Commission or the ALJ has the better of the
dispute between them on the matter. See, e.g.,
Kay v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Swan Creek Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 39 F.3d 1217, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).

Our colleague appears to read those
decisions’ embrace of that proposition to rest
on the need to maintain a distinction between
primary liability and secondary liability
under Rule 10b-5. We have described the
Janus Court’s reliance on that concern and
explained our conclusion that it does not
carry the day in the specific circumstances of
Lorenzo’s conduct. See supra Part III.B.2.

The Commission’s finding meets the
deferential, substantial-evidence standard.
After all, Lorenzo’s emails marked the only
time he communicated directly with
prospective investors, the emails concerned a
securities offering by his sole investment
banking client, the emails said he would
personally answer questions about their
content, and the emails carried his
professional imprimatur as director of
investment banking—all of which support
the Commission’s rejection of the idea that
Lorenzo simply sent his emails without
taking any stock of what they said.

Moreover, we do not read the
referenced courts of appeals’ decisions to rest
on concerns about preserving a distinction
between primary and secondary liability.
None of those decisions discusses (or
mentions) the concepts of primary and
secondary liability or any need to maintain a
separation between them. Indeed, two of the
three decisions postdate Janus, yet neither
cites Janus, much less invokes Janus’s
concerns with construing the scope of Rule
10b-5(b) in a manner that would encompass
too many aiders-and-abettors.

b. Even accepting that Lorenzo
thought about the statements in his emails
and sent them with an intent to deceive, the
dissent would still conclude that Lorenzo’s
conduct falls outside the ambit of Rules 10b-
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In addition, it is far from clear that the
rule articulated by those decisions could
suitably be grounded in concerns with
preserving a distinction between primary and
secondary liability. According to the
decisions, a “defendant may only be liable as
part of a fraudulent scheme based upon
misrepresentations and omissions under
Rules 10b-5(a) or (c) when the scheme also
encompasses
conduct
beyond
those
misrepresentations or omissions.” WPP
Luxembourg, 655 F.3d at 1057; see KV
Pharma., 679 F.3d at 987; Lentell, 396 F.3d
at 177. That understanding would be
overinclusive if the objective in fact were to
assure that aiders-and-abettors are not held
primarily liable under those provisions.

reference to WPP Luxembourg or the other
two decisions in his briefing
For those reasons, we disagree with
our dissenting colleague’s suggestion that our
holding conflicts with those decisions with
regard to the primary-secondary liability
distinction. See infra at 9 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting). We do not understand those
decisions to turn on that distinction.
Those decisions do generally state,
however, that Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) require
something more than misstatements. But they
did not have occasion to elaborate on that
understanding to any significant extent—
including, importantly for purposes of this
case, whether the same interpretation would
extend to Section 17(a)(1). Insofar as those
courts of appeals would find Lorenzo’s
actions to lie beyond the reach of those
provisions, we read the provisions
differently. Lorenzo’s particular conduct, as
we have explained, fits comfortably within
the language of Rules 10b5(a) and (c), along
with that of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1).

Consider, for instance, the facts of
WPP Luxembourg. There, the plaintiffs
alleged sufficient facts to make out a claim of
materially misleading omissions under Rule
10b5(b). 655 F.3d at 1051. There was no
question that the defendants faced primary
(not secondary) liability if the facts as
pleaded were proved. Id. Yet the court held
that the defendants could not be liable under
Rules 10b-5(a) or (c) because there were no
allegations against them apart from
misstatements or omissions. Id. at 1057-58.
The court’s requirement that plaintiffs prove
more than misstatements thus barred liability
under those provisions even though there
could have been no concerns about blurring
the distinction between primary and
secondary liability. Perhaps it is unsurprising,
then, that, while Lorenzo relies on the
importance of maintaining the primarysecondary liability distinction, he makes no

Finally, we briefly respond to our
dissenting colleague’s belief that there is an
incongruity in deciding both that Lorenzo
was not a maker of the false statements under
Rule 10b-5(b) and that he nonetheless
employed a fraudulent device and engaged in
a fraudulent act under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c)
and Section 17(a)(1). See infra at 11
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Those combined
decisions, in our view, follow naturally from
the terms of the provisions. Lorenzo was not
the “maker” of the false statements because
he lacked ultimate authority over them. Still,
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he “engaged” in a fraudulent “act” and
“employed” a fraudulent “device” when,
with knowledge of the statements’ falsity and
an intent to deceive, he sent the statements to
potential investors carrying his stamp of
approval as investment banking director. One
can readily imagine persons whose
ministerial acts in connection with false
statements would fail to qualify either as
“making” the statements or as “employing”
any fraudulent device. Lorenzo, in our view,
is not such a person.

liability under Rule 10b-5(b), we vacate the
sanctions and remand the matter to enable the
Commission to reconsider the appropriate
penalties.
We have no assurance that the
Commission would have imposed the same
level of penalties in the absence of its finding
of liability for making false statements under
Rule 10b-5(b). The Commission expressly
grounded its sanctions on its perceptions
about the “egregiousness of Lorenzo’s
conduct” and the “degree of scienter
involved,” as well as the need to deter others
“from engaging in similar misconduct.” Id. at
*12, *14. But the Commission operated
under the assumption that Lorenzo devised,
and had ultimate authority over, the
substance of the false statements contained in
the email messages he sent to investors. That
assumption, as we have concluded, is
unsupported by the record evidence. The
Commission in fact specifically based its
sanctions in some measure on a belief that
Lorenzo improperly sought to “shift blame”
by asserting “that he sent the emails at Gregg
Lorenzo’s direction.” Id. at *13. But as the
record indicates, that is essentially what
happened.

IV.
Lorenzo’s final challenge concerns
the sanctions imposed against him. The
Commission permanently barred Lorenzo
“from association with any broker, dealer,
investment adviser, municipal securities
dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or
nationally recognized statistical rating
organization and from participating in an
offering of penny stocks.” Lorenzo, 2015 WL
1927763, at *17. The Commission also
ordered him to pay a $15,000 monetary
penalty. Lorenzo argues that those penalties
are arbitrary and capricious for various
reasons,
including
that
they
are
disproportional to the severity of his
misconduct and to the sanctions imposed in
similar cases.

Because we “cannot be certain what
role,
if
any,”
the
Commission’s
misperception that Lorenzo was the “maker”
of the false statements ultimately played in its
choice of sanctions, “we must remand” to
enable it to reassess the appropriate penalties.
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA,
930 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991). When
the Commission does so under a correct
understanding about the nature of Lorenzo’s

We decline to reach the merits of
Lorenzo’s challenges. The Commission
chose the level of sanctions based in part on
a misimpression that Lorenzo was the
“maker” of false statements in violation of
Rule 10b-5(b). Because we have now
overturned the Commission’s finding of
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misconduct, it can assess “whether the
sanction is out of line with the agency’s
decisions in other cases” involving
comparable misconduct—which, as we have
observed, is one consideration informing
review of penalties for arbitrariness and
capriciousness. Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521,
526 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

So ordered.
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Suppose you work for a securities
firm. Your boss drafts an email message and
tells you to send the email on his behalf to
two clients. You promptly send the emails to
the two clients without thinking too much
about the contents of the emails. You note in
the emails that you are sending the message
“at the request” of your boss. It turns out,
however, that the message from your boss to
the clients is false and defrauds the clients out
of a total of $15,000. Your boss is then
sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (as is appropriate) for the
improper conduct.

The Commission, in this regard, notes
our previous observation that the
“Commission is not obligated to make its
sanctions uniform, so we will not compare
this sanction to those imposed in previous
cases.” Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 488
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Butz v. Glover
Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186-87
(1973)). In that vein, we have explained that
a mere absence of uniformity will not
necessarily render a particular action
“unwarranted in law,” id. at 488, or
“unwarranted as a matter of policy,”
Kornman, 592 F.3d at 188. But we have
never declined to compare past-and-present
Commission sanctions in the context of an
arbitrary-and-capricious challenge. In fact,
our decision in Collins clarified that such a
challenge may be brought to review the
propriety of the Commission’s choice of
sanction in a given case as compared with
sanctions in comparable situations. See 736
F.3d at 526.
*

*

*

*

What about you? For sending along
those emails at the direct behest of your boss,
are you too on the hook for the securities law
violation of willfully making a false statement
or willfully engaging in a scheme to defraud?
According to the SEC, the answer is
yes. And the SEC concludes that your
behavior – in essence forwarding emails after
being told to do so by your boss – warrants a
lifetime suspension from the securities
profession, on top of a monetary fine.
That is what happened to Frank
Lorenzo in this case. The good news is that
the majority opinion vacates the lifetime
suspension. The bad news is that the majority
opinion – invoking a standard of deference
that, as applied here, seems akin to a standard
of “hold your nose to avoid the stink” –
upholds much of the SEC’s decision on

*

For the foregoing reasons, we grant
the petition for review in part, vacate the
sanctions imposed by the Commission, and
remand the matter for further consideration.
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liability. I would vacate the SEC’s
conclusions as to both sanctions and liability.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
*

*

Lorenzo did not read the text of the emails
and that Lorenzo “sent the emails without
even thinking about the contents.” Id. at 7,
J.A. 908; see id. at 9, J.A. 910 (“Had he taken
a minute to read the text . . .”). Furthermore,
the judge noted that the emails themselves
expressly stated that they were being sent at
“the request” of Lorenzo’s boss. Id. at 5, J.A.
906.

*

The SEC initiated an enforcement
action against Frank Lorenzo and his boss.
The boss eventually reached a settlement
agreement with the SEC. Apparently
thinking he had done little wrong by merely
sending emails to two clients at the request of
his boss, Lorenzo did not settle.

Those factual findings were very
favorable to Lorenzo and should have cleared
Lorenzo of any serious wrongdoing under the
securities laws. At most, the judge’s factual
findings may have shown some mild
negligence on Lorenzo’s part. The judge,
however, went much further than that. The
judge somehow concluded that those findings
of fact demonstrated that Lorenzo willfully
violated the securities laws – meaning that
Lorenzo acted with an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. (A finding of
willfulness, as opposed to a finding of
negligence, matters because it subjects a
defendant to much higher penalties.) As a
sanction, the judge not only fined Lorenzo,
but also imposed a lifetime suspension that
prevents Lorenzo from ever again working in
the securities industry.

The case then proceeded through
three stages: a trial before an SEC
administrative law judge, review by the
Commission itself, and then review by this
Court. To understand my disagreement with
the majority opinion, it is necessary to
describe all three acts in this drama.
Act One: The Administrative Law Judge
The case proceeded to trial before an
administrative law judge. This was not your
usual trial. Surprisingly, the SEC did not
present testimony from Lorenzo’s boss or
from anyone else at the securities firm where
Lorenzo worked. Instead, only Lorenzo
testified about the extent of his involvement
in drafting and sending the emails.

The administrative law judge’s
factual findings and legal conclusions do not
square up. If Lorenzo did not draft the emails,
did not think about the contents of the emails,
and sent the emails only at the behest of his
boss, it is impossible to find that Lorenzo
acted “willfully.” That is Mens Rea 101.
Establishing that a defendant acted willfully
in this context requires proof at least of the
defendant’s “intent to deceive, manipulate, or

After hearing Lorenzo’s testimony
and weighing his credibility, the judge
concluded that Lorenzo’s boss had “drafted”
the emails in question and that Lorenzo’s
boss had “asked” Lorenzo to send the emails
to two clients. ALJ Op. at 5 (Dec. 31, 2013),
J.A. 906. The judge also concluded that
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defraud.” Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC,
512 F.3d 634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). How could
Lorenzo have intentionally deceived the
clients when he did not draft the emails, did
not think about the contents of the emails, and
sent the emails only at his boss’s direction?

the securities laws makes a hash of the term
“willfully,” and of the deeply rooted principle
that punishment must correspond to
blameworthiness based on the defendant’s
mens rea.
Act Two: The Securities and Exchange
Commission

The administrative law judge’s
decision in this case contravenes basic due
process. A finding that a defendant possessed
the requisite mens rea is essential to
preserving individual liberty. See, e.g.,
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
250-51, 263 (1952); see also United States v.
Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); United
States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Bluman
v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C.
2011) (three-judge panel). As Justice Jackson
explained: “The contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion.
It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty
of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil. A relation between some
mental element and punishment for a harmful
act is almost as instinctive as the child’s
familiar exculpatory ‘But I didn’t mean to.’”
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-51 (footnote
omitted).

Fast forward to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which heard the
appeal of the administrative law judge’s
decision. Surely the Commission would
realize that the administrative law judge’s
factual findings did not support the judge’s
legal conclusions and sanctions?
And indeed, the Commission did
come to that realization. But instead of
vacating the order against Lorenzo, the
Commission did something quite different
and quite remarkable. In a Houdini-like
move, the Commission rewrote the
administrative law judge’s factual findings to
make those factual findings correspond to the
legal conclusion that Lorenzo was guilty and
deserving of a lifetime suspension.
Recall what the administrative law
judge found: that Lorenzo’s boss “drafted”
the emails, that Lorenzo did not think about
the contents of the emails, and that Lorenzo
sent the emails only after being asked to do
so by his boss. ALJ Op. at 5, J.A. 906. The
judge reached those conclusions only after
hearing Lorenzo testify and assessing his
credibility in person.

The administrative law judge’s
opinion in this case did not heed those
bedrock mens rea principles. Given the
judge’s proLorenzo findings of fact, a legal
conclusion that Lorenzo “willfully” violated

Without hearing from Lorenzo or any
other witnesses, the Commission simply
swept the judge’s factual and credibility
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findings under the rug. The Commission
concluded that Lorenzo himself was
“responsible” for the emails’ contents. In the
Matter of Francis V. Lorenzo, Securities Act
Release No. 9762, Exchange Act Release No.
74836 at 16 (Apr. 29, 2015), J.A. 930. How
did the Commission magically explain its
decision to discard the administrative law
judge’s findings of fact? Easy. In a footnote,
the Commission said that it did not need to
“blindly” accept the administrative law
judge’s factual findings and credibility
judgments. Id. at 16 n.32, J.A. 930 n.32.
Voila.

So far, so good. But applying what it
calls “very deferential” review, the majority
opinion upholds the finding of liability
against Lorenzo under Section 10(b), Rule
10b-5(a) and (c), and Section 17(a). Maj. Op.
7, 18-25. The majority opinion does so on the
ground that Lorenzo willfully engaged in a
scheme to defraud even though he did not
“make” the statements in the emails.
I disagree on two alternative and
independent grounds with the majority
opinion’s merits analysis.
First, the majority opinion does not
heed the administrative law judge’s factual
conclusions, which were based on the judge’s
in-person assessment of Lorenzo’s testimony
at trial. Those factual conclusions
demonstrate that Lorenzo lacked the
necessary mens rea of willfulness.

The Commission’s handiwork in this
case is its own debacle. Faced with
inconvenient factual findings that would
make it hard to uphold the sanctions against
Lorenzo, the Commission – without hearing
any testimony – simply manufactured a new
assessment of Lorenzo’s credibility and
rewrote the judge’s factual findings. So much
for a fair trial.

To show that Lorenzo willfully
engaged in a scheme to defraud, the SEC had
to prove that Lorenzo acted with an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. But recall
that, as findings of fact, the administrative
law judge concluded (after hearing Lorenzo
testify) that Lorenzo did not draft the emails,
did not think about the contents of the emails,
and sent the emails only at the behest of his
boss.

Act Three: This Court
Fast forward to this Court. To its
credit, the majority opinion rightly concludes
that Lorenzo did not “make” the statements
in the emails for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b)
liability. See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v.
First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135
(2011). And the majority opinion, also to its
credit, vacates the grossly excessive lifetime
suspension of Lorenzo and sends the case
back to the SEC for reconsideration of the
appropriate penalties.

In light of the administrative law
judge’s factual findings, how can Lorenzo be
deemed to have willfully engaged in a
scheme to defraud? The majority opinion
says that the facts found by the administrative
law judge are not the right facts. Instead, in
reaching its conclusion, the majority opinion
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relies on the SEC’s alternative facts, which
the SEC devised on its own without hearing
from any witnesses. See Maj. Op. 20-21, 2629 (adopting the SEC’s view of the facts over
the administrative law judge’s view).

judge’s findings of fact was utterly
unreasonable and should not be sustained or
countenanced by this Court. Given that
Lorenzo was the only relevant witness at trial
(dwell again on that point for a few moments)
and given that his credibility was central to
the case, the SEC had no reasonable basis to
run roughshod over the administrative law
judge’s findings of fact and credibility
assessments. In short, the SEC’s rewriting of
the findings of fact deserves judicial
repudiation, not judicial deference or respect.

It is true that, under certain
circumstances, an agency such as the SEC
may re-examine and overturn
an
administrative law judge’s factual findings.
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 492 (1951). But an agency does not
have carte blanche to rewrite an
administrative
law
judge’s
factual
determinations. Rather, an agency must act
reasonably when it disregards an
administrative law judge’s factual findings, a
point the SEC’s attorney expressly
acknowledged at oral argument. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. at 28. It is black-letter law,
therefore, that “a contrary initial decision” by
an administrative law judge “may undermine
the support for the agency’s ultimate
determination.” Ronald M. Levin & Jeffrey
S. Lubbers, Administrative Law and Process
101 (6th ed. 2017). And here is the key
principle that speaks directly to this case:
“When the case turns on eyewitness
testimony . . . the initial decision should be
given considerable weight: the ALJ was able
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
assess their credibility and veracity first
hand.” Id.

Instead of deferring to the SEC’s
creation of an alternative factual record, as
the majority opinion does, we should
examine the administrative law judge’s
underlying findings of fact and ask whether
those findings suffice to support the
conclusion that Lorenzo willfully engaged in
a scheme to defraud. The answer to that
question, as explained above, is a clear no.
Second, put that aside. Even if I am
wrong about the first point, the majority
opinion still suffers from a separate flaw, in
my view.
The majority opinion creates a circuit
split by holding that mere misstatements,
standing alone, may constitute the basis for
so-called scheme liability under the securities
laws – that is, willful participation in a
scheme to defraud – even if the defendant did
not make the misstatements. No other court
of appeals has adopted the approach that the
majority opinion adopts here. Other courts
have instead concluded that scheme liability
must be based on conduct that goes beyond a
defendant’s role in preparing mere

In my view, the majority opinion
misapplies those blackletter principles.
Contrary to the majority opinion’s
acceptance of the SEC’s reconstruction of the
facts in this case, I would conclude that the
SEC’s rewriting of the administrative law
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misstatements or omissions made by others.
See, e.g., Public Pension Fund Group v. KV
Pharmaceutical Co., 679 F.3d 972, 987 (8th
Cir. 2012); WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three
Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039,
1057 (9th Cir. 2011); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2005); see
also SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 34344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Otherwise, the SEC
would be able to evade the important
statutory distinction between primary
liability and secondary (aiding and abetting)
liability. After all, if those who aid and abet a
misstatement are themselves primary
violators for engaging in a scheme to defraud,
what would be the point of the distinction
between primary and secondary liability?

I agree with the other courts that have
rejected the SEC’s persistent efforts to endrun the Supreme Court. I therefore
respectfully disagree with the majority
opinion that Lorenzo’s role in forwarding the
alleged misstatements made by Lorenzo’s
boss can be the basis for scheme liability
against Lorenzo.
Taking a step back on the scheme
liability point, moreover, think about the
oddity of the majority opinion’s combined
legal rulings today. The majority opinion
emphatically holds that Lorenzo did not
“make” the statements in the emails. In
reaching that conclusion, the majority
opinion accurately says that “Lorenzo
transmitted
statements
devised
by”
Lorenzo’s boss at his boss’s “direction.” Maj.
Op. 16. The majority opinion also correctly
notes that Lorenzo’s boss “asked Lorenzo to
send the emails, supplied the central content,
and approved the messages for distribution.”
Maj. Op. 17. At the same time, however, the
majority opinion emphatically holds that
Lorenzo nonetheless willfully engaged in a
scheme to defraud solely because of the
statements made by his boss. That combined
holding makes little sense (at least to me)
under the facts of this particular case. Nor
does it make much sense under the law,
which is presumably why the other courts of
appeals have rejected that kind of legal
jujitsu. In these circumstances, perhaps the
alleged offender (here, Lorenzo) could have
been charged with aiding and abetting, if the
relevant mens rea requirements for aiding
and abetting liability were met. But Lorenzo
may not be held liable as a primary violator,
in my view.

The distinction between primary and
secondary liability matters, particularly for
private securities lawsuits. For decades,
however, the SEC has tried to erase that
distinction so as to expand the scope of
primary liability under the securities laws.
For decades, the Supreme Court has pushed
back hard against the SEC’s attempts to
unilaterally rewrite the law. See Janus, 564
U.S. 135; Stoneridge Investment Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148
(2008); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994). Still undeterred in the wake of that
body of Supreme Court precedent, the SEC
has continued to push the envelope and has
tried to circumvent those Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., In the Matter of John P.
Flannery & James D. Hopkins, Release No.
3981 (Dec. 15, 2014). This case is merely the
latest example.
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*

*

*

I hope that the SEC on remand pays
attention, comes to its senses, and (at a
minimum) dramatically scales back the
sanctions
in
this
case.
Indeed,
notwithstanding the majority opinion, I hope
that the SEC, on its own motion, goes further
than that: The SEC should vacate the order
against Lorenzo in its entirety and either end
this case altogether or (if appropriate and
permissible) fairly start the process anew
before the administrative law judge.

Administrative
adjudication
of
individual disputes is usually accompanied
by deferential review from the Article III
Judiciary. That agency-centric process is in
some tension with Article III of the
Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.
See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 227-57
(2014). That tension is exacerbated when, as
here, the agency’s political appointees –
without hearing from any witnesses –
disregard an administrative law judge’s
factual findings. That said, the Supreme
Court
has
allowed
administrative
adjudication ever since Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932). But the premise of
Crowell v. Benson is that, putting aside any
formal constitutional problems with the
notion of administrative adjudication, the
administrative adjudication process will at
least operate with efficiency and with
fairness to the parties involved. This case,
among others, casts substantial doubt on that
premise.

I firmly disagree with the majority
opinion’s decision to sustain the SEC’s
findings of liability under Section 10(b), Rule
10b-5(a) and (c), and Section 17(a). I
respectfully dissent.

Securities brokers such as Frank
Lorenzo obviously do not tug at the judicial
heartstrings. And maybe Lorenzo really is
guilty of negligence (or worse). But before
the SEC reaches such a conclusion, Lorenzo
is entitled to a fair process just like everyone
else. Cf. United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d
500, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). He has not
received a fair process in this case.
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“Are False Statements Enough to Prove Fraud”
The New York Times
Peter J. Henning
July 3, 2018
Frauds usually start with some type of
deception that leads victims to hand over
their money. But what if false statements are
not enough to prove a person engaged in a
scheme to defraud?

at the brokerage firm, and Mr. Lorenzo
claimed that he had merely copied and pasted
it into the emails he sent the investors. The
S.E.C. accused him of committing a primary
violation of Rule 10b-5, not just being an
accomplice to a fraud. The administrative law
judge assigned to hear the evidence wrote
that the falsity in the emails was
“staggering.”

The Supreme Court will take up that issue
this year when it hears an appeal in Lorenzo
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the justices’ decision could result in cutting
back on the scope of Rule 10b-5, the primary
federal securities fraud prohibition. The
decision could affect how the S.E.C. pursues
fraud cases when defendants are accused of
making false statements to investors.

Rule 10b-5 prohibits three types of
violations: employing any “device, scheme
or artifice to defraud”; making a false
statement or omitting information that
misleads investors; or engaging in conduct
that “would operate as a fraud or deceit.” The
S.E.C. found that Mr. Lorenzo had violated
all three provisions. It barred him from the
securities industry and imposed a $15,000
penalty.

Francis V. Lorenzo was the director of
investment banking at a brokerage firm when
he sent emails to two potential investors in a
$15 million convertible debenture offering.
The company issuing the debt was working
to generate electricity by converting solid
waste into gas. A few days before sending the
emails, Mr. Lorenzo learned that the
“gasification” technology was not working
and that the company had written off $11
million worth of intangible assets related to
that.

Mr. Lorenzo took his case to the federal
appeals court in Washington. The issue was
whether an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Janus Capital Group v. First
Derivative Traders, prevented finding him to
be a primary violator of Rule 10b-5. In that
case, the justices held that liability for false
statements was limited to “the person or
entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and whether
and how to communicate it.” Mr. Lorenzo
argued that he could not be held directly

Mr. Lorenzo’s emails failed to mention the
accounting change and stated that the
company had purchase orders for $43
million. That information came from his boss
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responsible because he had just copied and
pasted the false statements, and that only his
boss had acted willfully.

the agency to take a broader approach to the
law than private litigants can.
But the Supreme Court has rejected the
regulator’s broader readings of the securities
laws over the past two years, at least outside
the context of insider trading. In Kokesh v.
Securities and Exchange Commission,
decided in June last year, the justices limited
the period in which the S.E.C. can seek to
compel a defendant to disgorge ill-gotten
gains to five years and even questioned
whether federal District Courts can order that
remedy.

The appeals court agreed that he did not make
the statement. But it upheld the S.E.C.’s
sanctions, finding that he had engaged in a
scheme to defraud. That meant he had
violated the other two parts of Rule 10b-5.
Because Mr. Lorenzo “conveyed materially
false information to prospective investors
about a pending securities offering backed by
the weight of his office as director of
investment banking,” the court said, he
joined in an effort to defraud investors and
was liable.

On June 21, the Supreme Court found
in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange
Commission that the S.E.C.’s method for
appointing administrative law judges was
flawed. The ruling threw into doubt a number
of recent cases decided by its in-house court
and caused the agency to stop pending
administrative proceedings until it can figure
out how to proceed.

The problem was that the decision opened a
back door around the Janus Capital ruling.
That approach usually does not play well
with the Supreme Court justices, who have
not been receptive to efforts to avoid its more
restrictive readings of Rule 10b-5. In the
2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, the justices
rejected “scheme liability,” which could
make third parties responsible for helping a
company file misleading financial statements
by engaging in sham transactions. The court
viewed “scheme liability” as an effort to
avoid its earlier rejection of aiding and
abetting liability for securities fraud in
private cases.

These decisions are part of a trend in which
the justices have shown greater skepticism to
government’s arguments that statutes need to
be read expansively. In Marinello v. United
States, decided in March, the court rejected
the Justice Department’s reading of what
constitutes obstructing the Internal Revenue
Service. The department’s view would have
made a felony out of almost any conduct that
made the process of collecting taxes more
difficult.

Unlike Janus Capital and Stoneridge, which
were private cases, the Lorenzo case involves
the S.E.C.’s trying to protect investors
through an enforcement action. It is possible
the court might be more forgiving and allow

Although the S.E.C. can bring cases against
those who aid another in committing a fraud,
it prefers to pursue defendants as primary
violators so it can impose harsher penalties
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that require proof of a willful violation. It
would not be a surprise to see the Supreme
Court read Rule 10b-5 more restrictively in
Mr. Lorenzo’s case.

would be liable as the primary person
engaging in fraudulent conduct. That could
make the agency’s job of policing the
markets more difficult and could require it to
pursue future targets as accomplices to
wrongdoing rather than as the principal bad
guy.

That would mean only those who were
directly responsible for a misstatement or
who failed to disclose important information
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“U.S. Supreme Court Will Consider Narrowing Securities-Fraud Laws”

Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 18, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider
narrowing the nation’s securities-fraud laws,
accepting an appeal from an investment
banker found by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to have duped
investors about a startup company’s
financial condition.

In his appeal, Lorenzo says allegations of
false statements, without more, aren’t
enough to hold someone liable for a
fraudulent scheme.
Lorenzo was also accused of violating
securities-fraud provisions that specifically
concern false statements, but the appeals
court threw those claims out. The panel said
Lorenzo wasn’t the one who actually made
false statements, because the emails were
drafted by Lorenzo’s boss and sent at his
direction.
The SEC judge fined Lorenzo $15,000 and
barred him from the securities industry for
life. As part of its ruling, the appeals court
told the SEC to reconsider those penalties.

The banker, Francisco V. Lorenzo, said the
SEC didn’t have enough proof to hold him
liable for taking part in a scheme to defraud
investors.
A divided federal appeals court said it was
enough that Lorenzo, who worked at
Charles Vista LLC, sent two emails
misrepresenting the financial condition of a
client, Waste2Energy Holdings Inc. The
company was seeking to develop a way to
generate electricity from solid waste, but the
technology never materialized.

The case, which the court will hear in the
nine-month term that starts in October, is
Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17-1077.

An in-house judge at the SEC concluded the
emails were “staggering” in their falsity.
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“Lorenzo v. SEC: Will High Court Further Curtail Rule 10b-5?”
Law360
Roger Cooper, Matthew Solomon and Leslie Silverman
July 18, 2018

In particular, the court’s decision may well
bring more clarity to the case law that has
developed after the Supreme Court held in
Central Bank of Denver NA v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver NA that private plaintiffs
may not maintain aiding-and-abetting suits
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.[4] Since that decision, a number of courts
have taken the position that each clause of
Rule 10b-5 is meant to capture different types
of conduct, and therefore cases based
primarily on misstatements or omissions that
give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5(b)
cannot also be charged under the scheme
liability provisions of (a) and (c) of that same
rule. Because Lorenzo allegedly involved the
use of a misleading statement by a nonmaker
under Janus that nevertheless, according to
the D.C. Circuit majority, amounted to a
scheme, it provides the court a vehicle,
should it wish, to impose restrictions on
scheme liability cases and thus limit claims
available to private plaintiffs where the fact
pattern involves the use of a material
misrepresentation by a nonmaker, but no
additional
deceptive
conduct.

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari in Lorenzo v. U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission,[1] a
case where Francis Lorenzo, a registered
representative of a broker-dealer, allegedly
emailed false and misleading statements to
investors that were originally drafted by his
boss. After administrative and commission
findings of liability, a divided panel of the
D.C. Circuit determined that, while Lorenzo
was not the “maker” of the statements, he did
use them to deceive investors, and thereby
violated the so-called scheme liability
provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. As
described in the petitioner’s motion seeking
certiorari, the case presents the question
whether, under the court’s 2011 Janus
Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
decision,[2] the scheme liability provisions
of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find
liability in connection with false or
misleading statements by persons who are
not themselves the maker of those statements
and, thus, not liable under the false-andmisleading statements provision of Rule 10b5(b).[3] The answer to this question could
have implications for the SEC's Enforcement
Division, as well as potentially significant
implications for private securities litigants
who principally rely on Section 10(b) to bring
private causes of action sounding in fraud.

The court’s ultimate approach on this appeal
may turn on whether President Donald
Trump’s nominee to fill the Kennedy
vacancy on the court, Judge Brett
Kavanaugh, is confirmed and, if so, whether
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determination. First, who is the “maker” of
the statement and thus potentially liable
under Section 10b-5(b)? And, second, is the
mere use of a false or misleading statement
by someone who is not himself the “maker”
sufficiently deceptive on its own to constitute
scheme liability under Rules 10b-5(a) and
(c), or is such an attempt to turn mere use into
a scheme an end-run around 10b-5(b)’s
primary
liability
requirements?

he participates in the appeal. Judge
Kavanaugh penned a strong dissent from
portions of the underlying D.C. Circuit
decision. If he is confirmed and recuses
himself on the basis of having heard the case
below, any attempt to limit the ability of the
SEC or private plaintiffs to bring scheme
liability claims could meet resistance from
the court’s four more liberal justices, each of
whom dissented from Janus, potentially
resulting in a 4-4 split that would in effect
affirm the D.C. Circuit’s decision below. In
any event, it is worth pausing to consider the
issues this appeal presents because the grant
of certiorari itself suggests that the court may
be looking for a vehicle to more clearly
demarcate the line between misstatements
and scheme liability cases, and possibly even
to rein in the scope of Rule 10b-5(b) cases
more broadly, either here or in a future
appeal.

Addressing the first question — who
“makes” a statement under 10b-5(b) — the
Supreme Court held in Janus that “the maker
of a statement is the person or entity with
ultimate authority over the statement,
including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”[5] On that question, the
court held that, “in the ordinary case,
attribution within a statement or implicit
from surrounding circumstances is strong
evidence that a statement was made by — and
only by — the party to whom it is
attributed.”[6] The second question — what
conduct is deceptive under 10b-5(a) and (c)
— has elicited somewhat mixed approaches
from the federal bench. A number of courts
have taken the position that each clause of
Rule 10b-5 is intended to capture different
types of conduct. Cases primarily based on
misstatements or omissions that would give
rise to liability under Rule 10b-5(b) therefore
cannot also be charged as scheme liability
under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) absent additional
deceptive conduct separate and apart from
the use of the misstatement itself.[7] The
commission has (unsurprisingly) taken the
more expansive view that Rules 10b-5(a) and
(c) can be used in appropriate circumstances

Primary vs. Secondary Liability
The significance of this case rests on the
difference between primary (misstatements
and/or scheme) liability and secondary
(aiding-and-abetting) liability for securities
law violations under Rule 10b-5 and its three
clauses.
Following
Central
Bank’s
foreclosure of aiding-and-abetting liability,
private litigation has focused on determining
what constitutes either a false or misleading
statement, actionable under Rule 10b-5(b), or
otherwise deceptive conduct, which may or
may not include a material misrepresentation,
actionable under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c),
which broadly prohibit deceptive devices,
schemes or other similar acts. This case
highlights two questions relevant to that
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to reach persons who disseminate a false or
misleading statement made by another.[8]

misleading statements because he sent the
email “at the behest of his boss” who
“supplied the content” and “approved” the
email.[17] As a result, the court held that
Lorenzo did not violate Rule 10b-5(b).[18]
Interestingly, the court did not address the
issue of attribution, instead focusing on the
notion that Lorenzo’s boss was the one with
ultimate authority over when and how to
communicate
the
email.

Lorenzo
The D.C. Circuit took a somewhat surprising
route in deciding a case implicating both of
these questions. Lorenzo was the director of
investment banking at a registered brokerdealer, Charles Vista LLC.[9] At the
direction of his boss, Lorenzo sent an email
to prospective investors lauding a number of
purported “layers of protection” against
default — including $10 million in assets —
of a startup company looking to issue
debentures.[10] Lorenzo sent the email from
his account and above his signature block, the
email identified him as Charles Vista’s head
of investment banking, and the email finished
with an invitation to call him if investors had
questions.[11] The email also included a note
that it was sent at the request of his boss,[12]
and Lorenzo later testified that he copied and
pasted the content from his boss.[13] After a
hearing, an SEC administrative law judge
found that Lorenzo understood when he sent
the email that none of these protections
existed, that the company had virtually no
assets to its name, and, as a result, that
Lorenzo violated all three clauses of Rule
10b-5.[14] The commission upheld the ALJ’s
decision.[15]

The court further held, however, that Lorenzo
violated 10b-5(a) and (c) by sending the
email.[19] In other words, Lorenzo’s use of
the statement to deceive was sufficient to
invoke the scheme liability provisions of
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), even though Lorenzo
was not himself the “maker” of the statement
under Janus and even though the court
identified no additional deceptive conduct
apart from the use of the misstatement itself.
In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected
Lorenzo’s argument that, at most, his conduct
amounted to aiding-and-abetting and not
primary liability.[20] Instead, the court found
that because Lorenzo interacted directly with
investors in supplying the false emails, he
was primarily liable. The court also found
that claims involving false statements did not
need to sit exclusively within 10b-5(b):
“Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), as well as Sections
10(b) and 17(a)(1) [of the Securities Act],
may encompass certain conduct involving the
dissemination of false statements even if the
same conduct lies beyond the reach of Rule
10b-5(b).”[21]

On appeal from the commission decision, a
2-1 panel majority of the D.C. Circuit agreed
that the statements in the email were false or
misleading and that Lorenzo acted with the
requisite scienter in sending it.[16] However,
the court also found that, under Janus,
Lorenzo was not the maker of the false or

In dissent, Judge Kavanaugh characterized
the commission’s tactics as decades of trying
to “circumvent” Supreme Court decisions
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— with clearly demarcating the line between
primary and secondary liability. While such
an approach would work to cabin private
actions, it would have less of an impact on
SEC enforcement actions in this area given
the commission’s ability to bring aiding-andabetting charges against nonmakers who use
misstatements to deceive, as well as the
commission’s ability to use Section 17 of the
Securities Act — to which most courts have
said Janus does not apply[27] — to capture
fraud in the offer or sale of securities “by
means of any untrue statement of a material
fact.”[28]

designed to distinguish primary and
secondary liability.[22] He criticized the
shifting interpretations of the record at each
level of the proceeding, and believed the
administrative law judge’s factual findings
did not support the required scienter.[23] He
also indicated that he would have ruled, in
accordance with the Second, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits, that “scheme liability must be
based on conduct that goes beyond a
defendant’s role in preparing mere
misstatements or omissions made by
others.”[24]
What’s Next?

Should Judge Kavanaugh be confirmed and
recuse himself, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court may well reach a 4-4
stalemate on the scope of scheme liability,
which would result in an affirmance of the
D.C. Circuit’s majority decision. This result
would leave in place — at least for the
moment — circuit court precedent that takes
an expansive view of the scope of 10b-5
liability, allowing the SEC and private
plaintiffs to bring primary liability claims
involving misrepresentations as scheme
liability claims, even without additional
deceptive conduct, against someone who is
not
the
statement’s
“maker.”

Lorenzo has asked the Supreme Court to
answer the question whether a misstatement
claim “that does not meet the elements set
forth in Janus can be repackaged and pursued
as a fraudulent scheme claim.”[25] A number
of possible outcomes present themselves.
Prior to Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination to
the court, the most likely outcome in view of
the court’s recent securities law decisions is
that a majority would subscribe to his dissent
and use Lorenzo to clarify what type of
conduct constitutes deception under scheme
liability by finding that allegations of conduct
involving use of a misleading statement alone
can only give rise potentially to primary
liability under Rule 10b-5(b) and not the
scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a)
and (c). This approach, which would accord
with the majority of federal courts to have
considered the issue, seems the most likely
given the court’s past concerns — reflected
in Central Bank, Janus and Stoneridge
Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta[26]

One thing to keep an eye out for is whether
the Supreme Court, either in this appeal or
perhaps a future appeal, further restricts
primary liability claims under Rule 10b-5(b)
by endorsing the D.C. Circuit’s holding that
only the person or entity with ultimate
authority over a statement can be a “maker”
for Janus purposes, without regard to explicit
attribution within a statement. This reading,
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while not necessary to answer the question
presented in Lorenzo, could, if followed by
the lower courts, dramatically curtail the
reach of Rule 10b-5 in both private and SEC
actions, particularly when combined with a
reversal of the D.C. Circuit on the scope of
scheme liability. For example, this
interpretation
could
affect
whether
investment banks can be held liable for
statements in issuers’ offering documents.
While such documents state that they are the
words of, and only of, the issuer,
underwriters are often credited on the cover
of such documents, which some courts have
held can furnish the necessary attribution
under Janus.[29] However, under the D.C.
Circuit’s reading, such attribution is likely
insufficient to reflect the necessary ultimate
authority
required
by
Janus.[30]

endorse the more restrictive view of Rule
10b-5’s scheme liability provisions either in
this case or, were a recusal to result in a 4-4
split, a future case on similar facts, to the
detriment of private plaintiffs. A majority
conservative court seems unlikely to endorse
the commission’s and the minority of courts’
views that a misstatement alone can be the
basis for a scheme liability primary violation.
And, in the likely worst outcome for the SEC
and private litigants, the court ultimately
could not only hem in scheme liability claims
but also take the additional step of expressly
endorsing the D.C. Circuit’s seeming
cabining of Janus’ holding on maker liability.
This latter outcome could significantly
complicate both SEC enforcement actions
and private lawsuits against underwriters and
others similarly situated. Additional clues to
the court’s leanings should present
themselves at oral argument in the fall.

In sum, the Supreme Court appears likely to
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“Broker Didn’t ‘Make’ False Statements, Appeals Court Says”
Bloomberg
Phyllis Diamond
September 29, 2017
“The bad news,” he said, is that the opinion
“upholds much of the SEC’s decision on
liability. I would vacate the SEC’s
conclusions as to both sanctions and
liability,” Kavanaugh said.

A divided D.C. Circuit set aside SEC
sanctions against Charles Vista LLC broker
Francis Lorenzo for sending out emails that
misrepresented the key features of a
securities offering in a start-up alternative
energy company.

The decision sheds light on a six-year old
U.S. Supreme Court decision on what it
means to “make” a material misstatement for
securities fraud purposes. The case “is a
useful reminder that the `making’ test can
serve as an important limitation on claims
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5,” Denver lawyer Michael MacPhail, Faegre
Baker Daniels LLP, told Bloomberg BNA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed Sept. 29 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission that
the statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false
or misleading and that he acted with culpable
intent (Lorenzo v. SEC , 2017 BL 345755,
D.C. Cir., No. 15-1202, 9/29/17).
However, Judge Sri Srinivasan said, Lorenzo
didn’t “make” the misstatements for purposes
of a 1934 Securities Exchange Act rule that
bars the making of materially false
statements in connection with a securities
transaction. Rather, Lorenzo’s boss, who
supplied the content of the false statements
and had “ultimate authority” over them, did.

Through a spokeswoman, the SEC declined
to comment.

Janus Test
In 2013, the SEC sued Charles Vista, a New
York-based brokerage firm, and two
unrelated brokers—Lorenzo and his boss
Gregg Lorenzo—for allegedly using false
and unfounded statements to secure
investments in Waste2Energy Holdings Inc.,
a purported clean energy company.

Because the commission’s sanctions were at
least partly based on the “misimpression”
that Lorenzo’s conduct violated Rule 10b5(b) they must be set aside and the case
remanded.

An SEC administrative law judge found
Lorenzo liable for sending investors emails
that he knew contained false and misleading
information. She fined him $15,000, ordered
him to cease and desist from future

Dissenting, Judge Brett Kavanaugh said the
“good news” is that the court vacated the
lifetime suspension imposed by the SEC.
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misconduct, and barred him from the
industry. The SEC affirmed and Lorenzo
appealed to the D.C. Circuit.

prepared or published it on behalf of
another.”
Applying that reasoning to this case, it said
Lorenzo wasn’t the “maker” of the
misstatements in the emails he sent potential
investors.
“Voluminous
testimony
established that Lorenzo transmitted
statements devised by Gregg Lorenzo at
Gregg Lorenzo’s direction,” the appeals
court said.

Vacating and remanding, the appeals court
said that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), a
person can’t have "`made’ a misstatement if
he lacked ultimate authority over what it said
and whether it was said, including if he
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Apple, Inc. v. Pepper
Ruling Below: IN RE APPLE IPHONE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017)
Overview: Purchasers of iPhones and iPhone apps argue that Apple monopolized the market for
the apps by requiring app developers to sell their apps exclusively to Apple’s App Store and
charging them a 30-percent commission on each sale. The iPhone users contend that, as a result,
they paid more for the apps than if they had bought them elsewhere. They asked a federal court in
California to award them, under federal antitrust law, three times the amount that Apple allegedly
overcharged them.
Issue: Whether consumers may sue anyone who delivers goods to them for antitrust damages, even
when they seek damages based on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims
of the alleged offense.
IN RE APPLE IPHONE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Robert Pepper; Stephen H. Schwartz;
Edward W. Hayter; Eric Terrell, Plaintiffs- Appellants
v.
APPLE, INC., Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on January 12, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
In their current complaint, Plaintiffs
allege that they purchased iPhones and
iPhone applications (“apps”) between 2007
and 2013, and that Apple has monopolized
and attempted to monopolize the market for
iPhone apps. In ruling on Apple’s fourth
motion to dismiss, the district court held that
Plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing under
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).
We must decide two questions. First,
we must decide whether Rule 12(g)(2) barred
the district court from considering on the

merits Apple’s fourth motion to dismiss,
brought under Rule 12(b)(6), in which Apple
contended that Plaintiffs lack statutory
standing under Illinois Brick. We conclude
that the district court may have erred in
considering this motion on the merits, but
that its error, if any, was harmless. Second,
we must decide whether Plaintiffs lack
statutory standing under Illinois Brick. We
hold that Plaintiffs are direct purchasers from
Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick
and therefore have standing.
I. Factual Allegations
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The following factual narrative is
drawn from Plaintiffs’ current complaint.
Because the district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ suit under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim, we take as true all plausible
allegations.

question before us. Four named plaintiffs
filed a putative antitrust class action
complaint (“Complaint 1”) against Apple on
December 29, 2011. Counts I and II of
Complaint 1 alleged monopolization and
attempted monopolization of the iPhone app
market by Apple. Count III alleged a
conspiracy between Apple and AT&T
Mobility, LLC (“ATTM”) to monopolize the
voice and data services market for iPhones.
Plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased
iPhones, but did not allege that they had ever
purchased, or attempted to purchase, iPhone
apps. On March 2, 2012, Apple moved to
dismiss the entire complaint under Rule
12(b)(7) for failure to join ATTM as a
defendant. This motion to dismiss was
mooted when the district court consolidated
the action with another action.

Apple released the iPhone in 2007.
The iPhone is a “closed system,” meaning
that Apple controls which apps— such as
ringtones, instant messaging, Internet, video,
and the like—can run on an iPhone’s
software. In 2008, Apple launched the “App
Store,” an internet site where iPhone users
can find, purchase, and download iPhone
apps. Apple has developed some of the apps
sold in the App Store, but many of the apps
sold in the store have been developed by
third-party developers. Apple earns a
commission on each third-party app
purchased for use on an iPhone. When a
customer purchases a third-party iPhone app,
the payment is submitted to the App Store. Of
that payment, 30% goes to Apple and 70%
goes to the developer.

Seven named plaintiffs, including the
original four plaintiffs, then filed a
consolidated putative class action complaint
(“Complaint 2”) against Apple on March 21,
2012. The allegations in Complaint 2 were
essentially the same as those in Complaint 1,
and the same three Counts were alleged.
None of the named plaintiffs alleged that they
had bought, or attempted to buy, an iPhone
app. ATTM was not added as a defendant. On
April 16, 2012, Apple moved again to
dismiss the entire complaint under Rule
12(b)(7) for failure to join ATTM as a
defendant. In the alternative, it moved to
dismiss Count III under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim for conspiracy
between Apple and ATTM. The district court
granted without prejudice the motion to
dismiss the entire complaint, even though
Counts I and II alleged no wrongdoing by

Apple prohibits app developers from
selling iPhone apps through channels other
than the App Store, threatening to cut off
sales by any developer who violates this
prohibition. Apple discourages iPhone
owners from downloading unapproved apps,
threatening to void iPhone warranties if they
do so.
II. Procedural History
The procedural history of this case is
complex. We describe as much of the history
as is necessary to resolve the procedural
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ATTM. The court specifically ordered
Plaintiffs either to add ATTM as a defendant
or to forgo Count III. It denied without
prejudice Apple’s motion to dismiss Count
III under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that, in
the absence of ATTM, the motion was
premature.

they had purchased or attempted to purchase
an iPhone app. The court declined to rule on
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under
Illinois Brick, concluding that, in the absence
of an alleged Article III injury, any ruling
would be advisory. The district court
dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiffs
filed
an
amended
consolidated complaint (“Complaint 3”) on
September 28, 2012. Complaint 3 was
essentially the same as Complaint 2, except
that Count III was now labeled as “Preserved
for Appeal.” None of the named plaintiffs
alleged that they had ever purchased, or
sought to purchase, iPhone apps, and ATTM
was not named as a defendant. On November
2, 2012, Apple moved under Rule 12(f) to
strike Claim III on the ground that ATTM had
still not been named as a defendant. As part
of the same motion, Apple moved to dismiss
Counts I and II under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of Article III standing, and under Rule
12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under
Illinois Brick. This was the first time Apple
had moved to dismiss Counts I and II.
Relying on Rule 12(g)(2), Plaintiffs opposed
Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) on the ground that Apple had not
moved to dismiss these claims under Rule
12(b)(6) in its two previous motions under
Rule 12.

Plaintiffs filed a second amended
consolidated complaint (“Complaint 4”) on
September 5, 2013. Complaint 4 alleged only
the iPhone app monopolization claims, which
had been Counts I and II of all of the earlier
complaints. For the first time, Plaintiffs
alleged that they had purchased iPhone apps,
thereby alleging sufficient injury under
Article III to support Counts I and II.
Complaint 4 added the following allegation
specifically addressed to statutory standing
under Illinois Brick
When an iPhone customer buys an
app from Apple, it pays the full purchase
price, including Apple’s 30% commission,
directly to Apple. . . . Apple sells the apps (or,
more recently, licenses for the apps) directly
to the customer, collects the entire purchase
price, and pays the developers after the sale.
The developers at no time directly sell the
apps or licenses to iPhone customers or
collect payments from the customers.
On September 30, 2013, Apple filed a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
contending that Plaintiffs lacked statutory
standing under Illinois Brick. The district
court agreed and dismissed Complaint 4 with
prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

The district court granted the Rule
12(f) motion to strike Count III. The district
court also granted the Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss Counts I and II for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, holding that Plaintiffs
lacked Article III standing to bring those
counts because Plaintiff failed to allege that

III. Standard of Review
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of process—entirely waives that defense.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A). A defendant who
omits a defense under Rule 12(b)(6)—failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted—does not waive that defense. Rule
12(g)(2) provides that a defendant who fails
to assert a failure-to-state-a-claim defense in
a pre-answer Rule 12 motion cannot assert
that defense in a later pre-answer motion
under Rule 12(b)(6), but the defense may be
asserted in other ways. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(2).

We review de novo alleged errors of
law in interpreting Rule 12. See Whittlestone,
Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973
(9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo
dismissals for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6). Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc.,
705 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiffs make three arguments on
appeal, of which we need to reach only two.
First, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 12(g)(2)
barred Apple from raising its Illinois Brick
statutory standing defense in its fourth Rule
12 motion to dismiss, and that the district
court erred in deciding the motion on the
merits. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the
district court erred in characterizing them as
indirect purchasers from Apple, and therefore
without statutory standing under Illinois
Brick. We address these two arguments in
turn.

Our sister circuits disagree about the
proper interpretation and application of Rule
12(g)(2). The Seventh Circuit has held that
Rule 12(g)(2) does not foreclose a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when there has
been a previous motion to dismiss under Rule
12. See Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 773
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 12(g)(2) does not
prohibit a new Rule 12(b)(6) argument from
being raised in a successive motion.”). The
Seventh Circuit misunderstands Rule 12,
reading Rule 12(h)(1) to provide the only
sanction for failure to raise a Rule 12 defense
in a prior motion under the Rule. It is true that
Rule 12(h)(1) singles out several Rule 12
defenses for an especially severe sanction. If
a defense under Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) is not
asserted in the first Rule 12 motion to
dismiss, Rule 12(h)(1) tells us that the
defense is entirely waived. But Rule 12(h)(2)
provides a less severe sanction for failure to
assert a defense under Rule 12(b)(6). If a
failure-to-state-a-claim defense under Rule
12(b)(6) was not asserted in the first motion
to dismiss under Rule 12, Rule 12(h)(2) tells
us that it can be raised, but only in a pleading
under Rule 7, in a post-answer motion under

A. Late-filed Motions to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6)
Rule 12(g)(2) provides, “Except as
provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that
makes a motion under this rule must not make
another motion under this rule raising a
defense or objection that was available to the
party but omitted from its earlier motion.”
The consequence of omitting a defense from
an earlier motion under Rule 12 depends on
type of defense omitted. A defendant who
omits a defense under Rules 12(b)(2)-(5)—
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue,
insufficient process, and insufficient service
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Rule 12(c), or at trial. See, e.g., English v.
Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1994)
(correctly describing the operation of the
rule).

specified in Rule 12(h)(2) can produce
unnecessary and costly delays, contrary to the
direction of Rule 1.
District courts in this circuit and
others are well aware of this. For example, as
the late Judge Pfaelzer recently wrote:

The Third and Tenth Circuits have
read Rule 12 correctly, but have been very
forgiving of a district court’s failure to follow
Rule 12(g)(2). See Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat.
Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 321–22 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“So long as the district court accepts all of
the allegations in the complaint as true, the
result is the same as if the defendant had filed
an answer admitting these allegations and
then filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment
on the pleadings, which Rule 12(h)(2)(B)
expressly permits.”); Albers v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty., Colo., 771 F.3d
697, 704 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hether the
district court dismissed the complaint based
on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or rule 12(c)
makes no difference for purposes of our
review. Therefore, any procedural error that
may have been been committed would be
harmless and does not prevent us from
reaching the merits of the district court’s
decision.”).

Rule 12(g) is designed to avoid
repetitive motion practice, delay, and ambush
tactics. If the Court were to evade the merits
of Defendants’ . . . defenses here, Defendants
would be required to file answers within 14
days of this Order. They would presumably
assert [the same defenses] in those answers.
Defendants would then file Rule 12(c)
motions, the parties would repeat the briefing
they have already undertaken, and the Court
would have to address the same questions in
several months. That is not the intended
effect of Rule 12(g), and the result would be
in contradiction of Rule 1’s mandate[.]
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (citations omitted); see also Banko v.
Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 2013 WL
6623913, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013)
(internal quotations omitted) (“Although
Rule 12(g) technically prohibits successive
motions to dismiss that raise arguments that
could have been made in a prior motion . . .
courts faced with a successive motion often
exercise their discretion to consider the new
arguments in the interests of judicial
economy.”); Davidson v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., No. 09-CV-2694-IEG JMA,
2011 WL 1157569, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29,
2011) (internal quotations omitted) (“Rule
12(g) applies to situations in which a party

We agree with the approach of the
Third and Tenth Circuits. We read Rule
12(g)(2) in light of the general policy of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressed
in Rule 1. That rule directs that the Federal
Rules “be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Denying latefiled Rule 12(b)(6) motions and relegating
defendants to the three procedural avenues
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amended to recognize the success of Apple’s
motions under Rule 12(b)(7), Apple moved
again to dismiss. It now moved for the first
time to dismiss Counts I and II, relying on
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, including for failure to allege
injury sufficient for Article III standing, may
be made at any time. See F. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). Apple’s earlier Rule
12 motions to dismiss thus in no way
foreclosed its late-filed motion to dismiss
Counts I and II for lack of Article III
standing. The district court granted Apple’s
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. It refused to
decide Apple’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for lack of statutory standing on the
ground that, in the absence of an Article III
case or controversy, a ruling on the motion
would be an advisory opinion.

files successive motions under Rule 12 for
the sole purpose of delay[.]”); Doe v. White,
No. 08-1287, 2010 WL 323510, at *2 (C.D.
Ill. Jan. 20, 2010) (citing the “substantial
amount of case law which provides that
successive Rule 12(b)(6) motions may be
considered where they have not been filed for
the purpose of delay, where entertaining the
motion would expedite the case, and where
the motion would narrow the issues
involved.”). Moore’s Federal Practice
endorses this approach. See 2-12 Moore’s
Federal Practice - Civil § 12.23 (“[B]ecause
[a 12(b)(6) defense] is so basic and was not
waived, [a district] court might properly
entertain a second motion if it were
convinced it was not interposed for delay and
that addressing it would expedite disposition
of the case on the merits.”).
Recognizing the practical wisdom of
these district courts, and of the Third and
Tenth Circuits, we conclude that, as a
reviewing court, we should generally be
forgiving of a district court’s ruling on the
merits of a late-filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
With that in mind, we turn to the case now
before us

Complaint 4 realleged Counts I and
II, and finally alleged, for the first time, that
Plaintiffs had purchased iPhone apps. That is,
Complaint 4 finally alleged sufficient injury
to confer Article III standing to support
Counts I and II. Apple moved to dismiss for
the fourth time, this time only under Rule
12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under
Illinois Brick.

Apple’s first two motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(7), directed to Complaints
1 and 2, were designed to force Plaintiffs to
add ATTM as a necessary and indispensable
party under Rule 19. These were appropriate
motions, given that Count III alleged a
conspiracy between Apple and ATTM to
monopolize voice and data services, and
given that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
Article III injury to make that claim. After
Plaintiffs filed Complaint 3, which had been

Apple’s motions to dismiss for lack of
standing under Rule 12(b)(6), made in its
third and fourth motions to dismiss under
Rule 12, may not have been late-filed within
the meaning of Rule 12(g)(2). Indeed, there
is an argument that Apple’s motion to dismiss
Complaint 3 under Rule 12(b)(6), made as
part of its third Rule 12 motion to dismiss,
was not late but premature. At that point,
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Plaintiffs had not alleged injury sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction over
Counts I and II. For that reason, the district
court properly refused to rule on Apple’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that, in the
absence of an allegation of Article III
standing, any ruling would be advisory. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83 (1998). The district court was willing
to decide Apple’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for lack of statutory standing only
when Plaintiffs finally alleged, in Complaint
4, sufficient injury to confer Article III
standing to bring the challenged counts.

12(b)(1). If that motion had been made and
granted, Plaintiffs would likelyhave amended
their complaint earlier to allege purchases of
iPhone apps. But we see no harm to Plaintiffs
caused by Apple’s delay in making its Rule
12(b)(1) motion. Second, resort to any of the
three default alternatives specified in Rule
12(h)(2)—a pleading under Rule 7(a), a postanswer motion to dismiss on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c), or a defense asserted at
trial—would have substantially delayed
resolution of the Illinois Brick statutory
standing question, and would have done so
for no apparent purpose. The district court’s
decision on the merits of Apple’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion materially expedited the
district court’s disposition of the case, which
was a benefit to both parties.

Even if we assume arguendo that
Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), made in its fourth Rule 12 motion,
was late, any error by the district court in
considering the motion on the merits was
harmless. First, the four motions to dismiss,
culminating in the motion to dismiss
Complaint 4 under Rule 12(b)(6), do not
appear to have been filed for any strategically
abusive purpose. Apple promptly moved to
dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ four complaints.
Apple’s first two motions to dismiss were
made on March 2 and April 16, 2012,
immediately after the filing of Plaintiffs’ first
two complaints. Plaintiffs filed Complaint 3
on September 28, 2012. Apple moved to
dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on
November 2, 2012. Plaintiffs filed Complaint
4 on September 5, 2013. Apple moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on September
30, 2013. We recognize that Apple could
have moved, along with its motion to dismiss
for failure to join ATTM under Rule
12(b)(7), to dismiss Counts I and I for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule

We therefore conclude that any error
committed by the district court in ruling on
Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under
Illinois Brick, if indeed there was error, was
harmless. We now turn to the merits of the
district court’s decision.
B. Standing Under Illinois Brick
1. The Direct-Purchaser Rule
Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, “any
person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him
sustained[.]”
15
U.S.C.
§
15(a).
Notwithstanding the statutory term “any
person,” the Supreme Court has limited those
who may sue for antitrust damages. The
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general rule is that only “the overcharged
direct purchaser, and not others in the chain
of manufacture or distribution,” has standing
to sue. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 729 (1977).

making such a showing, the Court observed,
would “normally prove insurmountable.” Id.
Second, if an antitrust violator were
permitted to defend against suit by showing
that the intermediary passed the alleged
overcharge onto its customers, those
customers would logically be entitled to
damages for any portion of the overcharge
they paid. In many cases, however, there
would be a large number of customers, each
of whom would have “only a tiny stake in a
lawsuit,” and who, in the view of the Court,
would thus have “little interest in attempting
a class action.” Id. at 494. As a result,
according to the Court, antitrust violators
would “retain the fruits of their illegality
because no one . . . would bring suit against
them.” Id.

The rule originated in Hanover Shoe
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 392 U.S. 481
(1968). Hanover, a shoe manufacturer,
alleged that the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation had used its monopoly over
shoe-manufacturing machinery to lease
machines to Hanover at supracompetitive
rates. Id. at 483–84. United argued that
Hanover had no legally cognizable injury
under the antitrust laws because it had passed
any illegal overcharge on to its customers. Id.
at 491. The Court rejected United’s
“defensive” use of the passon theory. For
purposes of antitrust damages, the Court
held, the direct purchaser is injured by the full
amount of the overcharge irrespective of who
ultimately bears the cost of that injury. Id. at
494.

Nine years after Hanover Shoe, the
Supreme Court rejected an attempt to use the
pass-on theory “offensively.” In Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the State of
Illinois sued a concrete block manufacturer
for allegedly fixing the price of concrete
blocks. The manufacturer had sold the blocks
to masonry contractors who had used the
blocks to build masonry structures. The
masonry contractors sold the structures to
general contractors who put the structures in
buildings they sold to the State. The State
alleged that the contractors had passed on the
manufacturer’s illegal overcharge at both
stages of the distribution chain, driving up the
State’s costs by $3 million.

The Court gave two reasons for its
holding. First, the dollar figures necessary to
demonstrate that an intermediary has avoided
economic injury by passing an overcharge
onto his customers were, the Court found,
“virtually unascertainable.” Id. at 493. A
litigant would need to show, among other
things, that the intermediary raised the price
of his product as a result of the illegal
overcharge; that the higher price charged by
the intermediary did not affect the
intermediary’s profits by reducing the
volume of sales; and that the intermediary
could not or would not have raised its price
absent the overcharge. The challenges to

The Supreme Court refused to
recognize the passed-on overcharges as a
basis for antitrust standing. As in Hanover
Shoe, the challenges of tracing the effects of
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an overcharge at each stage of a distribution
chain were, in the Court’s view,
insurmountable. Even if indirect purchasers
could meet these challenges, sorting out the
complicated variables would clog the courts
with protracted and expensive litigation. Id.
at 732. And even then problems of
administrability and enforcement would
remain. Allowing an indirect purchaser to sue
for whatever portion of an overcharge it was
assessed would either “create a serious risk of
multiple liability for defendants,” id. at 730,
or reduce the effectiveness of antitrust laws
by diluting the share of damages bettersituated direct purchasers might secure by
bringing suit. Id. at 731–35.

so concerned the Court in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick were largely absent. The Court
nonetheless applied the direct/indirect
purchaser rule, holding that “[i]n the
distribution chain,” the customers were “not
the immediate buyers from the alleged
antitrust violators.” UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at
207.
The transactions in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick have the same structure. In both
cases, a monopolizing or price-fixing
manufacturer sold or leased a product to an
intermediate
manufacturer
at
a
supracompetitive price. The intermediate
manufacturer (in Illinois Brick, two
intermediate manufacturers) then used that
product to create another product, which was
ultimately sold to the consumer. The details
in UtiliCorp are different, but the basic
structure is the same. In UtiliCorp, a
monopolizing producer sold a product to a
distributor at an allegedly supracompetitive
price. The distributor then sold the product to
the consumer. In all three cases, the consumer
was an indirect purchaser from the
manufacturer or producer who sold or leased
the product to the intermediary. The
consumer was a direct purchaser from the
intermediate manufacturer (Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick) or from the distributor
(UtiliCorp). The consumer did not have
standing to sue the manufacturer or producer,
but did have standing to sue the intermediary,
whether the intermediate manufacturer or the
distributor

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the Hanover Shoe/Illinois Brick rule in a case
where the practical considerations that gave
rise to the rule were not nearly as compelling
as in the two foundation cases. In Kansas v.
UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990),
customers of public utilities sued natural gas
producers for alleged violations of Section 4
of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs conceded that
they were direct purchasers from the public
utilities and indirect purchasers from the
producers. But they argued that the direct
purchasers, because they were regulated
public utilities, had the incentive and ability
to build into their pricing structure their entire
cost of purchasing natural gas. Id. at 205. On
the other side of the coin, because they were
public utilities, they had the obligation to
pass on the entirety of any cost savings
resulting from a reduced purchasing cost. Id.
at 212. Therefore, the complications in
determining the amount of illegal overcharge
that had been, or could be, passed on that had

2. Plaintiffs Are Direct Purchasers
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The question before us is whether
Plaintiffs purchased their iPhone apps
directly from the app developers, or directly
from Apple. Stated otherwise, the question is
whether Apple is a manufacturer or producer,
or whether it is a distributor. Under Hanover
Shoe, Illinois Brick, and UtiliCorp, if Apple
is a manufacturer or producer from whom
Plaintiffs purchased indirectly, Plaintiffs do
not have standing. But if Apple is a
distributor from whom Plaintiffs purchased
directly, Plaintiffs do have standing.

determined by a contract between O & M and
Bamberg. Id. at 1119.
Applying the “straightforward,”
“bright line” rule of Illinois Brick, we held in
Delaware Valley that Bamberg was an
indirect purchaser from J & J, the
manufacturer, and a direct purchaser from O
& M, the distributor. Id. at 1122, 1120. That
Bamberg and J & J had a contract setting the
wholesale price of the products, and that the
price Bamberg paid O & M was “set, in part,
by an agreement negotiated . . . on behalf of
Bamberg” with J & J were not determinative.
Id. at 1122. The determinative fact was that
O & M was a distributor who sold the
products directly to Bamberg. Because
Bamberg bought directly from O & M, the
distributor, it lacked standing to sue J & J, the
manufacturer. The necessary corollary of
Delaware Valley is that Bamberg would have
had standing to sue O & M, the distributor.

We do not write on a clean slate in
this circuit. In Delaware Valley Surgical
Supply, Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 523 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 2008), plaintiff Bamberg
County Memorial Hospital & Nursing Center
(“Bamberg”) brought suit against Johnson &
Johnson (“J & J”) alleging that J & J
“impermissibly leveraged its monopoly
power in sutures to create a monopoly” in the
market for endomechanical products. Id. at
1118. Bamberg did not purchase medical
supplies directly from J & J. Instead, a group
purchasing organization (“GPO”), of which
Bamberg was a member, negotiated
purchasing contracts with J & J and a
distributor, Owens & Minor (“O & M”). J &
J and O & M, in turn, had a distributorship
agreement specifying that O & M would pay
J & J the price negotiated by the GPO.
Bamberg would purchase from O & M,
paying O & M this price plus a set percentage
markup. Pursuant to this agreement, J & J
supplied products to the distributor, O & M,
which in turn sold and delivered the products
to Bamberg, at a price equal to the cost O &
M paid for the products plus the set markup

The Eighth Circuit has considered a
transaction
closely
resembling
the
transaction in the case before us. In Campos
v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th
Cir. 1998), plaintiffs alleged that
Ticketmaster used its monopolistic control
over concert ticket distribution services to
charge supracompetitive fees for those
services. The majority in Ticketmaster held
that a party’s status as a “direct” or “indirect”
purchaser turned on whether “an antecedent
transaction between the monopolist and
another, independent purchaser” absorbed or
passed on all or part of the monopoly
overcharge. Id. at 1169. Plaintiffs bought
concert tickets directly from Ticketmaster,
but the majority nevertheless concluded that
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to sell through their own “stores,” Apple
specifically forbids them to do so, instead
requiring them to sell iPhone apps only
through Apple’s App Store.

plaintiffs were indirect purchasers who
lacked standing under Illinois Brick. Id. at
1171. Using an analysis keyed to the
“antecedent transaction,” the majority
concluded that the ticket buyers were indirect
purchasers.

We do not address the question
whether Apple sells distribution services to
app developers within the meaning of Illinois
Brick. If it did, this would necessarily imply
that the developers, as direct purchasers of
those services, could bring an antitrust suit
against Apple. But whether app developers
are direct purchasers of distribution services
from Apple in the sense of Illinois Brick
makes no difference to our analysis in the
case now before us.

We disagree with the majority’s
analysis in Ticketmaster. As Judge Morris
Arnold pointed out in dissent, the majority’s
“antecedent transaction” analysis has no
basis in Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1174
(M. Arnold, J., dissenting). Illinois Brick held
that where plaintiffs are in a “direct vertical
chain of transactions” and an intermediary
“pass[es] on” monopolistic overcharges
originating further up the chain, subsequent
buyers lack standing. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Ticketmaster, “[t]he
monopoly product at issue . . . is ticket
distribution services, not tickets.” Id. The
distributor who “supplies the product directly
to” plaintiffs, rather than the producer of the
product, is the appropriate defendant in an
antitrust suit. Id.

We do not rest our analysis on the fact
that Plaintiffs pay the App Store, which then
forwards the payment to the app developers,
less Apple’s thirty percent commission.
Whether a purchase is direct or indirect does
not turn on the formalities of payment or
bookkeeping arrangements. See Freeman v.
San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133,
1146 (9th Cir. 2003). If Plaintiffs were direct
purchasers from Apple solely because Apple
collected their payments, Apple could escape
anti-trust liability simply by tinkering with
the order in which digital banking data zips
through cyberspace during a sales
transaction.

Apple argues that it does not sell apps
but rather sells “software distribution
services to developers.” In Apple’s view,
because it sells distribution services to app
developers, it cannot simultaneously be a
distributor of apps to app purchasers. Apple
analogizes its role to the role of an owner of
a shopping mall that “leases physical space to
various stores.” Apple’s analogy is
unconvincing. In the case before us, thirdparty developers of iPhone apps do not have
their own “stores.” Indeed, part of the anticompetitive behavior alleged by Plaintiffs is
that, far from allowing iPhone app developers

Nor do we rest our analysis on the
form of the payment Apple receives in return
for distributing iPhone apps. Apple does not
take ownership of the apps and then sell them
to buyers after adding a markup of thirty
percent. Rather, it sells the apps and adds a
thirty percent commission. But the
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distinction between a markup and a
commission is immaterial. The key to the
analysis is the function Apple serves rather
than the manner in which it receives
compensation for performing that function.

Because Apple is a distributor, Plaintiffs have
standing under Illinois Brick to sue Apple for
allegedly monopolizing and attempting to
monopolize the sale of iPhone apps.
Conclusion

Nor, finally, do we rest our analysis
on who determines the ultimate price paid by
the buyer of an iPhone app. In the case before
us, the price is determined as a practical
matter by the app developer who sets a price,
to which Apple’s thirty percent commission
is added automatically. Our opinion in
Delaware Valley makes clear that this does
not make app purchasers direct buyers from
the app developers. In Delaware Valley, the
price paid by the distributor, O & M, to the
manufacturer, J & J, was determined through
a negotiation between J & J and a GPO of
which Bamberg was a member. Despite the
fact that Bamberg, through its GPO, had a say
in the wholesale price charged by J & J to O
& M, to which the distributor added its
predetermined markup, we held that
Bamberg was a direct purchaser from O & M.
Here, the case is even stronger in favor of
Plaintiffs. Unlike Bamberg, Plaintiffs have
no say whatsoever in determining the price
set by the app developer to which the
distributor
adds
its
predetermined
commission.

We conclude that any error, if indeed
there was error, in the district court’s
consideration of the merits of Apple’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for lack of
statutory standing was harmless. We
conclude further that Plaintiffs are direct
purchasers of iPhone apps from Apple under
Illinois Brick and that they therefore have
standing to sue. The district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that they
lacked statutory standing under Illinois Brick.
We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

Instead, we rest our analysis, as
compelled by Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick,
UtiliCorp, and Delaware Valley, on the
fundamental
distinction
between
a
manufacturer or producer, on the one hand,
and a distributor, on the other. Apple is a
distributor of the iPhone apps, selling them
directly to purchasers through its App Store.
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“Apple Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review on iPhone App Fee Suit”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 18, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear
Apple Inc.’s bid to kill an antitrust lawsuit
over the market for iPhone apps in a case that
could shield e-commerce companies from
consumer claims over high commissions.

pressing the case has said Apple could be on
the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars.
A federal appeals court let the suit go
forward. The panel said Apple is serving as a
distributor, selling directly to consumers
through its App Store and pocketing part of
the price of each app.

The lawsuit accuses Apple of monopolizing
the app market so it can charge excessive
commissions of 30 percent. Apple, backed by
the Trump administration, says it can’t be
sued because the commission is levied on the
app developers, not the purchasers who are
suing.

The Supreme Court said in 1977 that only
direct purchasers -- and not those who buy a
product further downstream -- can sue under
federal antitrust law. The court said that rule
was necessary to avoid "duplicative
recoveries."

A victory for Apple could insulate companies
that run online marketplaces and interact with
consumers on behalf of third-party sellers.
Companies that could be affected include
Alphabet Inc.’s Google, Amazon.com Inc.
and Facebook Inc., Apple told the Supreme
Court in its appeal

The lawyers pressing the case say the
consumers who filed the lawsuit meet that
test. They "are undoubtedly the first party in
the distribution chain to buy from the
monopolist," the group said in court papers.

"This is a critical question for antitrust law in
the era of electronic commerce," Apple
argued.

Apple said it ultimately charges the
commission to the developers, making
consumers "indirect purchasers" who are
precluded under the 1977 ruling from suing.
The appeals court "expressly opened the door
to duplicative recoveries by different plaintiff
groups," Apple argued.

The suit accuses Apple of thwarting
competition by approving apps only if the
developer agrees to let them be distributed
exclusively through the App Store.
The suit, filed in federal court in Oakland,
California, seeks class action status. A lawyer

Apple credited the App Store and with
helping create a "dynamic new industry." In
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2016 alone, developers earned more than $20
billion through the App Store, which offers
more than 2 million apps to consumers, the
company said.

The court will hear arguments and rule in the
nine-month term that starts in October. The
case is Apple v. Pepper, 17-204.
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“Trump Administration Backs Apple in Supreme Court Antitrust Suit Over Apps”

The National Law Journal
Marcia Coyle
May 9, 2018
The
Trump
administration’s
U.S.
Department of Justice is urging the U.S.
Supreme Court to reverse a federal appellate
court decision that would allow an antitrust
class action to go forward against Apple Inc.,
exposing the company to treble damages for
its alleged monopoly of the market for iPhone
apps.

“The importance of the question
presented will only grow as
commerce continues to move online.
The Ninth Circuit is home to a
disproportionate share of the nation’s
e-commerce companies, and its
erroneous
decision
creates
uncertainty and a lack of uniformity
about the proper application of
Section 4 to this increasingly
common business model. This court
should grant certiorari and correct the
Ninth Circuit’s error.”

U.S. Solicitor General Noel Francisco, in an
amicus brief, said the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit misapplied a 40-yearold Supreme Court decision when it held last
year that Apple was a distributor of iPhone
apps, selling them directly to purchasers
through its App Store. The Justice
Department filed its brief at the invitation of
the justices for the government’s views in the
case Apple v. Pepper.

The high court case stems from an antitrust
class action brought under the Sherman Act
on behalf of those who purchased software
applications from Apple’s online store for
use of their iPhones from Dec. 29, 2007, to
the present. The consumer class claims that
Apple illegally monopolized the distribution
of iPhone apps, and that the commissions
charged to app developers inflate the prices
consumers ultimately pay for apps.

Francisco warned that how courts view
Apple’s app business model—an agency or
consignment
sales
model—”will
significantly affect” private enforcement of
federal antitrust law “because other existing
and emerging e-commerce platforms use
similar models.”

At the center of the case is Apple’s method of
connecting app developers to those who
purchase the apps.

In urging the justices to grant review and
reverse the Ninth Circuit, the Justice
Department wrote:

After the launch of the iPhone, Apple created
the App Store, an electronic portal through
which consumers could buy and download
apps. Apple earns 30 percent of every third-
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party app sold through its store and the app
developer retains 70 percent. Payment for an
app goes to the App Store which, in turn,
credits the developer with the 70 percent
share.

Wall cited as examples of agency-based
electronic marketplaces StubHub, eBay,
Google Play marketplace, Amazon.com
Inc.’s “Amazon Marketplace” business and
Facebook’s “Marketplace.”

In the 1977 case Illinois Brick v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court ruled that consumer antitrust
lawsuits could be brought only against the
party that represents the final point of sale of
the good or service in question. Plaintiffs
cannot state a claim for treble damages,
according to the Supreme Court, by relying
on a “pass-on theory”—where a defendant
unlawfully overcharged a third party and the
third party passed on all or part of the
overcharge to the plaintiff.

Representing Robert Pepper and the
consumer class, Mark Rifkin of New York’s
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz,
wrote in opposition to review that Apple is
not seeking to correct a misapplication
of Illinois Brick but to change the law.
“The price paid by purchasers for an app is
the amount set by the apps developer, plus
Apple’s own supra-competitive 30 percent
markup, both of which are paid directly to
Apple, the alleged monopolist, every time an
app is purchased,” Rifkin told the justices. He
added: “The apps developers do not sell their
apps to iPhone customers or collect any
payment from iPhone customers, and iPhone
customers are the only purchasers in the
entire chain of distribution. Respondents seek
damages based solely on the 30 percent
markup.”

Purchasers of apps are “indirect” purchasers,
according to Francisco. “To prove damages,
respondents would need to establish the
extent to which Apple’s allegedly unlawful
practices have caused developers to set
higher prices for their apps than they
otherwise would have,” argued Francisco.
“That is precisely the pass-on inquiry this
court has disapproved.”

Apple, Rifkin argued, wants the justices to
“jettison the straightforward direct purchaser
requirement of Illinois Brick and replace it
with a new ‘antecedent transaction’ analysis,
an approach to antitrust standing that finds no
support in this court’s precedent, would
invite the same factual complications and
speculation on damages that the bright-line
standing test of Illinois Brick seeks to avoid,
and would often leave nobody with standing
to sue a monopolist (as would be the case
here).”

Latham & Watkins partner Daniel Wall,
representing Apple, argued the Ninth Circuit
“has approached this case as if all commerce
fits the traditional resale distribution model,
where the party who delivers goods is also the
party who sets the price the consumer pays.
But increasingly this is a world of electronic
commerce based on electronic marketplaces
that—like Apple’s App Store—are structured
around an agency or consignment sales
model where the marketplace sponsor has
nothing to do with the pricing of the goods it
sells.”
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The Washington Legal Foundation and the
App Association have filed amicus briefs
supporting Apple’s petition for review.
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“The Supreme Court Will Decide If Apple’s App Store Is A Monopoly”
Wired
Louise Matsakis
June 18, 2018
HAS APPLE MONOPOLIZED the
market for iPhone apps? That's the question
at the heart of Apple Inc. v. Pepper, a case the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Monday,
which could have wide-reaching implications
for consumers as well as other companies like
Amazon. The dispute is over whether Apple,
by charging app developers a 30 percent
commission fee and only allowing iOS apps
to be sold through its own store, has inflated
the price of iPhone apps. Apple, supported by
the Trump administration, argues that the
plaintiffs in the case—iPhone consumers—
don't have the right to sue under current
antitrust laws in the US.

Illinois, which established what is known as
the Illinois Brick Doctrine. That rule says you
can't sue for antitrust damages if you're not
the direct purchaser of a good or service. If I
have a monopoly on bread and the local deli
sells you a sandwich, you can't sue me. It's
just too hard to figure out how much of your
sandwich price was inflated due to my illegal
activity.
Here's where things get complicated. Apple
isn't buying apps from developers and then
reselling them to consumers. It merely
charges a 30 percent commission fee, and
only makes them available in its own App
Store. Because of that, Apple argues that it's
protected from antitrust lawsuits lodged by
consumers because it's not the direct seller,
the developers are. It views the App Store
like a mall; it's merely charging developers
rent to sell in it.

The case marks a rare instance in which the
court has agreed not only to hear an antitrust
case, but also one where no current
disagreement exists in the circuit courts. The
outcome could change decades of antitrust
legal precedent—either strengthening or
weakening consumer protections against
monopolistic power. The case also represents
a huge source of revenue for Apple; the
company raked in an estimated $11
billion last year in App Store commissions
alone.

"Apple is trying to argue that the consumers
don't have the standing to sue here because
the app developers set the price," says
Sandeep Vaheesan, an antitrust lawyer at the
Open Markets Institute, a nonprofit that
advocates against monopolistic power.
"What the consumers are really upset at is
how the apps are being priced by
developers."

The Illinois Brick Doctrine
At the core of the lawsuit is another Supreme
Court case from 1977, Illinois Brick Co. v.
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But the plaintiffs in the suit argue that Apple
monopolized the distribution of the apps, not
the apps themselves. In a world where app
stores could actually compete for developers'
products, the commission rates might be
lower, resulting in lower-priced apps. This
plays out on Android already; the majority of
app downloads go through the Google Play
Store, but users can also go to the Amazon
Appstore for occasionally discounted apps,
or F-Droid for exclusively open source apps.

surprising decision, the Supreme Court will
hear the case.
Typically, the Supreme Court looks for
disagreement between the lower courts when
deciding to take up a case, but here none
currently exists. "It's unusual to take this one
because there's no pressing and strong circuit
split on the issue," Lopatka says.

By comparison, Apple is less like a mall, and
more like the only store in town. iOS app
developers have to abide by Apple's lengthy
guidelines if they want to sell their products
to iPhone consumers and the company can
exclusively decide when it doesn't want
certain apps on its phones.

The case that most closely addresses the same
issues is from nearly 20 years ago, when the
8th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a
lawsuit brought by concertgoers against
Ticketmaster. The court ruled that
concertgoers weren't the direct purchaser, the
venues were. It agreed that Ticketmaster was
just a ticket marketplace, rather than a
distribution monopoly.

"On the face of it, I certainly think [the
plaintiffs] have got a strong case. Whether it's
a winning case, I don't know yet," says John
Lopatka, an antitrust professor at Penn State
Law School and the author of Federal
Antitrust Law and The Microsoft Case:
Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer
Welfare. "If they lose, it's because the court is
going to want to change to some extent just
what this Illinois Brick rule is." Apple did not
return a request for comment.

This time, though, the highest court could
rule that Apple is, in fact, a distribution
monopoly. A ruling in the plaintiffs' favor
could have serious implications for other tech
companies with similar business models, like
Amazon, which sells a wide range of
products from third-party companies. And it
could make it harder for them to argue that
they're merely neutral intermediaries. That
means the Illinois Brick Doctrine might get
squashed, or significantly altered.

What Happens If Apple Wins?

The case is "really significant for platforms in
general," says Vaheesan. "Platforms and
other intermediators that rely on a
commission-based model might be able to
avoid antitrust liability in the form of
lawsuits" if Apple wins.

In 2013, a district court in California initially
sided with Apple, agreeing that the tech giant
was shielded by the Illinois Brick Doctrine.
But the plaintiffs appealed to the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower
court's opinion last year. Now, in a somewhat

But even if Apple loses, the plaintiffs still
face a long, uphill battle. A favorable ruling
from the Supreme Court would allow the suit
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to go to trial, but it may get settled out of
court before that even happens. In trial, the
plaintiffs would have to face a host of other
issues in order to successfully argue that
Apple's App Store really constitutes a
monopoly. For example, consumers can buy
other kinds of smartphones aside from
iPhones, which come with access to other app
stores.

and get different apps? That would be an
issue."
If Apple wins, though, consumers would
continue to have one less avenue to legally
fight back against increasingly powerful
technology corporations.
"This would just be another thumb on the
scale in favor of corporate defendants and
against antitrust plaintiffs," Vaheesan says.
"It would mean that the DOJ and the FTC
would have to do more to compensate for the
reduced private enforcement."

"Apple created the iPhone, Apple created the
entity that can use apps, has it monopolized
anything?" Lopatka says. "Is it fair to say that
there is a market in Apple apps, when you can
get a Samsung phone or lots of other phones
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“What happens if Apple loses its Supreme Court App Store antitrust appeal?”
The Verge
Adi Robertson
June 20, 2018
Earlier this week, the Supreme Court
officially picked up the long-running antitrust
case Apple v. Pepper. The court will decide
whether iPhone users can sue Apple for
locking down the iOS ecosystem, something
the suit’s plaintiffs say is creating an anticompetitive monopoly.

Apple v. Pepper began as a broader antitrust
complaint in 2011. Robert Pepper and three
other iPhone owners claimed that Apple had
stifled competition and driven up prices on its
iPhone — partly by locking out third-party
apps and partly by signing a five-year
exclusivity deal with AT&T. A court struck
the latter claim in 2013. Since then, the class
action case has focused purely on the App
Store.

Apple v. Pepper could theoretically affect
how tech companies can build walled
gardens around their products. The Supreme
Court isn’t going to make a call on
that specific issue, but its decision could
affect people’s relationship with all kinds of
digital platforms. Here’s what’s at stake
when the Supreme Court case starts, which
should happen sometime in the next year.

In 2014, Apple won a judgment against
Pepper, and the complaint was dismissed.
But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that decision in early 2017, allowing
the case to move forward. Now, Apple is
petitioning the Supreme Court to throw it out
again.

WHAT IS APPLE V. PEPPER?
Apple Inc. v. Robert Pepper is the latest salvo
in a legal fight over Apple’s iOS App Store.
A group of iPhone buyers are claiming that
Apple’s locked-down ecosystem artificially
inflates the prices of apps because all
developers must go through a single store that
takes a cut of their revenue. The buyers argue
that Apple has established an unlawful
monopoly over iOS apps, and they’re asking
the courts to make Apple allow third-party
iOS apps, in addition to repaying every iOS
user it’s overcharged in the past.

WHAT’S THE ACTUAL
ARGUMENT?
The central dispute is relatively simple:
Apple only allows iOS users to install apps
through its App Store. Any third-party stores
require jailbreaking your phone and voiding
the warranty. Apple also takes a 30 percent
commission on apps that are sold through the
App Store. Pepper’s complaint concludes
that developers are logically passing that cost
along to consumers.
The complaint says that iPhone users have
paid “hundreds of millions of dollars more”

HOW DID WE GET HERE?
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for apps “than they would have paid in a
competitive market.” That’s a claim that
could be challenged in court, but there are
real-world examples of apps passing costs to
customers. Spotify, for instance, charged
iTunes subscribers a higher fee before simply
disabling that payment option.

Yes, according to the 2017 ruling that Apple
is appealing. The Ninth Circuit appeals court
disregarded Apple’s arguments — like the
fact that it’s taking a commission from
developers rather than adding a fee to user
transactions — as hair-splitting. It
determined that regardless of who’s making
the apps or setting the exact prices, Apple is
acting as a distributor, which gives it a direct
relationship with its customers.

Apple denies the claim that its closed
ecosystem is an unlawful monopoly. It says
users can buy apps on other platforms, and
that by definition, opening the App Store in
2008 created new competitive opportunities.

But a lower court didn’t agree with that
interpretation, and there’s no guarantee the
Supreme Court will either.

But courts haven’t made a call on this
argument yet. Instead, they’ve focused on
whether iPhone users can sue Apple at all.

SO... WHAT DOES HAPPEN IF
APPLE LOSES?
Nothing — yet. If a court rules that Apple has
an unlawful monopoly, it could require Apple
to pay out hundreds of millions of dollars or
even change its App Store model. If the
Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, though, it will just send the case
back to a lower court, where the fight will
keep going.

In 1977, the Supreme Court established
what’s known as the Illinois Brick doctrine,
which says that “indirect purchasers” can’t
sue a company for antitrust damages.
Pepper’s lawsuit portrays Apple as directly
selling iOS apps to users at a markup. But
Apple claims that iOS users are essentially
buying apps from developers, who are buying
Apple’s software distribution services, which
would make developers the only direct
purchasers with the right to sue Apple.

But the decision will also affect how much
power consumers have over digital
platforms. In 1998, a major appeals court
ruling shot down concertgoers who sued
Ticketmaster for driving up ticket prices,
saying that Ticketmaster was actually selling
distribution services to concert venues. The
Ninth Circuit’s opinion explicitly says that
decision was wrong. So a favorable Supreme
Court ruling wouldn’t just keep this
particular lawsuit alive. It could make other
powerful online stores — or, in Reuters’ lesscharitable estimation, “toll-keepers” — more
accountable toward their users.

If Apple convinces the Supreme Court that
this is correct, it doesn’t even have to worry
about the monopoly question. Sure, a
developer could sue the company later, but
developers have a strong incentive to stay
friendly with Apple — and they actually
benefit from iOS’s locked-down, piracyunfriendly system.

IS APPLE TECHNICALLY
SELLING APPS TO USERS?
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“9th Circuit Apple antitrust ruling splits with 8th, is boon to consumers”

Reuters
Alison Frankel
January 13, 2017
provide. As you probably know, that’s a
critical difference in antitrust cases. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held - first in
1968’s Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe and
then, more famously, in 1977’s Illinois Brick
v. State of Illinois - that purchasers at the end
of a tainted supply chain can’t bring antitrust
claims against a monopolist because it’s too
hard for courts to figure out what portion of
the product’s ultimate cost is attributable to
illegal conduct. Under the court’s so-called
Illinois Brick precedent, only direct
purchasers have standing to sue monopolists.

If music fans want to see a show at a major
concert venue, they have just about no choice
but to buy tickets through Ticketmaster,
which has exclusive ticket distribution
contracts with virtually every concert
promoter in the country. Similarly, if iPhone
owners want to purchase an app, they must
buy through Apple’s App Store. Apple
doesn’t allow app developers to sell iPhone
apps through any other platform.
Ticketmaster and Apple are the toll-keepers
of their markets.
Consumers don’t much like paying tolls.
Both Ticketmaster and Apple were sued in
antitrust class actions accusing them of
taking advantage of their distribution
strangleholds, Ticketmaster back in the
1990s and Apple in 2011. In 1998, the 8th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
concertgoers’ antitrust claims in Campos v.
Ticketmaster. But on Thursday, the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that iPhone
app buyers can proceed - despite the 8th
Circuit’s Ticketmaster decision and parallels
in consumer claims against the two
companies.

In the sort of classic manufacturing supply
chains at issue in Hanover Shoe, which
involved allegedly inflated lease prices for
shoemaking equipment, and Illinois Brick, in
which the state claimed masonry contractors
passed along inflated charges for concrete
blocks, it’s easy to discern a bright line
between direct and indirect purchasers. The
split between the 8th and 9th Circuits in the
Ticketmaster and Apple cases shows how the
line blurs when the alleged monopolist is
selling a service instead of a tangible product.
The 8th Circuit majority in Ticketmaster
found concertgoers to be indirect purchasers
who were forced to use the company’s
services only because Ticketmaster first
pushed concert venues into exclusive ticket

The 9th Circuit split with the 8th on the
dispositive question of whether consumers
are direct or indirect purchasers of the
distribution services Ticketmaster and Apple
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distribution contracts. “Such derivative
dealing is the essence of indirect purchaser
status,” the majority said. “The plaintiffs’
inability to obtain ticket delivery services in
a competitive market is simply the
consequence of the antecedent inability of
venues to do so.”

by basing its ruling on the mere fact that
consumers pay the App Store for purchases.
“Whether a purchase is direct or indirect does
not turn on the formalities of payment or
bookkeeping arrangements,” the opinion
said. “The key to the analysis is the function
Apple serves rather than the manner in which
it receives compensation for performing that
function.”

In a dissent, Judge Morris Arnold suggested
his colleagues weren’t paying attention to
Ticketmaster’s real product: not tickets but
ticket distribution services. “Ticketmaster
supplies the product directly to concertgoers; it does not supply it first to venue
operators who in turn supply it to
concertgoers,” Arnold wrote. “It is
immaterial that Ticketmaster would not be
supplying the service but for its antecedent
agreement with the venues. But it is quite
relevant that the antecedent agreement was
not one in which the venues bought some
product from Ticketmaster in order to resell
it to concertgoers.”

Apple’s lawyers at Latham & Watkins had
argued that the company is indeed a
distributor, but that its customers are app
developers, not the consumers who buy apps.
It compared itself to a shopping mall owner
that leases space to stores, but the 9th Circuit
disputed Apple’s brick-and-mortar analogy.
“Third-party developers of iPhone apps do
not have their own ‘stores,’” the opinion said
“Indeed, part of the anti-competitive
behavior alleged by plaintiffs is that, far from
allowing iPhone app developers to sell
through their own ‘stores,’ Apple specifically
forbids them to do so, instead requiring them
to sell iPhone apps only through Apple’s App
Store.”

The 9th Circuit’s Apple opinion, written by
Judge William Fletcher for a panel that also
included Judge Wallace Tashima and U.S.
District Judge Robert Gettleman of Chicago,
sitting by designation, said the Ticketmaster
dissent was right. In selling iPhone apps,
Apple is not an ordinary manufacturer or
producer, the opinion said. It is a distributor,
selling apps directly to consumers through
the App Store.

It seems to me the 9th Circuit’s reasoning
could be problematic for other tech
companies that could be defined as
distributors. I expect amici to weigh in if
Apple asks for en banc reconsideration.
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman &
Herz represented plaintiffs in the iPhone
case. Apple declined a Reuters request for
comment on the 9th Circuit opinion.

The 9th Circuit insisted on figuring out the
essential relationship between Apple and app
purchasers instead of taking the easy way out
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Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido
Ruling Below: John Guido; Dennis Rankin v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, 859 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2017)
Overview: Mount Lemmon Fire District fired two of their captains who were the oldest
employees, John Guido and Dennis Rankin, under the guise of budget cuts. Guido and Rankin
were terminated supposedly not because of their age, rather because they failed to participate in
volunteer wildland assignments.
Issue: Whether, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the same 20-employee
minimum that applies to private employers also applies to political subdivisions of a state, as the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th Circuits have held, or whether the ADEA
applies instead to all state political subdivisions of any size, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
9th Circuit held in this case.
John Guido; Dennis Rankin, Plaintiffs- Appellants,
v.
Mount Lemmon Fire District, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on June 19, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge:
Guido at forty-six years of age and Rankin at
fifty-four.

We must decide whether the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
applies to a political subdivision of Arizona.

Guido and Rankin subsequently filed
charges of age discrimination against the Fire
District with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which
issued separate favorable rulings for each,
finding reasonable cause to believe the Fire
District violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34
(“ADEA”). They then filed this suit for age
discrimination against the Fire District in
April 2013.

I
John Guido and Dennis Rankin were
both hired in 2000 byMount Lemmon Fire
District, a political subdivision of the State of
Arizona. Guido and Rankin served as fulltime firefighter Captains. They were the two
oldest full-time employees at the Fire District
when they were terminated on June 15, 2009,
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The district court granted the Fire
District’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that it was not an “employer”
within the meaning of the ADEA.

associations, labor organizations,
corporations, business trusts, legal
representatives, or any organized
groups of persons.

Guido and Rankin timely appealed.

Guido and Rankin challenge the
district court’s conclusion that the Fire
District was not an “employer” within the
meaning of the ADEA.

The parties agree that the twentyemployee minimum applies to “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce”
and that the term “person” does not include a
political subdivision of a State. However,
they dispute whether the twenty-employee
minimum also applies to a “political
subdivision of a State.” § 630(b).

A

B

The ADEA applies only to an
“employer.” Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b):

Congress passed the ADEA to protect
older workers from “arbitrary age
discrimination in employment.” 29 U.S.C. §
621(b). The statute originally applied only to
private-sector employers. See Special
Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate,
Improving the Age Discrimination Law 11
(1973) (the “Senate Age Discrimination
Report”). Congress amended the ADEA in
1974 to extend coverage to States, political
subdivisions of States, and other State-related
entities by adding a second sentence to §
630(b). Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55
(1974) (the “1974 ADEA Amendment”).

II

The term “employer” means a person
engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more
employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year . . . . The term also
means (1) any agent of such a person,
and (2) a State or political subdivision
of a State and any agency or
instrumentality of a State or a
political subdivision of a State, and
any interstate agency, but such term
does not include the United States, or
a corporation wholly owned by the
Government of the United States.

1
Guido and Rankin contend that §
630(b) is not ambiguous and applies to the
Fire District. They assert that its plain
meaning creates distinct categories of
“employers” and that the Fire District fits
within one of them. See Young v. Sedgwick
County, 660 F. Supp. 918, 924 (D. Kan.

Under § 630(a):
The term “person” means one or more
individuals,
partnerships,
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1987); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226, 233 (1983) (“In 1974, Congress
extended the substantive prohibitions of the
[ADEA] to employers having at least 20
workers, and to the Federal and State
Governments.” (emphasis added)). Section
630(b), they argue, is deconstructed as
follows: The term “employer” means [A—
person] and also means (1) [B—agent of
person] and (2) [C—State-affiliated entities].

F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1117 (N.D. Ala. 2014)
(concluding the twenty-employee limitation
should not be imported into the definition of
employer covering political subdivisions of a
state); see also Johnson v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 356
(1985) (“[I]n 1974 Congress extended
coverage to Federal, State, and local
Governments, and to employers with at least
20 workers.” (emphasis added)).

They note that each of the three
“employer” categories is then further
defined. For example, the “person” category
is elaborated upon in § 630(a), which
provides multiple definitions of the term
“person” and then narrows the category to
those persons “engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees for each working day.” The
“State-affiliated entities” category lists the
various types of State-affiliated entities
covered, such as a “political subdivision of a
State,” and also contains clarifying language.

For example, imagine someone
saying: “The password can be an even
number. The password can also be an odd
number greater than one hundred.” These are
two separate definitions of what an
acceptable password can be, and the
clarifying language does not apply to both
definitions. If the sentences are reversed, the
“greater than one hundred” limiting language
would still not carry over to the second
sentence discussing even numbers. See
Holloway, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. This
becomes more obvious when it would be
illogical to carry clarifying language over. If
a statute said “The word bank means ‘the
rising ground bordering a lake, river, or sea’
and the word also means ‘a place where
something is held available,’” the second
definition would not be describing a place
that must border a lake, river, or sea.
Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/ dictionary/bank. The phrase
“also means” indicates that a second,
additional definition is being described. See
§ 630(b) (using the phrase “also means”).

a
They argue that the ordinary meaning
of “also” supports the notion that there are
three distinct categories. See Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty.,
555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009). We agree. The
word “also” is a term of enhancement; it
means “in addition; besides” and “likewise;
too.” E.g., Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary 34 (1973). As used in this context,
“also” adds another definition to a previous
definition of a term—it does not clarify the
previous definition. See Holloway v. Water
Works & Sewer Bd. of Town of Vernon, 24

b
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The EEOC, as amicus curiae,
expressing its views in support of Guido and
Rankin, contends that the English language
provided Congress many ways to apply
clarifying
language
across
multiple
definitions of a term, had it wanted to. The
EEOC cites the 1972 amendment to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an example
(the “1972 Title VII Amendment”). This
amendment extended Title VII protections to
States and State-related entities, including
political subdivisions of a State. Pub. L. 92261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e). The EEOC emphasizes that the
1972 Title VII Amendment used language
making clear that the twenty-employee
minimum applied to political subdivisions,
stating:

added the limiting language to each
definition discussed in § 630(b), or at least to
the definition covering political subdivisions,
but it chose not to.
2
In the face of such a strong textual
argument, the Fire District has a powerful
rebuttal: four other circuits have considered
this issue and all have declared § 630(b) to be
ambiguous. Cink v. Grant County, 635 F.
App’x 470, 474 n.5 (10th Cir. 2015); Palmer
v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d
892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998); E.E.O.C. v.
Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir.
1990); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801
F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1986). Cink, Palmer,
and Monclova Township all rely entirely on
Kelly’s reasoning regarding the statute’s
ambiguity.

(a) The term “person” includes one or
more individuals, governments,
governmental agencies, political
subdivisions,
labor
unions,
partnerships,
associations,
corporations, legal representatives,
mutual
companies,
joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, trustees in
cases under Title 11, or receivers.

The Seventh Circuit in Kelly
concluded the statute was ambiguous. While
acknowledging that the categorical reading
was a reasonable one, it concluded the
plaintiff “weaken[ed] his argument that the
statute is unambiguous by arguing that we
should look at ‘common sense’ and
congressional intent in deciding that the
statute is unambiguous.” 801 F.2d at 270. It
is not clear to us why an appeal to “common
sense” undermines this argument. Further,
any appeal to congressional intent is a nonsequitur; it is not a factor that should affect
the determination of whether a statute’s plain
meaning is ambiguous. See Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 391 (2012).

(b) The term “employer” means a
person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (emphasis added). The
EEOC argues that Congress knew how to use
language to ensure that an employee
minimum applied to political subdivisions
when it wanted. Congress could have also
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The Kelly opinion further supports its
conclusion by stating that the defendant
presented
a
reasonable
alternative
construction:

If Congress had wanted to include the second
sentence definitions of employer in the first
sentence, it could have used the word
“include” or utilized one of the other
alternative constructions described above.
The word “also” is not used in common
speech to mean “includes.” Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary 34 (1973). As
previously described, the use of separate
sentences and the word “also” combine to
create distinct categories, in which clarifying
language for one category does not apply to
other categories. See United States v. Rentz,
777 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“[U]ntil a clue emerges suggesting
otherwise, it’s not unreasonable to think that
Congress used the English language
according to its conventions.”). Even the
Supreme Court defaults into the categorical
approach when discussing the statute. E.g.,
Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 233; Johnson, 472 U.S.
at 356.

More significantly, the Park District
enunciates
another
fair
and
reasonable interpretation of section
630(b)—that Congress, in amending
section 630(b), merely intended to
make it clear that states and their
political subdivisions are to be
included in the definition of
‘employer,’ as opposed to being a
separate definition of employer.
Id. at 270–71. Since the alternative reading
was also deemed reasonable, the court
concluded the statute was ambiguous. Id. at
270.
A serious problem with the
alternative interpretation argument, however;
is that the court in Kelly never explained how
it is a “fair and reasonable interpretation” of
the statute’s actual language. A statute must
be “susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation” to be ambiguous. Alaska
Wilderness League v. E.P.A., 727 F.3d 934,
938 (9th Cir. 2013). But, declaring that
multiple reasonable interpretations exist does
not make it so. None of the cases cited by the
Fire District elaborate on how and why this
alternative interpretation is a reasonable
one—they simply declare it so.

3
We are persuaded that the meaning of
§ 630(b) is not ambiguous. The twentyemployee minimum does not apply to
definitions in the second sentence and there
is no reason to depart from the statute’s plain
meaning. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526,
534 (2004) (“It is well established that when
the statute’s language is plain, the sole
function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not
absurd—is to enforce it according to its
terms.”). We are satisfied that our reading
comports with Lamie and certainly does not
threaten to destroy the entire statutory
scheme. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,

As a matter of plain meaning, the
argument that § 630(b) can be reasonably
interpreted to include its second sentence
definitions within its first is underwhelming.
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Congress wrote it.”); Scalia & Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 391 (critiquing those who think “that
the purpose of interpretation is to discover
intent”). We need not read minds to read text.

2495 (2015) (preventing the destruction of
the statutory scheme may justify departing
from “the most natural reading of the
pertinent statutory phrase”). Courts should
rarely depart from a statute’s clear meaning
because it risks creating a perception that
they are inserting their own policy
preferences into a law. See id. at 2495–96
(citing Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79,
83 (1939)). Here, there is no valid
justification to depart from the plain meaning
of the language and to adopt another
interpretation.

Both parties argue that the 1972 Title
VII Amendment supports their position. But,
critically, Congress used different language
than it used in the 1974 ADEA Amendment,
which changes the ADEA’s meaning relative
to Title VII, and such Congressional choice
must be respected. See Univ. of Tex. SW Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–29
(2013). If Congress had wanted the 1974
ADEA Amendment to achieve the same
result as the 1972 Title VII Amendment, it
could have used the same language.

C
Even if we agreed with the Fire
District and concluded that the statute is
ambiguous—which we do not—the outcome
would not change. The best reading of the
statute would be that the twenty-employee
minimum does not apply to a political
subdivision of a State. We reject the Fire
District’s contention that considering the
legislative history Kelly reviewed should lead
us to an alternative interpretation.

Nor does the legislative history Kelly
relies on address the specific question before
us. Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271–72. It references a
Senate report written a year before the bill
was passed discussing how the same set of
rules should apply to the private sector and
the government. Id. (citing Senate Age
Discrimination Report at 17). The Senate
report never states that the twenty-employee
minimum should apply to political
subdivisions, but it does “urge that the law be
extended . . . to include (1) Federal, State, and
local governmental employees, and (2)
employers with 20 or more employees.”
Senate Age Discrimination Report at 18
(emphasis added). It also cites a House report
containing the same vague language about
ensuring the same rules apply and two floor
statements by Senator Bentsen, one of which
occurred in 1972, arguing that the
amendment is needed so that government

After concluding that the statute is
ambiguous, Kelly relied on “the parallel
[1972] amendment of Title VII” and the
legislative history around the 1974
Amendment to conclude “that Congress
intended section 630(b) to apply the same
coverage to both public and private
employees.” 801 F.2d at 271–72. Kelly’s
focus on divining congressional intent, rather
than determining the ordinary meaning of the
text, led it astray. See Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008)
(“We have to read [the ADEA] the way
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employees receive the “same protection.” Id.
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 93- 913 (1974); 118
Cong. Rec. 15,895 (1972); 120 Cong. Rec.
8768 (1974)).

role to choose what we think is the best policy
outcome and to override the plain meaning of
a statute, apparent anomalies or not. See
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.
Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014).

Eventually, the Kelly court resorted to
arguing that given its perception of
Congressional intent, Congress could not
have intended what it said. 801 F.2d at 273
(“We also believe that applying the ADEA to
government employers with less than twenty
employees would lead to some anomalous
results which we do not believe Congress
would have intended.”). However, there are
plenty of perfectly valid reasons why
Congress could have structured the statute
the way it did.10 In any event, it is not our

III
The district court erred in concluding
that the twentyemployee minimum applies to
political subdivisions; it does not. Therefore,
the order granting summary judgment is
reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

311

“US Supreme Court to kick off next session with AZ age-discrimination case”

Arizona Capitol Times
Howard Fischer
Jul 9, 2018
The ability of a tiny Arizona fire district to
fire its two oldest employees takes center
stage in Washington as the U.S. Supreme
Court will hear arguments the first day of its
new session, possibly with a new justice
already seated.

The whole case turns on a single legal point:
Can government employers be too small to
have to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws.
Court records show the pair were hired in
2000, eventually rising to the rank of fulltime fire captains.

In a brief order Monday, the court put the
case of John Guido and Dennis Rankin and
their case against the Mount Lemmon Fire
District on the Oct. 1 agenda. What the
justices rule will most immediately affect
whether the pair, the district’s two oldest
employees before they were let go, have a
right to sue under federal age discrimination
law.

In 2009, with the district facing a financial
shortfall, it terminated the pair. At the time,
they were the district’s oldest employees,
with Guido at 45 and Rankin at 54.
Awerkamp said they were replaced as
captains with two younger people, one them
just 28 with only six years of experience as a
firefighter.

But whatever the high court decides clearly
has broader implications, to the point that an
alphabet soup of state and local government
organizations and their allies filed their own
legal brief telling the justices that they should
side with the fire district and block the ability
of the two fired workers to sue.

The district argued that the pair were laid off
because they had not participated in recent
years in voluntary shifts fighting wildland
fires. The pair then sued.
A trial judge threw out the claim, concluding
the federal Age Discrimination Employment
Act covers public employers only if they
have 20 or more workers. But a federal
appeals court reversed, saying while that’s
true of private companies, it finds no such
minimum number in statutes governing
public employers.

That argument is getting a fight from Tucson
attorney Don Awerkamp who hopes to
convince the justices that his clients’ rights
were violated and they deserve their day in
court.

312

That brought the case to the Supreme Court
— and the attention of public employers
nationwide who want the appellate ruling
overturned.

He said most states have requirements that
political subdivisions pay monetary damages
if they discriminate on the basis of age.
Awerkamp said that even includes rural and
sparsely-populated places like Alaska and
Wyoming which grant no exceptions to small
public employers from their own agediscrimination laws.

“Small public sector employers are
particularly vulnerable, sometimes operating
with only a handful of staff,” wrote attorney
Collin O. Udell. Among the groups he is
representing are the National Conference of
State Legislatures, the National Association
of Counties, the National League of Cities
and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.

“The fire district identifies no adverse
consequences on those statutes,” he wrote.
And Awerkamp said public employers can
participate in insurance pools that cover the
cost of discrimination lawsuits, so the burden
does not fall on any one particular district.

The issue is particularly acute, he said, in
rural special districts like this one.

But Awerkamp urged the justices not to be
swayed by arguments by the district and its
legal allies of financial hardship.

“There are fewer alternatives to layoffs and
terminations when budget cuts must be
made,” Udell wrote.

“It is important not to lose sight of what it
actually seeks here — a free pass under
federal law to discriminate on the basis of
age,” he said. “No matter how blatant or
unjustified its reliance on age, the first direct
seeks immunity for inflicting on individual
workers the economic and psychological
injury accompanying the loss of opportunity
to engage in productive and satisfying
occupations.”

“Small, rural special districts may not have
other positions or locations to which they can
transfer an employee in lieu of termination or
layoffs,” he continued. “When resources are
strained, already-leanly staffed special
districts
encountering
employment
discrimination lawsuits may find it
impossible to remain financially viable.”
Awerkamp called those arguments “incorrect
and overblown.”

Even if the court hears the case in early
October, it is likely to be sometime in 2019
before there is a ruling.

313

“Age Law Shield for State Workers Doesn’t Turn on Unit Size”
Bloomberg
Kevin McGowan

June 19, 2017
differently,” Matura told Bloomberg BNA
June 19.

A federal statute prohibiting age bias in
employment applies to an Arizona state fire
district regardless of whether it had 20
employees, a federal appeals court ruled
(Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. , 2017
BL 208360, 9th Cir., No. 15-15030, 6/19/17
).

“It’s the classic circuit split,” Matura said.
The fire district hasn’t made a final decision,
but it likely will ask the Supreme Court to
provide “clarity once and for all” on the
ADEA coverage issue, he said.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit’s June 19 decision creates a split
among the federal appeals courts by ruling
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s
20-employee threshold for coverage applies
only to private employers.

It’s “been a long road” for John Guido and
Dennis Rankin, two captains who were
terminated by the fire district in 2009 at ages
46 and 54, respectively, said Shannon Giles
of Awerkamp, Bonilla & Giles PLC in
Tucson, Ariz., who represented them.

A petition for U.S. Supreme Court review is
“likely,” said Jeffrey Matura of Graif Barrett
& Matura PC in Phoenix, who represented
the fire district

Discovery in the lower court was completed
before a district judge summarily ruled for
Mount Lemmon based on his reading of the
ADEA employee threshold, Giles told
Bloomberg BNA June 19.

The act’s “plain language” establishes that a
state’s political subdivisions, such as the
Mount Lemmon Fire District in Arizona, are
covered by the ADEA regardless of how
many workers they employ, the Ninth Circuit
said.

Guido and Rankin hope the Ninth Circuit’s
decision means a trial soon on their bias
claims, she said.
ADEA’s Meaning Is Clear, Court Says

Four other federal appeals courts have ruled
state political subdivisions must employ at
least 20 workers to fall within the act’s
purview. The Ninth Circuit is the only federal
circuit to “interpret the relevant language

Three other federal appeals courts have
followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Kelly
v. Wauconda Park District, finding that the
ADEA is “ambiguous.” Those courts said the
better reading of the act is that Congress
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intended the 20-employee threshold to apply
to all employers, public as well as private.

The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which filed an amicus brief
supporting the fired firefighters, is “gratified”
the court agreed with the commission that the
ADEA covers all political subdivisions, even
if they don’t have 20 employees, Anne Noel
Occhialino, an EEOC senior appellate
attorney, said in an email June 19.

The Ninth Circuit, however, said there’s no
ambiguity. The ADEA’s 1974 amendment
can only be read as extending the act’s
protections to all state government workers,
regardless of the size of the unit in which they
work, Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain wrote
in an opinion joined by Judges Ronald M.
Gould and Milan D. Smith Jr.
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“ADEA Applies To Small State Offices, Feds Tell High Court”

Law360
Branden Campbell
July 13, 2018
Federal bias law doesn’t give small state
subdivisions a free pass to discriminate
against older workers, the government said
Thursday in a U.S. Supreme Court case that
will clarify the Age Discrimination in
Employment
Act’s
scope.

discriminating against workers or job
applicants age 40 or older. In its current form,
the law defines “employer” as a “person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce”
that had “twenty or more employees” during
much of the preceding calendar year. The law
says employer “also means” states or
political
subdivisions.

The government in an amicus brief urged the
Supreme Court to uphold a Ninth Circuit
ruling that a section of the ADEA barring
“state or political subdivision[s]” from
discriminating against older workers
describes a different class of covered
employer than a section limiting enforcement
to only those private businesses with “twenty
or
more
employees."

The high court in February agreed to hear a
challenge by an Arizona firefighting service
to a Ninth Circuit ruling reviving a suit by
two fired workers. The Ninth Circuit said a
district court incorrectly applied the 20worker minimum to the Mount Lemmon Fire
District, a public office that had fewer than
20 workers when the plaintiffs sued.

That Congress in a 1974 amendment to the
ADEA said the law, which originally covered
only private businesses of a certain size,
“also” covers state entities shows the
categories are separate, the government said.

The government’s brief argues the
background of the 1974 amendment makes
clear that Congress meant the ADEA to apply
separately to public and private employers. It
notes the ADEA shares “several key
features” with the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which Congress in the same 1974 package
extended to public agencies regardless of
their
size.

“Because the ordinary meaning of ‘also’ is
‘in addition to,’ the second sentence defines
an additional category of covered
employers—namely states and political
subdivisions,” the government said.
“Congress did not apply any minimumemployee requirement to that category.”
The

ADEA

bars

“employers”

“Because the FLSA does not include a
minimum-employee requirement, it is
reasonable to infer that Congress similarly
extended the ADEA to governmental entities

from
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without imposing such a requirement,” the
government
said.

political
subdivisions
as
to
all
antidiscrimination
claims—for
race,
ethnicity, gender, etc.—but not for age," he
said. "And neither grapples with the
devastating effect the Ninth Circuit’s ruling
will have on tiny political subdivisions that
provide crucial government services."

The government also pushed back against
Mount Lemmon’s argument that small
government offices would be deluged with
litigation should the high court rule the
ADEA’s minimums don’t apply to state
employers. It notes the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,
which administers the ADEA, has said for
decades that the law applies to government
offices with fewer than 20 workers, and that
most states have passed separate laws
forbidding government employers of any size
from discriminating against older workers.

Representatives for the AARP Foundation
and the U.S. Department of Justice declined
comment.
The government is represented by James Lee,
Jennifer Goldstein, Anne Noel Occhialino,
Noel Francisco, Jeffrey Wall and Morgan
Goodspeed of the U.S. Department of Justice.

A coalition of worker groups led by
the AARP also filed an amicus brief
Thursday backing the workers and the Ninth
Circuit. The groups argue the 1974
amendment plainly applies to state offices of
any size and distinguish the ADEA from Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, which only
applies to government offices if they have 15
or more workers. The National Employment
Lawyers Association is also on the brief.

The AARP is represented by Daniel
Kohrman, Laurie McCann, Dara Smith and
William Alvarado Rivera of the AARP
Foundation.
Mount Lemmon is represented by Jeffrey C.
Matura and Amanda J. Taylor of
Graif Barrett & Matura PC and Joshua
Rosenkranz, Robert Loeb, Thomas Bondy,
Ned Hirschfeld and Logan Dwyer of Orrick
Herrington
&
Sutcliffe
LLP.

Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP attorney
Joshua Rosenkranz, who represents Mount
Lemmon, said Friday neither brief
"persuasively reconciles the result they
advocate with the language and structure of
the
statute."

The workers are represented by Don
Awerkamp and Shannon Giles of Awerkamp
Bonilla
&
Giles
PLC.
The case is Mount Lemmon Fire District v.
John Guido et al., case number 17-587, in the
U.S. Supreme Court.

"They don’t explain why Congress would
have opted [in Title VII] to exempt small
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Frank v. Gaos
Ruling Below: IN RE GOOGLE REFERRER HEADER PRIVACY LITIGATION, 869 F.3d 737
(9th Cir. 2017)
Overview: The Cy Pres doctrine gives courts the power to interpret a will or a charitable gift to
implement the giver’s intent when it is impossible to carry out the terms as they are written. The
Cy Pres doctrine has recently been applied to distribute to charity the proceeds of a class-action
settlement that have not been claimed by class members, usually because the award to each person
is relatively small. Some object to the use of the Cy Press doctrine for class actions because
unaffected entities—like charities and non-profits—would unfairly benefit.
Issue: Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides
no direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports with the requirement
that a settlement binding class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
IN RE GOOGLE REFERRER HEADER PRIVACY LITIGATION,
Paloma GAOS; Anthony Italiano; Gabriel Priyev, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs- Appellees
v.
Melissa Ann Holyoak; Theodore H. Frank, Objectors–Appellants
v.
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on August 22, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

pres–only settlement and conclude that it did
not.

Google’s free Internet search engine
(“Google Search”) processes more than one
billion user-generated search requests every
day. This case arises from class action claims
that Google violated users’ privacy by
disclosing their Internet search terms to
owners of third-party websites. We consider
whether the district court abused its
discretion in approving the $8.5 million cy

BACKGROUND
In these consolidated class actions,
three Google Search users—Paloma Gaos,
Anthony Italiano, and Gabriel Priyev
(collectively “plaintiffs”)—asserted claims
for violation of the Stored Communications
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.; breach of
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contract; breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; breach of implied contract;
and unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs sought
statutory and punitive damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief for the
alleged privacy violations.

parties reached a settlement, which they
submitted to the district court for preliminary
approval in July 2013. The settlement
provided that Google would pay a total of
$8.5 million and provide information on its
website disclosing how users’ search terms
are shared with third parties, in exchange for
a release of the claims of the approximately
129 million people who used Google Search
in the United States between October 25,
2006 and April 25, 2014 (the date the class
was given notice of the settlement).

The claimed privacy violations are
the consequence of the browser architecture.
Once users submit search terms to Google
Search, it returns a list of relevant websites in
a new webpage, the “search results page.”
Users can then visit any website listed in the
search results page by clicking on the
provided link.

Of the $8.5 million settlement fund,
approximately $3.2 million was set aside for
attorneys’ fees, administration costs, and
incentive payments to the named plaintiffs.
The remaining $5.3 million or so was
allocated to six cy pres recipients, each of
which would receive anywhere from 15 to
21% of the money, provided that they agreed
“to devote the funds to promote public
awareness and education, and/or to support
research, development, and initiatives,
related to protecting privacy on the Internet.”
The six recipients were AARP, Inc.; the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon
University; the Illinois Institute of
Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law
Center for Information, Society and Policy;
the Stanford Center for Internet and Society;
and the World Privacy Forum. Each of the
recipients submitted a detailed proposal for
how the funds would be used to promote
Internet privacy.

When a user visits a website via
Google Search, that website is allegedly
privy to the search terms the user originally
submitted to Google Search. This occurs
because, for each search results page, Google
Search generates a unique “Uniform
Resource Locator” (“URL”) that includes the
user’s search terms. In turn, every major
desktop and mobile web browser (including
Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, and
Safari) by default reports the URL of the last
webpage that the user viewed before clicking
on the link to the current page as part of
“referrer header” information. See In re
Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1102
(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining how “referrer
headers” operate).
The genesis of the plaintiffs’
complaints is the application of the search
protocol, coupled with Google’s “Web
History” service, which tracks and stores
account holders’ browsing activity on
Google’s servers. Following mediation, the

After a hearing, the district court
certified the class for settlement purposes and
preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice
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comme possible (or “as near as possible”), is
an equitable doctrine that originated in trusts
and estates law as a way to effectuate the
testator’s intent in making charitable gifts.
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038
(9th Cir. 2011). In the class action settlement
context, the cy pres doctrine permits a court
to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable
portions of a class action settlement fund to
the “next best” class of beneficiaries for the
indirect benefit of the class. Id.

was given to the class on April 25, 2014, via
a website, toll-free telephone number, paid
banner ads, and press articles. Thirteen class
members opted out of the settlement, and five
class members, including Melissa Ann
Holyoak and Theodore H. Frank (collectively
“Objectors”), filed objections.
Following a final settlement approval
hearing at which the district court heard from
both the parties and Objectors, the district
court granted final approval of the settlement
on March 31, 2015. With respect to the
objections, the district court found that: (1) a
cy pres–only settlement was appropriate
because
the
settlement
fund
was
nondistributable; (2) whether or not the
settlement was cy pres– only had no bearing
on whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority
requirement was met; (3) the cy pres
recipients had a substantial nexus to the
interests of the class members, and there was
no evidence that the parties’ preexisting
relationships with the recipients factored into
the selection process; and (4) the attorneys’
fees were commensurate with the benefit to
the class. The district court awarded $2.125
million in fees to class counsel and $15,000
in incentive awards to the three named
plaintiffs. Objectors appealed.

Here, the cy pres recipients were six
organizations that have pledged to use the
settlement funds to promote the protection of
Internet privacy. We review for abuse of
discretion the district court’s approval of the
proposed class action settlement. Id. In
addition, because the settlement took place
before formal class certification, settlement
approval requires a “higher standard of
fairness.” Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d
811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1998)), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). Recognizing that,
at this early stage of litigation, the district
court cannot as effectively monitor for
collusion and other abuses, we scrutinize the
proceedings to discern whether the court
sufficiently “account[ed] for the possibility
that class representatives and their counsel
have sacrificed the interests of absent class
members for their own benefit.” Id.

ANALYSIS
The settlement at issue involves a cy
pres–only distribution of the $5.3 million or
so that remains in the settlement fund after
attorneys’ fees, administration costs, and
incentive awards for the named plaintiffs are
accounted for. Cy pres, which takes its name
from the Norman French expression cy pres

I. Appropriateness of the Cy Pres–Only
Settlement
As an initial matter, we quickly
dispose of the argument that the district court
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erred by approving a cy pres–only settlement.
Notably, Objectors do not contest the value
of the settlement nor do they plead monetary
injury. To be sure, cy pres–only settlements
are considered the exception, not the rule. See
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d
468, 474 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
direct distributions to class members are
preferable because “[t]he settlement-fund
proceeds, having been generated by the value
of the class members’ claims,” are “the
property of the class”); accord William B.
Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions §
12:26 (5th ed. 2017). However, they are
appropriate where the settlement fund is
“non-distributable” because “the proof of
individual claims would be burdensome or
distribution of damages costly.” Lane, 696
F.3d at 819 (quoting Nachshin, 663 F.3d at
1038). We have never imposed a categorical
ban on a settlement that does not include
direct payments to class members.

court found that the cost of verifying and
“sending out very small payments to millions
of class members would exceed the total
monetary benefit obtained by the class.”
To begin, the district court found that
the amount of the fund was appropriate given
the shakiness of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Objectors do not contend that it would have
been feasible to make a 4-cent distribution to
every class member. Instead, they ask us to
impose a mechanism that would permit a
miniscule portion of the class to receive
direct payments, eschewing a class
settlement that benefits members through
programs on privacy and data protection
instituted by the cy pres recipients. Objectors
suggest, for example, that “it is possible to
compensate an oversized class with a small
settlement fund by random lottery
distribution,” or by offering “$5 to $10 per
claimant” on the assumption that few class
members will make claims. Our review of the
district court’s settlement approval is not
predicated simply on whether there may be
“possible” alternatives; rather, we benchmark
whether the district court discharged its
obligation to assure that the settlement is
“fair, adequate, and free from collusion.”
Lane, 696 F.3d at 819 (quoting Hanlon, 150
F.3d at 1027). If we took their objections at
face value, Objectors would have us jettison
the teachings of Lane. Objectors would also
have us ignore our prior endorsement of cy
pres awards that go to uses consistent with
the nature of the underlying action. Nachshin,
663 F.3d at 1039–40.

The district court’s finding that the
settlement fund was non-distributable
accords with our precedent. In Lane, we
deemed
direct
monetary
payments
“infeasible” where each class member’s
individual recovery would have been “de
minimis” because the remaining settlement
fund was approximately $6.5 million and
there were over 3.6 million class members.
Id. at 817–18, 820–21. The gap between the
fund and a miniscule award is even more
dramatic here. The remaining settlement fund
was approximately $5.3 million, but there
were an estimated 129 million class
members, so each class member was entitled
to a paltry 4 cents in recovery—a de minimis
amount if ever there was one. The district

Likewise, we easily reject Objectors’
argument that if the settlement fund was non-
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parties, their counsel, or the court.”
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038–39; see also
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865
(9th Cir. 2012); Six (6) Mexican Workers v.
Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308–
39 (9th Cir. 1990). Due to these dangers, we
require cy pres awards to meet a “nexus”
requirement by being tethered to the
objectives of the underlying statute and the
interests of the silent class members.
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039.

distributable, then a class action cannot be the
superior means of adjudicating this
controversy under Rule 23(b)(3). “[T]he
purpose of the superiority requirement is to
assure that the class action is the most
efficient and effective means of resolving the
controversy.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N.
Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir.
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 7AA
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1779 (3d ed. 2005)). Not
surprisingly, there is a relationship between
the superiority requirement and the
appropriateness of a cy pres–only settlement.
The two concepts are not mutually exclusive,
since “[w]here recovery on an individual
basis would be dwarfed by the cost of
litigating on an individual basis, this factor
weighs in favor of class certification.” Id. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the superiority requirement was met
because the litigation would otherwise be
economically infeasible. This finding
dovetails with the rationale for the cy pres–
only settlement.

Objectors suggest that the district
court rubber-stamped the settlement, by
“simply h[olding] that the Ninth Circuit and
district courts have approved other all–cy–
pres settlements and class members
effectively had no right to complain about the
parties’ choice of compromise.” That
characterization is unfair and untrue. And
oddly, despite this claim, Objectors do not
dispute that the nexus requirement is satisfied
here.
The district court found that the six cy
pres
recipients
are
“established
organizations,” that they were selected
because they are “independent,” have a
nationwide reach and “a record of promoting
privacy protection on the Internet,” and “are
capable of using the funds to educate the class
about online privacy risks.” Although the
district court expressed some disappointment
that the recipients were the “usual suspects,”
it recognized that “failure to diversify the list
of distributees is not a basis to reject the
settlement . . . when the proposed recipients
otherwise qualify under the applicable
standard.” Accordingly, the district court
appropriately found that the cy pres

II. The Cy Pres Recipients
We now turn to the crux of this
appeal: whether approval of the settlement
was an abuse of discretion due to claimed
relationships between counsel or the parties
and some of the cy pres recipients. We have
long recognized that the cy pres doctrine,
when “unbridled by a driving nexus between
the plaintiff class and the cy pres
beneficiaries[,] poses many nascent dangers
to the fairness of the distribution process,”
because the selection process may then
“answer to the whims and self interests of the
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distribution addressed the objectives of the
Stored Communications Act and furthered
the interests of the class members. Previous
cy pres distributions rest on this same
understanding of the nexus requirement. See,
e.g., Dennis, 697 F.3d at 866–67 (no nexus
between false advertising claims relating to
the nutritional value of Frosted MiniWheats® and charities providing food for the
indigent); Lane, 696 F.3d at 817, 820– 22
(nexus between Facebook privacy claims and
charity giving grants promoting online
privacy and security); Nachshin, 663 F.3d at
1039–41 (no nexus between breach of
privacy, unjust enrichment, and breach of
contract claims relating to AOL’s provision
of commercial e-mail services and the Legal
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, the Boys and
Girls Clubs of Santa Monica and Los
Angeles, and the Federal Judicial Center
Foundation); Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904
F.2d at 1307–09 (no nexus between Farm
Labor Contractor Registration Act claims and
foundation operating human assistance
projects in areas where plaintiffs resided).

be ordered if the court or any party has any
significant prior affiliation with the intended
recipient that would raise substantial
questions about whether the selection of the
recipient was made on the merits.” Principles
of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.07 cmt. b
(Am. Law Inst. 2010) (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, Objectors take issue
with the choice of cy pres recipients because
Google has in the past donated to at least
some of the cy pres recipients, three of the cy
pres recipients previously received Google
settlement funds, and three of the cy pres
recipients are organizations housed at class
counsel’s alma maters. See In re Google Buzz
Privacy Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL
7460099, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2011). The
Objectors point to a comment from the
American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation which
suggests that “[a] cy pres remedy should not

We do not need to explore the
contours of the “significant prior affiliation”
comment because in the context of this
settlement, the claimed relationships do not
“raise substantial questions about whether the
selection of the recipient was made on the
merits.” See id. § 3.07 cmt. b. As a starting
premise, Google’s role as a party in
reviewing the cy pres recipients does not cast
doubt on the settlement. In Lane, we
approved a cy pres–only settlement in which
the distributor of the settlement fund was a
newlycreated entity run by a three-member
board of directors, one of whom was

The benchmark for “significant prior
affiliation” is left undefined. Id. Of course it
makes sense that the district court should
examine any claimed relationship between
the cy pres recipient and the parties or their
counsel. But a prior relationship or
connection between the two, without more, is
not an absolute disqualifier. Rather, a number
of factors, such as the nature of the
relationship, the timing and recency of the
relationship, the significance of dealings
between the recipient and the party or
counsel, the circumstances of the selection
process, and the merits of the recipient play
into the analysis. The district court explicitly
or implicitly addressed this range of
considerations.
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defendant Facebook’s Director of Public
Policy. 696 F.3d at 817. We rejected the
claim that this structure created an
“unacceptable
conflict
of
interest,”
explaining that “[w]e do not require . . . that
settling parties select a cy pres recipient that
the court or class members would find ideal”
since “such an intrusion into the private
parties’ negotiations would be improper and
disruptive to the settlement process.” Id. at
820–21. Instead, we recognized that, as the
“‘offspring of compromise,’” settlement
agreements “necessarily reflect the interests
of both parties to the settlement.” Id. at 821
(quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027). Thus, we
concluded that Facebook’s ability to have “its
say” in the distribution of cy pres funds was
“the unremarkable result of the parties’ giveand-take negotiations” and acceptable so
long as the nexus requirement was satisfied.
Id. at 821–22.

recipient organizations have challenged
Google’s Internet privacy policies in the past.
Most importantly, there was transparency in
this process, with the proposed recipients
disclosing donations received from Google.
Each recipient’s cy pres proposal identified
the scope of Google’s previous contributions
to that organization, and, unlike in Lane,
explained how the cy pres funds were distinct
from Google’s general donations. See
Dennis, 697 F.3d at 867–68 (casting doubt on
the value of cy pres funds that a defendant
“has already obligated itself to donate”).
Citing Lane, the district court found that
“[t]he chosen recipients and their respective
proposals are sufficiently related so as to
warrant approval; they do not have to be the
recipients that objectors or the court consider
ideal.”
The objection that three of the cy pres
recipients had previously received cy pres
funds from Google does not impugn the
settlement without something more, such as
fraud or collusion. See Rodriguez v. W.
Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir.
2009). That “something more” is missing
here. Indeed, the proposition that cy pres
funds should not be awarded to previous
recipients would be in some tension with our
nexus requirements. As we have recognized,
it is often beneficial for a cy pres recipient to
have a “‘substantial record of service,’”
because such a record inspires confidence
that the recipient will use the funds to the
benefit of class members. See Dennis, 697
F.3d at 865 (quoting Six (6) Mexican
Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308); Lane, 696 F.3d
at 822. But in emerging areas such as Internet
and data privacy, expertise in the subject

Given the burgeoning importance of
Internet privacy, it is no surprise that Google
has chosen to support the programs and
research of recognized academic institutes
and nonprofit organizations. Google has
donated to hundreds of third-party
organizations whose work implicates
technology and Internet policy issues,
including university research centers, think
tanks, advocacy groups, and trade
organizations. These earlier donations do not
undermine the selection process employed to
vet the cy pres recipients in this litigation.
The district court conducted a “careful[]
review” of the recipient’s “detailed
proposals” and found a “substantial nexus”
between the recipients and the interests of the
class members. Notably, some of the
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matter may limit the universe of qualified
organizations that can meet the strong nexus
requirements we impose upon cy pres
recipients. Given that, over time, major
players such as Google may be involved in
more than one cy pres settlement, it is not an
abuse of discretion for a court to bless a
strong nexus between the cy pres recipient
and the interests of the class over a desire to
diversify the pick via novel beneficiaries that
are less relevant or less qualified. See
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040 (considering
whether the cy pres distribution “provide[s]
reasonable certainty that any member will be
benefitted”).

burden on the Objectors. The district court
appropriately considered the substance of the
objections and explained why those
challenges did not undermine the overall
fairness of the settlement. See In re Pac.
Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir.
1995). The court affirmatively analyzed the
issue and was cognizant of the claim of a
potential conflict. All class counsel swore
that they have no affiliations with the specific
research centers. Class counsel repeated that
attestation at the final settlement approval
hearing and added that they sit on no boards
for any of the proposed recipients. As one
class counsel put it, “I simply got my law
degree [at Harvard], and that’s simply the end
of it.” The recipients are well recognized
centers focusing on the Internet and data
privacy, and the district court conducted a
“careful[] review” of the recipients’ “detailed
proposals” and found a “substantial nexus”
between the recipients and the interests of the
class members. No one suggested that any of
the centers acted with any impropriety, and
the Objectors provided no alternative
suggestions for other law schools with more
qualified centers or institutes. The district
court found “no indication that counsel’s
allegiance to a particular alma mater factored
into the selection process,” particularly since
the identity of the recipients “was a
negotiated term included in the Settlement
Agreement and therefore not chosen solely
by . . . alumni.” Thus, the district court gave
a “sufficient[ly] reasoned” response to the
objections as to the claimed preexisting
relationships. In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.,
47 F.3d at 377. We can hardly say that the
alumni connections cloud the fairness of the
settlement.

Finally, we reject the proposition that
the link between the cy pres recipients and
class counsel’s alma maters raises a
significant question about whether the
recipients were selected on the merits. There
may be occasions where the nature of the
alumni connections between the parties and
the recipients could cast doubt on the
propriety of the selection process. But here,
we have nothing more than a barebones
allegation that class counsel graduated from
schools that house the Internet research
centers that will receive funds.
The claim that counsel’s receipt of a
degree from one of these schools taints the
settlement can’t be entertained with a straight
face. Each of these schools graduates
thousands of students each year. Objectors
have never disputed that class counsel have
no ongoing or recent relationships with their
alma maters and have no affiliations with the
specific research centers. Nor did the district
court simply accept this concession or put the

325

As an overarching matter, nothing in
this record “raise[s] substantial questions
about whether the selection of the recipient
was made on the merits.” See Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.07 cmt. b.
We do not suggest, however, that a party’s
prior relationship with a cy pres recipient
could not be a stumbling block to approval of
a settlement. Cf. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9
(mem.) (statement of Roberts, C.J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari)
(recognizing that given the “fundamental
concerns surrounding” cy pres awards and
their increasing prevalence, the Court “may
need to clarify the limits on the use of such
remedies” in the future). We hold merely
that, under the circumstances here, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
approving the cy pres recipients.

class, a court has discretion to employ either
the “percentage-of-recovery” method or the
“lodestar” method to calculate appropriate
attorneys’ fees, so long as its discretion is
exercised so as to achieve a reasonable result.
See id. at 942. Here, the district court found
that the requested fees were appropriate
under either metric.
Under the percentage-of-recovery
method, the requested fee was equal to 25%
of the settlement fund. According to the
district court, this percentage was
commensurate with the risk posed by the
action and the time and skill required to
secure a successful result for the class, given
that class counsel faced three motions to
dismiss and participated in extensive
settlement negotiations. The district court
also found that this percentage hewed closely
to that awarded in similar Internet privacy
actions. See, e.g., In re Netflix Privacy Litig.,
No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL
1120801, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013);
see also In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942
(noting that 25% is our “benchmark” for a
reasonable fee award).

III. Attorneys’ Fees
Turning to the issue of attorneys’
fees, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by approving $2.125 million in
fees and $21,643.16 in costs. As an initial
matter, there is no support for Objectors’
view that the settlement should have been
valued at a lower amount for the purposes of
calculating attorneys’ fees simply because it
was cy pres– only. See generally Lane, 696
F.3d at 818 (acknowledging a 25% fee award
that also involved a cy pres–only settlement).
Rather, the question is whether the amount of
attorneys’ fees was reasonable. In re
Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654
F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011).

Although not required to do so, the
district court took an extra step, crosschecking this result by using the lodestar
method. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941–
44 (checking the district court’s percentageof-recovery fees calculation against the
lodestar method, which is “calculated by
multiplying the number of hours the
prevailing party reasonably expended on the
litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate for
the region and the experience of the lawyer”).
The district court found that class counsel

In a settlement that produces a
common fund for the benefit of the entire
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provided sufficient support for its lodestar
calculation that fees totaled $2,126,517.25.

search terms) to unauthorized third parties.
Google’s practice allegedly violated the
federal Stored Communications Act, along
with various state laws. After several rounds
at the motion to dismiss stage, the parties
agreed to a class-wide settlement (before
formal class certification by the district
court). The parties estimated the size of the
class to be 129 million people.

AFFIRMED.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Sections I and III of the
majority opinion. I agree that a cy pres-only
settlement was appropriate in this case and do
not contend that the district court abused its
discretion in calculating class counsel’s fees.

The settlement contained the
following key terms: (1) Google agreed to
pay $8.5 million into a settlement fund; (2)
Google would provide notice of the
settlement on its website; (3) each class
representative would receive $5,000, claims
administration costs would be $1 million, and
attorney’s fees would be $2.125 million (25%
of the settlement fund); and (4) the remainder
of the settlement fund (about $5 million)
would go to six cy pres recipients. The six cy
pres recipients were to be Carnegie Mellon
University (21% of the remainder), the World
Privacy Forum (17%), Chicago-Kent College
of Law Center for Information, Society and
Policy (16%), the Stanford Center for
Internet and Society (16%), the Berkman
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard
University (15%), and that the AARP
Foundation (15%).

I dissent, however, from Section II of
the opinion, in which the majority blesses the
district court’s approval of the settlement,
despite the preexisting relationships between
class counsel and the cy pres recipients. To
me, the fact alone that 47% of the settlement
fund is being donated to the alma maters of
class counsel raises an issue which, in
fairness, the district court should have
pursued further in a case such as this. The
district court made no serious inquiry to
alleviate that concern. Accordingly, I would
vacate the district court’s approval of the
class settlement, and remand with
instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing,
examine class counsel under oath, and
determine whether class counsel’s prior
affiliation with the cy pres recipients played
any role in their selection as beneficiaries.

II.
We review a district court’s approval
of a class action settlement for an abuse of
discretion. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563
F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, however,
the parties reached the settlement before the
class certification stage. “Prior to formal
class certification, there is an even greater

I.
As the majority opinion outlines,
plaintiffs in this case alleged that Google
violated class members’ privacy rights by
disclosing personal information (such as
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potential for a breach of fiduciary duty owed
the class during settlement. Accordingly,
such agreements must withstand an even
higher level of scrutiny for evidence of
collusion or other conflicts of interest than is
ordinarily required.” In re Bluetooth Headset
Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir.
2011).

§ 3.07 comment b (2010) (emphasis added).
Although the majority tells us correctly that
no circuit has adopted the specific “prior
affiliation” language, circuits have endorsed
§ 3.07’s guidance regarding scrutinizing cy
pres disbursements. See, e.g., In re
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d
1060, 1064–65 (8th Cir. 2015) (vacating a cy
pres settlement because “class counsel and
the district court entirely ignored this nowpublished ALI authority”); In re Baby Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting ALI § 3.07, comment a
(2010)); In re Lupron Marketing and Sales
Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir.
2012) (citing to ALI § 3.07 and asserting that
“[c]ourts have generally agreed with the ALI
Principles”).

As stated above, three of the cy pres
distribution payments in our case are to
Chicago-Kent College of Law (16%),
Stanford (16%), and Harvard (15%).
Attorneys for the class attended all three of
these institutions. We, along with other
courts and observers, have pointed out the
unseemly occurrence of cy pres funds being
doled out to interested parties’ alma maters.
See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d
1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011); Securities &
Exchange Comm’n v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,
Inc., 626 F.Supp.2d 402, 414–16 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Adam Liptak, Doling out Other
People’s Money, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2007
(“Lawyers and judges have grown used to
controlling these pots of money, and they
enjoy distributing them to favored charities,
alma maters and the like”).

I conclude that our circuit should
adopt the ALI’s guidance as set forth in §
3.07. District courts should be required to
scrutinize cy pres settlements when the
proffered recipients of the funds have a “prior
affiliation” with counsel, a party, or even the
judge, especially when one of those players is
a loyal alumni of a cy pres recipient. I do not
mean to suggest that class counsel’s alma
mater can never be a cy pres beneficiary.
Rather, I propose that the burden should be
on class counsel to show through sworn
testimony, in an on-the-record hearing, that
the prior affiliation played no role in the
negotiations, that other institutions were
sincerely considered, and that the
participant’s alma mater is the proper cy pres
recipient.

In response to this all-too-common
development, the American Law Institute has
set forth, in its Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation, that “[a] cy pres
remedy should not be ordered if the court or
any party has any significant prior affiliation
with the intended recipient that would raise
substantial questions about whether the
selection of the recipient was made on the
merits.” American Law Institute (ALI),
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation

The majority responds to this line of
argument by asserting that “here, we have
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nothing more than a barebones allegation that
class counsel graduated from schools that
house the Internet research centers that will
receive funds.” The majority then salutes the
district court’s conclusion that there is “no
indication that counsel’s allegiance to a
particular alma mater factored into the
selection process,” and stresses that the cy
pres recipients were a negotiated term, not
chosen solely by alumni. In essence, the
majority holds that despite the nascent
dangers posed by apportioning cy pres funds
to the distributing parties’ alma maters, the
burden is entirely on the objectors to show
that the settlement might be tainted.

objectors to prove more, despite the
objectors’ lack of access to virtually any
relevant evidence that would do so.
I would hold that the combination of
a cy pres-only award, a pre-certification
settlement, and the fact that almost half the cy
pres fund is going to class counsel’s alma
maters, is sufficient to shift the burden to the
proponents of the settlement to show, on a
sworn record, that nothing in the
acknowledged relationship was a factor in the
ultimate choice. Here, the only sworn-to
items in the record on this issue are boiler
plate, one-line declarations from class
counsel stating “I have no affiliation” with
the subject nstitutions. While the majority
asserts that the district court conducted a
“careful review,” these terse declarations are
the only shred of sworn-to evidence in the
record. There was essentially nothing for the
district court to review—carefully or not.
Although there was some discussion between
counsel and the district court during the
hearings on the settlement, this was nothing
more than unsworn lawyer talk during an oral
argument.

I disagree fundamentally with this
analysis. Our precedent requires that district
courts “must be particularly vigilant not only
for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle
signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit
of their own self-interests and that of certain
class members to infect the negotiations.” In
re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947. In our case, we
have a cy pres-only settlement. That alone
raises a yellow flag. Furthermore, we have a
class settlement before formal class
certification. That raises another yellow flag.
Lastly, we have almost half of the settlement
fund, several million dollars, being given to
class counsel’s alma maters. To me, that
raises a red flag. I am especially dubious of
the inclusion of the Center for Information,
Society and Policy at Chicago-Kent Law
School (a law school attended by class
counsel), which center appears to have
inaugurated only a year before the parties
herein agreed to their settlement. Even with
these red and yellow flags, under the
majority’s holding, the burden is still on the

I still have many questions
surrounding how these universities were
chosen, such as: What other institutions were
considered? Why were the non-alma mater
institutions rejected? What relationship have
counsel had with these universities? Have
counsel donated funds to their alma maters in
the past? Do counsel serve on any alma mater
committees or boards? Do counsel’s family
members? How often do counsel visit their
alma maters? There are many questions still
lingering that have not been answered under
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oath. Here, as we have directed before, “the
district court should have pressed the parties
to substantiate their bald assertions with
corroborating evidence.” Id. at 948.

Serv. Commission of the City and County of
San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir.
1982) (internal citations omitted). Instead, I
would remand the case to the district court for
further fact finding in accordance with the
concerns I have expressed.

Although I would vacate the parties’
settlement, I express no opinion on the
definitive fairness of the parties’ agreement.
It is not the province of appellate judges to
“substitute our notions of fairness for those of
the district judge.” Officers for Justice v. Civ.
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“Google Privacy Deal is ‘Clear Abuse,’ High Court Told”
Law360
Shayna Possess
July 10, 2018
the class-action process — especially with
regard to settlements — careful judicial
scrutiny is necessary lest class counsel and
the defendant bargain away the rights of the
class members on terms that minimize payoff
by the defendant, maximize benefit to class
counsel, and leave injured class members out
in the cold," the challengers said. "Yet the
Ninth Circuit below took the opposite
approach, declaring that close scrutiny of the
terms of a cy pres settlement would be 'an
intrusion into the private parties' negotiations'
and therefore 'improper and disruptive to the
settlement
process.'"

Challengers to an $8.5 million settlement
resolving claims that Google shared user
search histories urged the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn the deal Monday, saying
the agreement — which provides millions to
class counsel and the rest to third parties,
including organizations tied to class counsel
and the tech giant — is "clear abuse."
The opening brief by Theodore H. Frank and
Melissa Ann Holyoak of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute asserted that the Ninth
Circuit's decision upholding the deal sets a
dangerous precedent by potentially making
cy pres settlements, which other circuits have
been reluctant to endorse, more common.

The
high
court
granted the
challengers' petition for a writ of certiorari in
April over the objections of Google and class
counsel, who argued the deal is appropriate
because divvying up the fund among class
members
isn't
feasible.

Cy pres deals involve distributing funds to
charities and other third parties rather than
class members and are typically used when
the sheer number of individuals makes
distribution impossible or impracticable. But
Frank and Holyoak asserted that they should
be used sparingly, contending that in the
process of approving the deal in this case, the
appeals court adopted holdings that run the
risk of encouraging gamesmanship at the
expense of absent class members and the
filing of meritless actions that only benefit
attorneys.

In the underlying case, Google struck a deal
with users in 2014 to end privacy claims
accusing it of selling users' search terms
containing
personally
identifiable
information to advertisers, allegedly in
violation of the Stored Communications Act.
At the time, class counsel had argued that
without accounting for attorneys' fees and
costs, the $8.5 million settlement would have

"Because of conflicts of interest inherent in
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had to be divided among 129 million class
members — yielding just 4 cents per person.

activity on third-party sites with their
Facebook friends without consent — and pay
$9.5 million to set up an online privacy
foundation and compensate class counsel.

After U.S. District Judge Edward J.
Davila signed off on the settlement in March
2015, Frank and Holyoak brought their
objections before the Ninth Circuit, arguing
that in an era of massive class actions,
allowing class counsel to invoke cy pres
would set a dangerous precedent of
converting every class action into an "all-cy
pres
settlement."

At the time, Chief Justice John Roberts
issued a rare statement explaining that while
the Marek case wasn't the right vehicle, it
could be time for the court to determine the
limits
of
cy
pres
awards.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed to take
up the Google case, and the objectors lodged
their opening brief Monday, telling the
justices it's high time to decide whether, or
under what circumstances, a cy pres
settlement with no direct benefit to class
members meets requirements that a deal be
"fair,
reasonable
and
adequate."

In October, the Ninth Circuit stood by its split
decision to leave the settlement undisturbed,
prompting the objectors to take their
challenge to the high court. They argued in
January that cy pres awards demand
heightened scrutiny since they can "facilitate
tacit or explicit collusion between
defendants" eager to settle and class counsel,
"who are seeking to maximize their fees and
may be willing to accommodate defendants'
interests in exchange for a 'clear sailing'
agreement not to challenge the fee request."

The challengers asserted that these sorts of
deals are rare for a reason, saying the high
court has consistently shot down the use of
procedural tactics to game class actions like
cy pres, which they called "one of the most
notorious devices used to create the 'illusion
of
compensation.'''

The objectors got support from several amici
in February, including 16 state attorneys
general, who argued that these settlements
hurt consumers and that the Google deal was
the "ideal vehicle" to address when, if ever,
such
arrangements
are
permissible.

Though the Ninth Circuit treated the
arrangement as equivalent to a settlement
providing $8.5 million to class members, the
class members are actually getting nothing,
while the attorneys are set to receive more
than $2 million and the rest of the money is
slated to go to third parties like class
counsel's alma maters and nonprofits Google
already contributes to, Frank and Holyoak
contended. That is neither fair nor
reasonable,
they
argued.

The justices previously passed up the
opportunity to tackle the issue in 2013 when
they refused in Marek v. Lane to review a
divided
Ninth
Circuit
opinion
approving Facebook's settlement agreeing to
terminate its short-lived Beacon feature —
which allegedly shared data about users'
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Frank, who will be arguing the case before
the high court in the fall, said in a Tuesday
statement that they hope the review will
result in a standard that aligns class counsel's
incentives with those of the class.

H. Frank, Melissa Holyoak and Anna St.
John of the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
The Google users are represented by Kassra
P. Nassiri of Nassiri & Jung LLP and
Michael Aschenbrener of KamberLaw LLC.

"The lawyers claim it's too difficult to
distribute money to such a large class," he
said. "But we have seen that when courts
agree that attorneys should only get paid
when their clients do, lawyers magically
discover ways to get money to class
members.
Incentives
work."

Google is represented by Randall W.
Edwards of O'Melveny & Myers LLP and
Donald M. Falk, Edward D. Johnson and
Daniel E. Jones of Mayer Brown LLP.
The case is Frank et al. v. Gaos et al., case
number 17-961, in the Supreme Court of the
United
States.

Representatives for Google and the class
didn't immediately return requests for
comment
Tuesday.

--Additional reporting by Christopher
Crosby. Editing by Marygrace Murphy.

The challengers are represented by Theodore
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“Frank v. Gaos: Cy Pres Gets Its Day at the Supreme Court”
Bloomberg Law: Big Law Business
Jonah M. Knobler and Sam A. Yospe
June 7, 2018
Increasingly, courts presiding over class
actions employ a controversial practice called
cy pres (“see-pray”) that diverts damages
owed to injured class members to non-party
charitable institutions. The theory behind cy
pres is that, when getting damage awards to
class members is difficult, giving that money
to a relevant charity is the next-best result.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never
considered whether cy pres is legitimate or
how it is supposed to work. That may soon
change: on April 30, the Court granted
certiorari in Frank v. Gaos (No. 17-961),
which presents these questions. The decision
in Frank may have enormous implications for
class-action practice. At minimum, however,
it should provide much-needed clarity on this
contentious subject.

repurpose a trust that had been created to
support the abolition movement to instead
provide assistance to poor African
Americans.” Frank v. Gaos, Cert. Pet. at 5.
This trust-law version of cy pres has existed
in one form or another since ancient Rome.
By contrast, the class-action version of cy
pres is relatively new. In 1966, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3) was enacted, and the moneydamages class action was born. A
fundamental problem with this new form of
litigation soon became evident. Even when it
was possible to calculate the aggregate
damage caused by a defendant, it was often
difficult or impossible to locate the injured
class members and notify them of an
available damage award (and when class
members were notified, they often failed to
complete the claims process). Courts faced
with this scenario were in a bind. They could
allow the unclaimed portion of the aggregate
damage award to revert to the defendant-but
this would permit the defendant to keep the
fruits of its wrongful conduct. They could
permit the unclaimed funds to escheat to the
state-but this would provide no benefit to the
class. Or they could pay the unclaimed funds
out as a bonus to those class members who
had already claimed and received damagesbut this would provide a windfall to those
class members at the expense of the
“nonclaiming or unidentified class members”

Origins of Cy Pres
The term cy pres derives from the French cy
pres comme possible (“as near as possible”).
In trust law, it is a doctrine providing that,
when the proceeds of a charitable trust can no
longer be paid to the intended beneficiary
(e.g., because it is defunct), a court may
designate a new beneficiary “as near as
possible” to the original one, so that the
donor’s intent may be substantially
vindicated. For example, after the
Emancipation Proclamation, “a 19th-century
court applied the [cy pres] doctrine to
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who “have superior equitable interests in the
remaining fund[s].” Powell v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 496 (W.D.
Ark. 1994), aff’d 119 F.3d 703 (8th Cir.
1997).

reason unrelated to the reason for the trust
doctrine”). In both of its forms, cy pres
involves courts picking a “next best”
recipient for money originally intended for
someone else. But that is where the similarity
ends. In the trust context, the donor who
created a charitable trust obviously intended
to give his money away to charity; thus, it can
be safely assumed that he would have wanted
the trust to benefit a related charitable cause
rather than having the trust fail and the corpus
revert to his heirs. In the class-action context,
by contrast, cy pres does not even arguably
effectuate the intent of the injured class
members whose money is being given away.
If given a choice, they would prefer to be
made whole for their injuries, rather than
make a charitable donation that will benefit
them indirectly at best. Thus, rather than
substantially vindicating the intent of the
“donor,” class-action cy pres usually subverts
it. Nevertheless, the analogy has taken root,
and cy pres is now widely employed in classaction practice, especially when classes are
certified for settlement. SeeFrank v. Gaos,
Cert. Pet. at 32 (noting that “cy pres
settlements [are now] at their highest levels
ever”).

Class-action cy pres developed in the 1970s
and 1980s as a purported solution to this
problem. SeeMiller v. Steinbach, No. 66-cv356 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (first recorded
application of class-action cy pres). As courts
now apply it, the doctrine provides that, when
it is impracticable to pay out some or all of
the damages fund to injured class memberse.g., because they cannot be located, because
they do not submit claims, or because the perperson award is de minimis-that money may
instead be paid to a charity or nonprofit
whose mission relates to the subject matter of
the lawsuit. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, Cy
Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the
Modern Class Action: A Normative and
Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 61820 (2010) (“Redish”). In a consumerprotection case, for example, a cy pres award
might go to a consumer advocacy group; in a
race-discrimination case, a cy pres award
might go to a civil-rights organization. In this
way, the theory goes, class members who do
not receive money damages still derive some
benefit from the lawsuit-however indirectbecause they will supposedly feel the positive
impact of the cy pres recipient’s charitable
work.

Criticisms of Cy Pres
Unlike trust-law cy pres, class-action cy pres
is controversial. For starters, the legal basis
for it is unclear. Rule 23, which governs class
actions in federal court, says nothing about cy
pres. No statute affirmatively authorizes it.
The Supreme Court has never said a word
about it. Rather, it appears that the notion of
class-action cy pres “can be traced largely to
a pioneering student comment, published in
the University of Chicago Law Review in

The analogy to trust-law cy pres is somewhat
strained. SeeMirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp.,
356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.)
(describing class-action cy pres as
“something parading under [the] name” of
trust-law cy pres that is “applied … for a
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1972.” Redish, supra, at 631. Two years later,
the first court to employ the doctrine, Miller
v. Steinbach, No. 66-cv-356 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), acknowledged that “neither counsel
nor the Court ha[d] discovered [any]
precedent for [it]” (aside from the
questionable analogy to trust law). That is a
shaky foundation for a practice that
redistributes many millions of dollars each
year.

ordering monetary awards to non-parties that
are strangers to an adversarial proceeding and
lack an injury-in-fact traceable to the
defendant. The Due Process Clause may
prohibit courts from appropriating funds
rightfully belonging to absent class members
and transferring them to someone else. And
when cy pres awards are made to groups that
engage in expressive or political activity, as
is often the case, this may infringe on class
members’ First Amendment right not to
subsidize “speech” with which they disagree.
Cf. Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty., and
Mun. Empls., Council 31, No. 16-1466
(argued Feb. 26, 2018) (case challenging
mandatory union “agency fees” under First
Amendment on grounds that such fees fund
advocacy with which some employees
disagree).

Some argue that cy pres is affirmatively
prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act, the
statute under which the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated. The Act states
that those Rules-including Rule 23-“shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” 28 U.S.C. §2072(b). Thus, the use of
Rule 23 to aggregate individual claims does
not permit courts to alter the substantive law
governing those claims. That includes the
remedies that are authorized, and not
authorized, by the underlying substantive
law. For example, if a given statute permits
only injunctive relief in an individual action,
then Rule 23 does not permit a court to award
money damages in a class suit; that would be
a prohibited “modif[ication] of …
substantive right[s].” The same arguably
goes for cy pres: if a statute does not
authorize a court to deny compensation to an
individual plaintiff and order the defendant to
make a charitable donation instead, then the
Rules Enabling Act prohibits courts from
doing so in the class-action context.

Even if it is not unlawful, however, cy pres
can be deeply problematic. For starters, the
notion at the heart of cy pres that charitable
awards provide a meaningful benefit to
unidentified or non-claiming class members
is often a fiction. SeePearson v. NBTY Inc.,
772 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.)
(“The $1.13 million cy pres award to [an]
orthopedic foundation [in a consumer class
action involving joint-health supplements]
did not benefit the class, except insofar as
armed with this additional money the
foundation may contribute to the discovery of
new treatments for joint problems-a
hopelessly speculative proposition.”). In
addition, cy pres can create an appearance of
impropriety-if not outright corruption-by
permitting judges and lawyers to direct
millions of dollars to institutions they are
personally connected to, such as their own
alma maters. Frank v. Gaos, Cert. Pet. at 26.

Indeed, some go even further and argue that
class-action cy pres is unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Redish, supra, at 641. For example,
Article III’s “case or controversy”
requirement may prohibit federal courts from
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Cy pres can also permit defendants to reduce
or even eliminate their effective liability by
selecting a recipient charity that they were
already planning to sponsor independently of
the litigation. Id. at 28. Moreover, cy pres
creates an inherent conflict of interest
between class counsel and the class members
they ostensibly represent. Id. at 25-26.
Specifically, class counsel’s fee award is
usually based on the size of the total recovery
obtained, and cy pres “recovery” is usually
considered part of that total-no different from
money paid to class members. Class counsel,
therefore, have no incentive to fight for a
settlement that maximizes their clients’
recovery. To the contrary, since locating
class members and providing notice is
expensive and time-consuming, and writing a
check to a charity is quick and easy, class
counsel are incentivized to prefer a cy pres
award that minimizes, or even eliminates,
their own clients’ recovery-in Judge Posner’s
words, to “s[ell] [their clients] down the
river.” Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 785. Finally,
because cy pres allows attorneys to reap large
fee awards in cases that might not otherwise
be certified for class treatment, its existence
may motivate lawyers to file many suits that
they would not otherwise file-and, some
would argue, ought not be filed. See Redish,
supra, at 653-56 (discussing cy pres’
enablement of “‘faux’ class actions”).

privacy torts by disclosing their search
queries to the websites that they access
through Google searches. See In re Google
Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-cv04809 (N.D. Cal.).
Google reached an early settlement with class
counsel. It agreed to pay $8.5 million in
exchange for a release of all the privacy
claims of the approximately 129 million
Americans who used its search engine
between 2006 and 2014. However, none of
that $8.5 million would go to the allegedly
wronged web searchers giving up their
claims. Instead, $3.2 million of the fund
would go toward the fees and costs of
plaintiffs’ counsel, and the remainder would
be paid as a cy pres award to institutions that
research or advocate for Internet privacy.
Together, class counsel and Google selected
six awardees, which included the alma maters
of the parties’ lawyers; institutions with
which Google had a preexisting donor
relationship; and a nonprofit (AARP) that
lobbies on controversial legislative and
policy issues.
Ted Frank, a class member (who is also the
Director of the Center for Class Action
Fairness), objected to the proposed
settlement. He argued that a cy pres-only
settlement, under which every class
member’s right to sue is extinguished without
any corresponding compensation, is by
definition not “fair, reasonable, and
adequate” as Rule 23(e)(2) requires of any
class settlement. The district court approved
the settlement over Frank’s objection, In re
Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 87 F.
Supp. 3d 1122 (N.D. Ca. 2015), and Frank
appealed.

Frank v. Gaos
In Frank v. Gaos, many of these concerns are
prominently on display. The case began as a
consolidated class action brought against
Google. In the underlying case, web users
allege that Google violated the Stored
Communications Act and committed various
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In re Google
Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737,
742 (9th Cir. 2017). It relied on circuit
precedent holding that cy pres-only
settlements “are appropriate where the
settlement fund is ‘non-distributable'”
because “proof of individual claims would be
burdensome or distribution of damages
costly.” Id. at 741. Here, the court observed,
the funds remaining after accounting for
attorney’s fees amounted to just “a paltry four
cents” per class member-“a de minimis
amount if ever there was one.” Id. at 742. The
cost of sending out 129 million four-cent
checks would exceed the value of the
settlement. In the Ninth Circuit’s view,
therefore, cy pres was the only option. It
dismissed out of hand Frank’s argument that
this quandary indicated that the case should
never have been certified for class treatment
in the first place. As for the particular cy pres
awardees, the court concluded that they were
sufficiently related to “the objectives of the
Stored Communications Act” and found no
problem with their connections with Google
or counsel. Id at 743-46.

appropriate case. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S.
1003, 1006 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring
in denial of certiorari). These concerns
included:
when, if ever, such relief should be
considered; how to assess its fairness as a
general matter; … how [recipients] should be
selected; what the respective roles of the
judge and parties are in shaping a cy pres
remedy; [and] how closely the goals of any
enlisted organization must correspond to the
interests of the class.
Id.
What To Expect
The Supreme Court may use Frank as a
vehicle to resolve some or all of the concerns
that Chief Justice Roberts posed in Marek.
Notably, the very first question in that list“when, if ever, such relief may be
considered” (emphasis added)-suggests that
the Court could potentially deem class-action
cy pres illegitimate across the board, perhaps
citing the statutory and constitutional
concerns described above. If the Court issues
such a ruling, class-action practice could be
completely transformed: again, if cy pres
were categorically unavailable, many class
actions that now make sense for plaintiffs’
lawyers to pursue would no longer be
economically viable and might not be filed at
all. SeeFrank v. Gaos, Reply in Support of
Cert. at 13 (“After all, without a cy pres
award to inflate the settlement fund, it would
have been impossible to justify paying class
counsel over $2 million in fees, and so the
case may never have been filed.”). Classaction filings could drop sharply in situations

Frank petitioned for certiorari, supported by
a coalition of amici-most notably, a
bipartisan group of 16 state attorneys general.
Google and the class plaintiffs opposed. On
April 30, 2018, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case in its upcoming Term. This was
no great surprise: In 2013, when the Court
denied certiorari in a class action against
Facebook, Chief Justice John Roberts
observed that cy pres awards are a “growing
feature of class action settlements” and that
there are “fundamental concerns surrounding
the use of such remedies in class action
litigation” that merited examination in an
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where class members are difficult to locate or
notify or where each class member’s damage
award would be de minimis.

pres may be used to distribute residual
settlement funds after an initial attempt has
been made to compensate class members.
Because cy pres-only settlements like the one
in Frank represent a modest percentage of all
cy pres awards-perhaps as low as 3 percent
(see Google Br. in Opp. to Cert at 21)-a ruling
cabined to such settlements would be
important, though perhaps not earth-shaking.

On the other hand, the Court may eschew any
sweeping pronouncements and confine its
ruling to cy pres-only settlements, like the
one in Frank itself. Class-action cy pres was
originally conceived, and is most often used,
as a fallback method to dispose of funds
remaining after reasonable efforts to make all
of the injured class members whole. The
situation in Frank is quite different: there, the
district court certified the class and approved
the proposed settlement with the express
understanding that no attempt would even be
made to pay any portion of the settlement
fund to the class. If the Court finds this
unorthodox use of cy pres improper, it may
leave for another day whether and how cy

It is difficult to guess at what the Court will
do. The odds may be that the Court will rule
for Frank and reverse the Ninth Circuit-if
only because the Supreme Court most often
grants certiorari in cases that it believes were
wrongly decided. What is certain, however,
is that the class-action bar (and the charities
who rely on cy pres awards for funding) will
be watching closely.
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“Ninth Circuit Confirms that a Cy Pres Only Settlement Can Work In Privacy
Class Action”
Lexology
Jay Ramsey
September 7, 2017
The internet continues to expand into every
aspect of our lives. With it, many companies
have collected, tracked, and used an
enormous amount of data. All of this has
given rise to class action lawsuits challenging
the privacy practices of these companies.
But, these lawsuits often challenge practices
that do not cause any actual damage, which
can make it difficult to reach a settlement,
particularly of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. So, how
can parties wanting to settle proceed?

nothing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s approval of the settlement,
holding that a cy pres only settlement was
appropriate where the settlement fund was
“non-distributable.” In the case, there were
129 million class members. If the $5.3
million settlement had been distributed, each
class member would have received “a paltry
4 cents.” The court held that, because each
class member’s recovery would have been de
minimis, a cy pres only settlement was
appropriate.

In a recent opinion, the Ninth Circuit upheld
a district court’s approval of a class action
settlement in a privacy litigation where the
class received no damages, and the settlement
funds went to cy pres recipients instead. In In
re Google Referrer Header Privacy
Litigation, No. 15-15858 (9th Cir. Aug. 22,
2017), the plaintiffs challenged Google’s
practice of providing websites with the
search terms that individuals used in
Google’s search engine to reach the website.
The plaintiffs claimed this violated their
privacy.

The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that the cy
pres recipients were appropriate. The
recipients included organizations to which
Google
had
previously
donated,
organizations that had previously received
settlement funds from Google, and
organizations
housed
at
plaintiffs’
counsel alma maters. The Ninth Circuit held
that these connections did not raise any
conflicts. For example, the Ninth Circuit
stated: “Given the burgeoning importance of
Internet privacy, it is no surprise that Google
has chosen to support the programs and
research of recognized academic institutes
and nonprofit organizations. Google has
donated to hundreds of third-party
organizations whose work implicates
technology and Internet policy issues,
including university research centers, think

The parties reached a settlement with an $8.5
million fund. Of that, $3.2 million was set
aside for attorneys’ fees, administration
costs, and incentive payments, the remaining
$5.3 million was allocated to six cy
pres recipients, and class members received
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tanks, advocacy groups, and trade
organizations. These earlier donations do not
undermine the selection process employed to
vet the cy pres recipients in this litigation.”

Going forward, we might see more cy
pres only settlements in cases alleging
violations of privacy, particularly where the
alleged violations cause no actual (or very
little actual) damage to the class.
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Jam v. International Finance Corp.
Ruling Below: Budha Ismail Jam, et al. v. International Finance Corporation, 860 F.3d 703 (D.C.
Cir. 2017)
Overview: The Plaintiffs in the case are farmers and fishermen who live near a power plant in
India—that they contend, ruined local water supplies, decimated fish populations, and
contaminated the air around the plant—that was financed through loans from the IFC. Plaintiff’s
filed a lawsuit in a federal district court in Washington, D.C., but the district court dismissed the
case because it concluded that the IFC was immune from suit. IFC was held to be immune from
suit because of the International Organizations Immunities Act, which gives international
organizations the “same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by
foreign governments.”
Issue: Whether the International Organizations Immunities Act—which affords international
organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments have, 22 U.S.C. §
288a(b)—confers the same immunity on such organizations as foreign governments have under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.
BUDHA ISMAIL JAM, ET AL., Appellant
v.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Decided on June 23, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Appellants, a group of Indian
nationals, challenge a district court decision
dismissing their complaint against the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) on
grounds that the IFC is immune from their
suit. The IFC provided loans needed for
construction of the Tata Mundra Power Plant
in Gujarat, India. Appellants who live near
the plant alleged—which the IFC does not
deny—that contrary to provisions of the loan
agreement, the plant caused damage to the
surrounding communities. They wish to hold
the IFC financially responsible for their

Before: PILLARD, Circuit Judge, and
EDWARDS and SILBERMAN, Senior
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit
Judge SILBERMAN.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge
PILLARD.
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
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injuries, but we agree with the well-reasoned
district court opinion that the IFC is immune
to this suit under the International
Organizations Immunities Act, and did not
waive immunity for this suit in its Articles of
Agreement.

inadequate supervision of the project. Yet the
IFC did not take any steps to force the loan
recipients into compliance with the Plan.
The appellants’ claims are almost
entirely based on tort: negligence, negligent
nuisance, and trespass. They do, however,
raise a related claim as alleged third party
contract beneficiaries of the social and
environmental terms of the contract.
According to appellants, the IFC is not
immune to these claims, and, even if it was
statutorily entitled to immunity, it has waived
immunity.

I.
Appellants are fishermen, farmers, a
local government entity, and a trade union of
fishworkers. They assert that their way of life
has been devastated by the power plant.
The
IFC,
headquartered
in
Washington, is an international organization
founded in 1956 with over 180 member
countries. It provides loans in the developing
world to projects that cannot command
private capital. IFC Articles, art. III §3(i),
Dec. 5, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S.
117. The IFC loaned $450 million to Coastal
Gujarat Power Limited, a subsidiary of Tata
Power, an Indian company, for construction
and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant. The
loan agreement, in accordance with IFC’s
policy to prevent social and environmental
damage, included an Environmental and
Social Action Plan designed to protect the
surrounding communities. The loan’s
recipient was responsible for complying with
the agreement, but the IFC retained
supervisory authority and could revoke
financial support for the project.

II.
Appellants are swimming upriver;
both of their arguments run counter to our
long-held precedent concerning the scope of
international organization immunity and
charter-document immunity waivers.
The IFC relies on the International
Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), which
provides that international organizations
“shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . .
as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except
to the extent that such organizations may
expressly waive their immunity for the
purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of
any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The
President
determines
whether
an
organization is entitled to such immunity. 22
U.S.C. § 288. The IFC has been designated
an international organization entitled to the
“privileges, exemptions, and immunities”
conferred by the statute. Exec. Order No.
10,680, 21 Fed. Reg. 7,647 (Oct. 5, 1956).

Unfortunately, according to the IFC’s
own internal audit conducted by its
ombudsman, the plant’s construction and
operation did not comply with the Plan. And
the IFC was criticized by the ombudsman for
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In response to the IFC’s claim of
statutory entitlement under the IOIA,
appellants rather boldly assert that Atkinson
v. InterAm. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1998), our leading case on the immunity
of international organizations under that
statute, should not be followed. Atkinson held
that foreign organizations receive the
immunity that foreign governments enjoyed
at the time the IOIA was passed, which was
“virtually absolute immunity.” Id. at 1340
(quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)). And that
immunity is not diminished even if the
immunity of foreign governments has been
subsequently modified, particularly by the
widespread acceptance and codification of a
“commercial activities exception” to
sovereign immunity. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(2).

The problem with this argument—
even if we thought it meritorious, which we
do not—is that it runs counter to Atkinson’s
holding, which explicitly rejected such an
evolving notion of international organization
immunity. See 156 F.3d at 1341. We noted
that Congress anticipated the possibility of a
change to immunity of international
organizations, but explicitly delegated the
responsibility to the President to effect that
change—not the judiciary. Id. Morever,
when considering the legislation, Congress
rejected a commercial activities exception—
which is exactly the evolutionary step
appellants wish to have us adopt. Id. As the
district court recognized, we recently
reaffirmed Atkinson, saying that the case
“remains vigorous as Circuit law.” Nyambal
v. Int’l Monetary Fund, 772 F.3d 277, 281
(D.C. Cir. 2014).

Attacking Atkinson, appellants make
two related contentions. First, Atkinson was
wrong to conclude that when Congress tied
the immunity of international organizations
to foreign sovereigns, it meant the immunity
foreign sovereigns enjoyed in 1945. Instead,
according to appellants, who echo the
arguments pressed in Atkinson itself,
lawmakers intended the immunity of the
organizations to rise or fall—like two boats
tied together—with the scope of the
sovereigns’ immunity. In other words, even
assuming foreign sovereigns enjoyed
absolute immunity in 1945, if that immunity
diminished, as it has with the codification of
the commercial activity exception, Congress
intended that international organizations fare
no better.

Recognizing that a frontal attack on
Atkinson’s holding would require an en banc
decision, appellants next argued that we can,
and should, bypass its precedential impact
because the Supreme Court has undermined
its premise—that in 1945 the immunity of
foreign sovereigns was absolute (or virtually
absolute).
To be sure, the Court has said in dicta
that in 1945, courts “‘consistently . . .
deferred to the decisions of the political
branches—in particular, those of the
Executive Branch—on whether to take
jurisdiction’ over particular actions against
foreign sovereigns . . . .” Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004)
(quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486). But as
a matter of practice, at that time, whenever a
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foreign sovereign was sued, the State
Department did request sovereign immunity.
Id. The only arguable exception involved a
lawsuit in rem against a ship owned but not
possessed by Mexico; it was not a suit against
Mexico. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945). And, even if appellants
are correct that the executive branch played
an important role in immunity determinations
in 1945, that does not diminish the absolute
nature of the immunity those sovereigns
enjoyed; although Supreme Court dicta refers
to the mechanism for conferring immunity on
foreign sovereigns in 1945, Executive
Branch intervention does not speak to the
scope of that immunity.

that language narrowly to allow only the type
of suit by the type of plaintiff that “would
benefit the organization over the long term,”
Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 552 F.3d 836,
840 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Atkinson, 156
F.3d at 1338 and Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618).
To be sure, it is a bit strange that it is
the judiciary that determines when a claim
“benefits” the international organization;
after all, the cases come to us when the
organizations deny the claim, and one would
think that the organization would be a better
judge as to what claims benefit it than the
judiciary. Perhaps that is why Osseiran,
when applying Mendaro, refers to long-term
goals, rather than immediate litigating tactics.

In any event, the holding of
Atkinson—regardless how one characterizes
the immunity of foreign sovereigns in
1945—was that international organizations
were given complete immunity by the IOIA
unless it was waived or the President
intervened. And as we noted, that holding
was reaffirmed in Nyambal after the Supreme
Court dicta on which appellants primarily
rely. Therefore, we conclude our precedent
stands as an impassable barrier to appellants’
first argument.

But whether or not the Mendaro test
would be better described using a term
different than “benefit,” it is the Mendaro
criteria we are obliged to apply. Ironically,
the line of cases applying Mendaro ended up
tying waiver to commercial transactions, so
there is a superficial similarity to the
commercial activities test that appellants
would urge us to accept. But whatever the
scope of the commercial activities exception
to sovereign immunity, that standard is
necessarily broader than the Mendaro test; if
that exception applied to the IFC, the
organization would never retain immunity
since its operations are solely “commercial,”
i.e., the IFC does not undertake any
“sovereign” activities.

III.
That brings us to the waiver
argument. There is no question that the IFC
has waived immunity for some claims.
Indeed, its charter, read literally, would seem
to include a categorical waiver. But our key
case interpreting identical waiver language in
the World Bank charter, Mendaro v. World
Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983), read

The Mendaro test instead focused on
identifying those transactions where the other
party would not enter into negotiations or
contract with the organization absent waiver.
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See 717 F.2d at 617 (inferring waiver only
insofar as “necessary to enable the
[organization] to fulfill its functions”).
Mendaro provided examples: suits by
debtors, creditors, bondholders, and “those
other potential plaintiffs to whom the
[organization] would have to subject itself to
suit in order to achieve its chartered
objectives.” Id. at 615.

benefit from their lawsuit because they are
attempting to hold the IFC to its stated
mission and to its own compliance processes.
They argue that obtaining “community
support” is a required part of any IFC project,
and suggest that communities will be
unlikely to support IFC projects if the IFC is
not amenable to suit. Appellants’ ability to
enforce the requirement that the IFC protect
surrounding communities is as central to the
IFC’s mission as a commercial partner’s
ability to enforce the requirement that the IFC
pay its electricity bill.

We have stretched that concept to
include a claim of promissory estoppel, see
Osseiran, 552 F.3d at 840-41, and a quasicontract claim of unjust enrichment, see Vila
v. Inter-Am. Invest. Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 27880 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But all the claims we
have accepted have grown out of business
relations with outside companies (or an
outside individual engaged directly in
negotiations with the organization).4
Compare Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v.
Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (finding waiver in debtors’ suit to
enforce loan agreement) with Mendaro, 717
F.2d at 611 (rejecting employee sexual
harassment and discrimination claim);
Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1336 (rejecting
garnishment proceeding against organization
employee).

But
Mendaro
drew
another
distinction between claims that survive and
those that don’t. Those claims that implicate
internal operations of an international
organization are especially suspect because
claims arising out of core operations, not
ancillary business transactions, would
threaten the policy discretion of the
organization. Accord Vila, 570 F.3d at 28689 (Williams, J., dissenting).
That notion applies here. Should
appellants’ suit be permitted, every loan the
IFC makes to fund projects in developing
countries could be the subject of a suit in
Washington. Appellee’s suggestion that the
floodgates would be open does not seem an
exaggeration. Finally, if the IFC’s internal
compliance report were to be used to buttress
a claim against the IFC, we would create a
strong
disincentive
to
international
organizations using an internal review
process. So even though appellants convince
us that the term “benefit” is something of a
misnomer—its claim in some sense can be

Appellants attempt to define
“benefit” more broadly. They argue that
holding the IFC to the very environmental
and social conditions it put in the contract,
conditions which the IFC itself formulated,
would benefit the IFC’s goals. Even though
appellants had no commercial relationship
with the IFC (other than, allegedly, as third
party beneficiaries of the loan agreement’s
requirements), they contend that the IFC will
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thought of as a “benefit”—it fails the
Mendaro test.
Accordingly,
decision is affirmed.

the

district

We took a wrong turn in Atkinson when we
read the IOIA to grant international
organizations a static, absolute immunity that
is, by now, not at all the same “as is enjoyed
by foreign governments,” but substantially
broader.

court

So ordered.
When a statute incorporates existing
law by reference, the incorporation is
generally treated as dynamic, not static: As
the incorporated law develops, its role in the
referring statute keeps up. Atkinson itself
correctly acknowledged that a “statute [that]
refers to a subject generally adopts the law on
the subject,” including “all the amendments
and modifications of the law subsequent to
the time the reference statute was enacted.”
Atkinson v. Inter-American Development
Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(emphasis omitted); see El Encanto, Inc. v.
Hatch Chile Co., 825 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th
Cir. 2016).

PILLARD, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I agree that Atkinson and Mendaro,
which remain binding law in this circuit,
control this case. I write separately to note
that those decisions have left the law of
international organizations’ immunity in a
perplexing state. I believe both cases were
wrongly decided, and our circuit may wish to
revisit them.
1. The International Organizations
Immunities Act (IOIA), Pub L. No. 79-291,
59 Stat. 669 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
288
et
seq.),
grants
international
organizations the same immunity “as is
enjoyed by foreign governments.” Id. § 2(b).
When Congress enacted the IOIA in 1945,
foreign states enjoyed “virtually absolute
immunity,” so long as the State Department
requested immunity on their behalf.
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). President
Eisenhower designated the IFC as entitled to
immunity under the IOIA in 1956. See Exec.
Order No. 10,680, 21 Fed. Reg. 7,647 (Oct.
5, 1956). Congress and the courts have since
recognized that foreign governments’
immunity is more limited, as described by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1604-05; see Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).

The IOIA references foreign
sovereign immunity, but in Atkinson we did
not apply the familiar rule of dynamic
incorporation because we thought another
IOIA provision showed that Congress
intended that reference to be static. Section 1
of the IOIA authorizes the President to
“withhold or withdraw from any such
[international] organization or its officers or
employees any of the privileges, exemptions,
and immunities provided for” by the IOIA.
IOIA § 1. We read that language to mean that
Congress intended the President alone to
have the ability, going forward, to adjust
international organizations’ immunity from
where it stood as of the IOIA’s enactment in
1945. Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1341. That
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presidential power was, we thought,
exclusive of any shift in international
organizations’ immunity that might be
wrought by developments in the law of
foreign sovereign immunity to which the
IOIA refers.

to grant international organizations an
unchanging absolute immunity (subject only
to presidential power to recognize
organization-specific exceptions) it could
have simply said so. It might have expressly
tied international organizations’ immunity to
that enjoyed by foreign governments as of the
date of enactment. Or, even better, it might
have avoided cross-reference altogether by
stating that international organizations’
immunity is absolute. As it happens, the
original House version of the IOIA did just
that, providing international organizations
“immunity from suit and every form of
judicial process.” H.R. 4489, 79th Cong. (as
introduced, Oct. 24, 1945; referred to H.
Comm. on Ways and Means), but the Senate
rejected that as “a little too broad,” 91 Cong.
Rec. 12,531 (1945), even as it retained the
absolute immunity language in provisions
granting the property of international
organizations immunity from search,
confiscation and taxation. See IOIA §§ 2(c),
6. In lieu of the House version’s broad
language, the Senate adopted the current
formulation of section 2(b), which provides
international organizations the “same
immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign
governments.” H.R. 4489, 79th Cong. (as
reported by S. Comm. on Finance, Dec. 18,
1945).

Correctly read, however, section 1
merely empowers the President to make
organizationand
function-specific
exemptions
from
otherwise-applicable
immunity rules. It says that the President may
“withhold or withdraw from any such
organization”—note the singular—“or its
officers or employees any of the privileges,
exemptions, and immunities” otherwise
provided for by the IOIA. IOIA § 1 (emphasis
added). Section 1 thus empowers the
President to roll back an international
organization’s
immunity
on
an
organizationspecific basis. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth R. Wilcox, Digest of United States
Practice in International Law 405 (2009)
(describing President Reagan’s 1983 exercise
of section 1 authority to withhold immunity
from INTERPOL, followed by President
Obama’s 2009 restoration of the immunity
after INTERPOL opened a liaison office in
New York). Nothing about section 1 suggests
that Congress framed or intended it to be the
exclusive means by which an international
organization’s
immunity
might
be
determined to be less than absolute.

The considered view of the
Department of State, harking back to before
Atkinson, is that the immunity of
international organizations under the IOIA
was not frozen as of 1945, but follows
developments in the law of foreign sovereign
immunity under the FSIA. In a 1980 letter,
then-Legal Adviser Roberts Owen opined

The inference we drew from section 1
in Atkinson seems particularly strained
because it assumes that Congress chose an
indirect and obscure route to freezing
international organizations’ immunity over a
direct and obvious one. If Congress intended
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that, by “virtue of the FSIA, . . . international
organizations are now subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their
commercial activities.” Letter from Roberts
B. Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State, to Leroy D. Clark, General Counsel,
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission (June 24, 1980), reprinted in
Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International
Law, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 917, 917-18 (1980).
Although
the
State
Department’s
interpretation of the IOIA is not binding on
the court, the Department’s involvement in
the drafting of the IOIA lends its view extra
weight. See H.R. Rep. No. 79-1203, at 7
(1945) (referring to the draft bill as “prepared
by the State Department”); see also Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21
(2004) (citing a letter of the State
Department’s
Legal
Adviser
and
encouraging courts to “give serious weight to
the Executive Branch’s view” in cases that
may affect foreign policy).

Fed. Reg. 10,405 (Oct. 23, 1962); see also
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, Can.U.S., Sept. 10, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2836. Neither
the IOIA nor our cases interpreting it explain
why nations that collectively breach contracts
or otherwise act unlawfully through
organizations should enjoy immunity in our
courts when the same conduct would not be
immunized if directly committed by a nation
acting on its own.
Were I not bound by Atkinson, I
would hold that international organizations’
immunity under the IOIA is the same as the
immunity enjoyed by foreign states. Accord
OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space
Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 762- 64 (3d Cir. 2010)
(declining to follow Atkinson and holding
that restricted immunity as codified in the
FSIA, including its commercial activity
exception,
applies
to
international
organizations under the IOIA).
2. Atkinson’s error is compounded in
certain suits involving waiver under the
Mendaro doctrine. In Mendaro v. World
Bank, we decided that courts should pare
back an international organization’s apparent
waiver of immunity from suit whenever we
believe the waiver would yield no
“corresponding benefit” to the organization.
717 F.2d 610, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see
Osserian v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 552 F.3d 836,
840 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding organization’s
facially broad waiver of immunity effective
only as to types of plaintiffs and claims that
“would benefit the organization over the long
term”). That doctrine lacks a sound legal
foundation and is awkward to apply; were I
not bound by precedent, I would reject it.

Reading the IOIA to dynamically link
organizations’ immunity to that of their
member states makes sense. The contrary
view we adopted in Atkinson appears to allow
states, subject to suit under the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA, to carry on
commercial activities with immunity through
international organizations. Thus, the
Canadian government is subject to suit in
United States courts for disputes arising from
its commercial activities here, but the Great
Lakes Fishery Commission—of which the
United States and Canada are the sole
members—is immune from suit under
Atkinson. See Exec. Order No. 11,059, 27
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It is undisputed that IOIA immunity
may be waived, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b), and the
majority recognizes that the IFC’s charter
“would seem to include a categorical
waiver.” Maj. Op. 6-7 & n.2; see IFC Articles
of Agreement art. 6, § 3, May 25, 1955, 7
U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 118. Half a
century ago, we read the Agreement
establishing
the
Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) to effectuate a
broad waiver of the Bank’s immunity. See
Lutcher S. A. Celulose e Papel v.
InterAmerican Development Bank, 382 F.2d
454, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.). The
IFC’s Articles of Agreement, which use the
same waiver language as did the IADB in
Lutcher, would appear to waive the IFC’s
immunity here. Under the reasoning of
Lutcher, the IFC, like the IADB in that case,
may be sued in United States court.

waiver did not apply to the claim of Mendaro,
a former Bank employee challenging her
termination,
because
recognizing
employment claims had no “corresponding
benefit” for the Bank. Id. at 612-14.
We saw Mendaro as distinguishable
from Lutcher. Allowing the debtor’s claims
in Lutcher “would directly aid the Bank in
attracting responsible borrowers,” whereas
complying with the law governing the Bank’s
“internal operations” in Mendaro would not
“appreciably advance the Bank’s ability to
perform its functions.” Id. at 618-20
(emphasis omitted). In other words, Mendaro
assumes that business counterparties will be
unwilling to transact with an international
organization if they lack judicial recourse
against it, but that making employees’ legal
rights unenforceable against such an
organization will not affect their willingness
to work there. We thus held that a facially
broad waiver of an organization’s immunity
should be read not to allow employee claims.

But Lutcher was not our last word. As
just noted, we decided in Mendaro to honor
an international organization’s “facially
broad waiver of immunity” only insofar as
doing so provided a “corresponding benefit”
to the organization. 717 F.2d at 613, 617. We
thought it appropriate to look to the
“interrelationship between the functions” of
the international organization and “the
underlying purposes of international
immunities” to cabin a charter document’s
immunity waiver. Id. at 615. The member
states, we opined in Mendaro, “could only
have intended to waive the Bank’s immunity
from suits by its debtors, creditors,
bondholders, and those other potential
plaintiffs to whom the Bank would have to
subject itself to suit in order to achieve its
chartered objectives.” Id. We decided the

The “corresponding benefit” doctrine
calls on courts to second-guess international
organizations’ own waiver decisions and to
treat a waiver as inapplicable unless it would
bring the organization a “corresponding
benefit”—presumably one offsetting the
burden of amenability to suit. The majority
acknowledges that “it is a bit strange” that
Mendaro calls on the judiciary to redetermine an international organization’s
own waiver calculus. Slip Op. at 8. I agree
that the organization itself is in a better
position than we are to know what is in its
institutional interests. But, whereas my
colleagues point to the fact that “the cases
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come to us when the organizations deny the
claim,” id., I would be inclined to think that
organizations’ assessments of their own longterm goals are more reliably reflected in their
charters and policies—here, in the broad
waiver included in IFC’s Articles of
Agreement— than in their litigation positions
defending against pending claims.

European Space Agency in state and federal
courts in New Jersey). Sophisticated
commercial actors that fail to bargain for
such terms are surely less entitled to benefit
from broad immunity waivers than victims of
torts or takings who lacked any bargaining
opportunity, or unsophisticated parties
unlikely to anticipate and bargain around an
immunity bar.

It is not entirely clear why we have
drawn the particular line we have pursuant to
Mendaro. Why are suits by a consultant, a
potential investor, and a corporate borrower
in an international organization’s interest, but
suits by employees and their dependents not?
Compare, e.g., Vila v. InterAmerican
Investment, Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 276, 279-82
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (permitting suit by a
consultant); Osseiran, 552 F.3d at 840-41
(permitting suit by a potential investor);
Lutcher, 382 F.2d at 459-60 (permitting suit
by a corporate borrower), with, e.g.,
Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1338-39 (barring suit
by a former wife seeking garnishment of
former husband’s wages); Mendaro, 717
F.2d at 618-19 (barring suit by a terminated
employee asserting a sex harassment and
discrimination claim).

The IFC successfully argued here that
it would enjoy no “corresponding benefit”
from immunity waiver. The local entities and
residents that brought this suit contend that
giving effect here to the IFC’s waiver would
advance the Corporation’s organizational
goals. The “IFC requires ‘broad community
support’ before funding projects” like the
Tata Mundra power plant, and “local
communities may hesitate to host a high-risk
project,” the appellants contend, “if they
know that the IFC can ignore its own
promises and standards and they will have no
recourse.” Appellants Br. at 48-49. Without
directly addressing the benefits of legal
accountability to the communities it seeks to
serve, the IFC contends that treating the
waiver in its Articles of Agreement as
effective here would open a floodgate of
litigation in United States courts. That
argument has it backwards: The IFC
persuaded the majority to stem a litigation
flood it anticipates only because the
immunity waiver in the IFC’s own Articles of
Agreement opened the gate.

Our cases seem to construe charterdocument immunity waivers to allow suits
only by commercial parties likely to be repeat
players, or by parties with substantial
bargaining power. But the opposite would
make more sense: Entities doing regular
business with international organizations can
write waivers of immunity into their
contracts with the organizations. See, e.g.,
OSS Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 759 (contract
clause authorizing software developer to sue

The perceived need for Mendaro’s
odd approach would not have arisen if we
had, back in Atkinson, read the IOIA to confer
on international organizations the same
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immunity as is enjoyed by foreign
governments—i.e. restrictive immunity that,
today, would be governed by the FSIA. As
the majority observes, Slip Op. at 8, the cases
in which we have applied Mendaro to hold
that claims are not immunity-barred look
remarkably like cases that would be allowed
to proceed under the FSIA’s commercial
activity exception. The activities we held to
be non-immunized—such as suits by
“debtors, creditors, [and] bondholders,”
Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615, “suits based on
commercial transactions with the outside
world” affecting an organization’s “ability to
operate in the marketplace,” Osseiran, 552
F.3d at 840, and unjust enrichment claims by
commercial lending specialists, Vila, 570
F.3d at 276, 279-82—seem like just the kinds
of claims that would be permitted under the
commercial activity exception. We should
have achieved that result, not via Mendaro’s
“corresponding benefit” test, but by
recognizing that the IOIA hitched the scope
of international organizations’ immunity to
that of foreign governments under the FSIA.
There is a time-tested body of law under the
FSIA that delineates its contours—including
its commercial activity exception. The
pattern of decisions applying Mendaro may
approximate some of the results that would
have
occurred
had
international
organizations been subject to the FSIA, but
Mendaro begs other important questions that
assimilation of IOIA immunity to the FSIA
would resolve.

curbing doctrine that has developed under
Mendaro. I believe that the full court should
revisit both Atkinson and Mendaro in an
appropriate case. But because those decisions
remain binding precedent in our circuit, I
concur.

Our efforts to chart a separate course
under the IOIA were misguided from the
start, and the doctrinal tangle has only
deepened in light of the amorphous waiver-
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“Justices to Review Scope of Immunity For Int’s Orgs”
Law360
Jimmy Hoover
May 21, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to
review a D.C. Circuit decision holding that
international organizations enjoy even more
immunity from lawsuits than do foreign
governments, taking up a case Monday from
a group of Indian nationals suing
the International Finance Corp. over a power
plant project they say has wreaked havoc on
the
surrounding
environment.

A D.C. federal court granted the
organization’s bid for immunity and threw
out the lawsuit, a decision upheld by a D.C.
Circuit panel and left untouched by the full
circuit bench. The Supreme Court’s order
granting certiorari has breathed hope into the
group’s effort to revive the power plant
lawsuit.
“We’re gratified that the court has taken up
the case and look forward to the next stage,”
said Stanford University law professor
Jeffrey Fisher, an attorney for the group of
Indian nationals that petitioned the high
court’s
review.

In Jam v. International Finance Corp., the
high court will decide the scope of immunity
for international organizations such as the
IFC — which is headquartered in
Washington, D.C. — under the International
Organizations Immunities Act. As is its
custom, the court granted certiorari in the
case without explanation, adding it to its
October
2018
term.

At issue is a provision of the IOIA stating that
international organizations “shall enjoy the
same immunity from suit ... as is enjoyed by
foreign governments.” Relying on its
precedent, the D.C. Circuit held in June 2017
that the provision refers to the “virtually
absolute” status of sovereign immunity that
existed when the IOIA was enacted in 1945,
before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
codified a crucial exception for when
countries engage in commercial activity.

The petitioners are farmers, fishermen and a
local government entity claiming to have
experienced devastating environmental
damage from the Tata Mundra Power Plant in
Gujarat, India, which was financed through
$450 million in loans from the IFC. They say
the international organization neglected its
obligation to supervise the project and did not
comply with the funding agreement and its
own internal policies to protect the
surrounding environment, and that as a result
the water is contaminated and thermal
pollution is killing off marine life.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision created an
“entrenched circuit split” with the Third
Circuit’s holding that the provision
incorporates developments in the area of
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sovereign immunity, such as the FSIA’s
commercial exception, the farmers and
fishermen wrote in a January petition asking
the court to resolve the disagreement. The
petitioners received a supporting brief from a
group of international legal scholars from
various
law
schools.

immunity such as the United Nations and
the International
Monetary
Fund.
The case was first distributed for the justices’
regular conference on May 10, but relisted for
the Thursday conference before the court
decided to take the case Monday. The
Supreme Court has not yet set a date for oral
arguments
in
the
case.

The IFC said in an opposition brief filed in
late March that the IOIA conferred nearcomplete immunity that could only be
waived by the organization itself or the
president. “The immunity conferred in the
IOIA was not altered, decades later, by the
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act — a different statute, covering different
entities,
with
different
motivating
principles,”
it
said.

The IFC declined to comment on Monday.
The petitioners are represented by Richard L.
Herz, Marco B. Simons and Michelle C.
Harrison of EarthRights International, and
Jeffrey L. Fisher, David T. Goldberg and
Pamela S. Karlan of Stanford Law School.
The International Finance Corp. is
represented by Francis A. Vasquez Jr., Dana
E. Foster and Maxwell J. Kalmann of White
&
Case
LLP.

In any event, the IFC said, the D.C. Circuit’s
disagreement with the Third Circuit created
only a “shallow circuit split” that does not
warrant review given the infrequency with
which people bring lawsuits against
international organizations, let alone those
without founding treaties conferring such

The case is Jam v. International Finance
Corp., case number 17-1011, in the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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“Supreme Court Grants Cert in Jam v. International Finance Corporation”
Lawfare
Elliot Kim
June 12, 2018
On May 21, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Jam v. International Finance
Corporation to
determine
whether
international organizations are afforded the
same immunity from lawsuits under
the International Organizations Immunities
Act(IOIA) that foreign governments are
conferred under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. Since the IOIA was enacted
in 1945, foreign sovereign immunity has
been curtailed by the development and
codification of the “commercial activities
exception” doctrine. Under this doctrine,
foreign governments cannot enjoy sovereign
immunity when the lawsuit is based on those
governments’ commercial activities.

procedural background of this case and the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion.
Factual and Procedural Background
The IFC is an international organization
based in Washington D.C. comprised of over
180 member countries. The purpose of the
IFC is “to further economic development by
encouraging the growth of productive private
enterprise in member countries.” The IFC
focuses on funding private sector projects in
developing countries that would otherwise
have difficulty attracting capital.
This case arose from the IFC’s 2008 decision
to lend $450 million to an Indian power
company developing the Tata Mundra Power
Plant in Gujarat, India. The plaintiffs—
farmers and fisherman who lived near the
plant, the government of village located near
the plant, and a local trade union of
fishworkers—claimed that the IFC failed to
comply with its internal policies and with the
specific environmental action plan that was
part of the funding agreement for the plant.
As a result, the plaintiffs claim the area
surrounding the plant suffered disastrous
environmental and social harm, including
contamination of drinkable groundwater,
degradation in local air quality, and
displacement of local fisherman and farmers.

Jam will
determine
whether
such
developments in foreign sovereign immunity
apply in turn to international organization
immunity. The case involves a power plant in
India that was financed by the International
Financial Corporation (IFC), the privatesector investment arm of the World Bank. By
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court has a
chance to bring much needed clarity to what
Circuit Judge T.L. Pillard has described as
the “perplexing state” of the law on
international-organization immunity, at a
time when these organizations are
increasingly being sued in U.S. courts. The
following is a summary of the factual and
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In 2015, the plaintiffs brought suit against the
IFC in the U.S. District Court of the District
of Columbia claiming negligence, negligent
supervision, public nuisance, private
nuisance, trespass and breach of contract.
Judge John D. Bates dismissed the complaint
on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the
IFC was immune from the lawsuit under the
IOIA. The IOIA provides that:

immunity in its Articles of Agreement.
Specifically the plaintiffs referred to Article
VI, Section 3 of the those articles, which
states:
Actions may be brought against the [IFC]
only in a court of competent jurisdiction in
the territories of a member in which the [IFC]
has an office, has appointed an agent for the
purpose of accepting service of process, or
has issued or guaranteed securities. No
actions shall, however, be brought by
members or persons acting for or deriving
claims from members. The property and
assets of the [IFC] shall, wheresoever located
and by whomsoever held, be immune from
all forms of seizure, attachment or execution
before the delivery of final judgment against
the [IFC].

International organizations, their property
and their assets, wherever located, and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same
immunity from suit and every form of
judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments, except to the extent that such
organizations may expressly waive their
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings
or by the terms of any contract.
In interpreting the IOIA, Bates cited a 1998
D.C. Circuit case Atkinson v. Inter-American
Development Bank, which held that
international organizations receive the same
foreign immunity as foreign governments at
the time the IOIA was enacted in 1945. This
interpretation excluded the developed
commercial activities exception, so the
plaintiffs urged Judge Bates to instead follow
the Third Circuit’s decision in OSS Nokalva,
Inc. v. European Space Agency, which held
that the IOIA incorporates subsequent
changes in foreign sovereign immunity,
including
the
commercial
activities
exception. Noting that the District Court’s
“role is to apply [D.C.] Circuit law,” Bates
concluded that the IFC is entitled to “virtually
absolute immunity” under Atkinson.

Judge Bates rejected this claim by citing to
the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Osseiran v.
International Financial Corporation and
in Vila v. Inter-American Investment
Corporation. In those cases, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the argument that international
organizations with “nearly identical
language” in their founding documents had
waived their immunity. The plaintiffs
subsequently appealed to the D.C. Circuit.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’
alternative argument that the IFC waived its

Majority Opinion

D.C. Circuit Judgment
Judge Lawrence H. Silberman wrote
the majority opinion, which Judge Harry T.
Edwards joined and Judge Pillard joined in
part. Judge Pillard wrote a separate
concurrence.
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The majority agreed with the District Court’s
“well-reasoned” decision on both scope of
immunity under the IOIA and the absence of
waiver of immunity in a succinct, ten page
opinion. Though majority acknowledged the
“dismal picture” painted by the plaintiffs’
complaint, the court found the plaintiffs’
arguments foreclosed by its own prior case
law.

foreign sovereign enjoyed absolute immunity
in 1945 when IOIA was enacted. Instead, the
plaintiffs asserted that immunity was granted
based on the deference to the judgment of
political branches, specifically through
express request by the State Department.
However, the majority dismissed the
relevance of the Supreme Court dicta cited by
the plaintiffs. According to the majority,
those cases’ references to State Department
intervention refer to the mechanism for
conferring immunity on foreign sovereigns in
1945, not the scope of that immunity. To
support its position, the court again invoked
its decision Nyambal, which came after the
Supreme Court cited by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs first argument was that IOIA
intended to incorporate of changes to the law
of foreign sovereign immunity, rather than
preserving the prevailing understanding of
foreign sovereign immunity from 1945. Thus
according to the plaintiffs, the Atkinson court
misinterpreted Congress’s intent to keep
immunity for foreign governments and
international organizations connected. In
response, the majority reiterated the
rationales of Atkinson, starting with the
argument that the statute explicitly delegated
the responsibility of changing the amount of
immunity
granted
to
international
organizations to the president, not to the
courts. In addition, the majority reiterated the
point made in Atkinson that the Congress that
passed the IOIA in 1945 considered—yet
ultimately
rejected—inclusion
of
a
commercial
activities
exception
to
international organization immunity. Finally,
the majority rejected the plaintiffs argument
by reminding the them that the D.C. Circuit
“recently reaffirmed Atkinson” in its 2014
decision, Nyambal v. International Monetary
Fund.

As in the lower court proceedings, the
plaintiffs raised an alternative argument that
the IFC waived its immunity. According to
the plaintiffs, their position was consistent
with Osseiran, Vila, and Mendaro v. World
Bank, in which the D.C. Circuit first adopted
the “corresponding benefits” test for
determining whether an international
organization waived its immunity. Under this
test, courts determine ex post whether
waiving immunity for certain plaintiffs and
claims would have “benefitted” the
international organization. An international
organization is considered to have received a
“corresponding benefit” for waiving its
immunity if that waiver would have been
“necessary to enable the [international
organization] to fulfill its functions.” Thus
according to Silberman, creditors or
bondholders are types of plaintiffs for whom
international organizations probably waived
their immunity because the organizations
would not have been able to borrow money
without agreeing to waive their immunity.

The
plaintiffs
further
contended
that Atkinson should be ignored because the
Supreme Court has in recent years
undermined the premise of Atkinson that
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The majority rejects the notion that the IFC
would receive a corresponding benefit to
waiving its immunity for the plaintiffs’ suit
for two reasons. First, Silberman emphasized
that prior case law has generally accepted
waiver arguments only when the “claims
have grown out of business relationships”
between the plaintiffs and the international
organizations. By contrast, the IFC has no
direct commercial or contractual relationship
with the plaintiffs. Silberman highlighted
another fatal issue for the plaintiffs: their case
“threaten the policy discretion of the
organization” because the claims arise from
“core operations [of the IFC], not ancillary
business transactions.” As such, the court
determined that the consequences of waiving
immunity in this type of case would
determined outweigh any benefit to the IFC.
Accordingly, the majority affirmed the
district court’s opinion.

and immunities
subchapter ...

provided

for

in

this

Pillard’s Concurrence

Pillard offered several additional arguments
to support her reading of the IOIA. First, she
contended
that
the
interpretation
in Atkinson rested on the flawed assumption
that Congress chose “an indirect and obscure
route to freezing international organizations’
immunity over a direct and obvious one.”
Congress could have simply stated its
intention to grant unchangeable, absolute
immunity to international organizations;
instead, Congress chose to set the level of
international organization immunity by
reference to the immunity of foreign
governments.

According to Pillard, the mistake
in Atkinson was the court’s incorrect
interpretation of Section 1 of IOIA as
authorizing “the President alone to have the
ability, going forward to adjust international
organizations’ immunity from where it stood
as of the IOIA’s enactment in 1945.” Instead,
Pillard noted that the use of the singular terms
such as “any such organization” and “its
officers or employees” in Section 1 suggests
that Congress intended to authorize the
President to limit immunity for organization
on a case-by-case basis. In fact, no part of
Section 1 of IOIA suggests that “Congress
framed or intended [that section] to be the
exclusive means by which an international
organization’s
immunity
might
be
determined to be less than absolute.”

Pillard agreed with the majority that the
outcome of the case is decided by D.C.
Circuit precedent. However, she wrote
separately to urge her colleagues on the D.C.
Circuit to reconsider Atkinson and Mendaro,
two cases which she believes were “wrongly
decided.”
Pillard began by looking at Section 1 of the
IOIA, which reads in relevant part:
The President shall be authorized, in the light
of the functions performed by any such
international organization, by appropriate
Executive order to withhold or withdraw
from any such organization or its officers or
employees any of the privileges, exemptions,

Furthermore, Pillard compared the IOIA text
to the unambiguous language of the original
House version of the IOIA, which granted
international organizations “immunity from
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suit and every form of judicial process.” The
fact that this draft language, untethered to the
level of immunity enjoyed by foreign
governments, was not included in the final
version of the bill implied to Pillard that
Congress intended the two levels of
immunity to be dynamically linked.

organization’s charter using the already welldeveloped case law under the FSIA for
determining whether a sovereign nation has
waived its immunity.
Pillard advised that the full D.C. Circuit
“revisit” Atkinson and Mendaro. However,
three months after its opinion, the D.C.
Circuit denied a petition for an en banc
rehearing on Jam v. IFC. In January 2018, the
plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorariwith the
Supreme Court.

In addition, Pillard cited to the State
Department’s support for the dynamic view
of international organizational immunity,
noting that additional weight should be given
to the State Department view given its
involvement in drafting in the IOIA. Finally,
Pillard highlighted the illogical consequences
of Atkinson. Granting broader immunity to
international organizations than to foreign
governments would immunize “nations that
collectively breach contracts or otherwise act
unlawfully through organizations,” even if
that same conduct would be subject to
judicial process if a nation were acting on its
own. Thus, according to Judge Pillard, the
D.C. Circuit “took a wrong turn
in Atkinson when [it] read the IOIA to grant
international organizations a static, absolute
immunity.”

Supreme Court Review
Jam is the first case before the Supreme
Court considering the scope of immunity for
international organizations under IOIA. The
court’s decision to grant cert in Jam may
have come as a surprise because it recently
declined to resolve a circuit split on the scope
of immunity under the IOIA after the D.C.
Circuit’s
2014
decision
in Nyambal conflicted with the Third
Circuit’s 2010 decision in OSS Nokalva. One
reason the court may have now decided to
resolve this issue is that international
organizations are increasingly finding
themselves in U.S. courts, facing serious
allegations such as aiding and abetting
violations of human rights. As noted by the
plaintiffs in their cert-stage reply brief,
international organizations are deeply
involved in a range of matters from
“international business to natural resource
management to human health and safety.” As
the portfolios of international organizations
have expanded, the number of lawsuits
against these organizations brought in U.S.
courts has also increased in recent years. A
decision on the merits that weakens the

Pillard added that the D.C. Circuit has
“compounded” its errors in Atkinson by
adopting the “corresponding benefits” test for
waiver of immunity in Mendaro. Pillard
dismissed the process of asking “the judiciary
to
re-determine
an
international
organization’s waiver calculus” based on
“amorphous” concepts of long-term benefit.
Instead of using a test that “lacks a strong
legal foundation,” Pillard suggested that an
international organization’s intent to waive
immunity should be determined either by
referring directly to the language in an
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immunity
granted
to
international
organizations could therefore have a chilling
effect, especially on organizations like the
IFC, which according to D.C. Circuit opinion
primarily engages in “commercial activities.”
Such a decision would also provide third
parties who are being harmed by
international organizations’ activities an
important avenue of redress.

lower court proceedings. One such question
raised by the plaintiffs is whether the
executive branch intervention is necessary
for an international organization to have
immunity. The other issue is how courts can
determine
whether
an
international
organization has waived its immunity.
Specifically, the plaintiffs in their petition for
cert claimed that the D.C. Circuit’s
“corresponding benefits” test as a distorting
the statutory language of the IOIA. Just as the
court in recent terms has reconsidered the
scope
of
foreign
sovereign
immunity, Jam could signal the beginning of
a string of Supreme Court cases providing
greater clarity on the status of international
organizations within our legal system.

Although it agreed to address the scope of
IOIA immunity, the Supreme Court declined
to consider the second question raised
by Jam: what are the rules governing
immunity for international organizations?
Thus, this case will leave unresolved several
important questions on international
organization immunity raised during the
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“Indian fisherman hail U.S Supreme Court decision to hear World Bank suit”
Reuters
Rina Chandran
May 22, 2018
Farmers and fishermen in western India have
welcomed a U.S. Supreme Court decision to
hear their lawsuit against a World Bank
agency, which financed a power plant they
blame for damaging the environment and
their livelihoods.

coal-fired plant operated by a Tata Power unit
near Mundra, in Gujarat state.

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to hear an appeal by the villagers of a lower
court ruling that the International Finance
Corp (IFC) was immune from such lawsuits
under federal law.

But the 4,000 megawatt plant - billed as key
to providing cheap energy and creating jobs has had a “devastating and irreversible
impact” on the coastal ecosystem, according
to the submission by villagers who live near
the plant.

Loans from the IFC include provisions
requiring that certain environmental
standards will be met.

The court must now consider for the first time
whether international organizations are
immune from such suits under federal law,
according to the advocacy group EarthRights
International (ERI), which is representing the
plaintiffs.

Coal ash damages crops, water for drinking
and irrigation have been contaminated, while
discharges from the plant’s cooling system
have reduced fish stocks, they said.
Lead plaintiff Budha Ismail Jam and others
sued in federal court in Washington in 2015,
saying the IFC had failed to meet its
obligations.

“This is a big victory for us,” said Bharat
Patel, a plaintiff and general secretary of the
fishermen’s group Machimar Adhikar
Sangharsh Sangatha.

Representatives for Tata Power and the
World Bank in India did not respond to emails seeking comment.

“We fought for so many years to be heard.
This decision gives us hope,” he told the
Thomson Reuters Foundation.

A district court in 2016 and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in 2017 ruled that the lawsuit was barred

The case revolves around the IFC’s decision
in 2008 to provide $450 million in loans for a
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commercial activities” under the 1976
Foreign
Sovereign
Immunities
Act,
according to ERI.

because the IFC is immune from such
litigation under a 1945 law.
The question before the Supreme Court now
is whether there are limits to immunity for
entities like the IFC under the 1945
International Organizations Immunity Act.

“Since a foreign government would not be
immune from this suit, the IFC, which is
made up of foreign states, should not be
immune either,” it said.

That law gives international organizations
“the same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed
by foreign governments”.

The court will hear arguments and decide the
case in its next term, which begins in
October.

However, governments “are not entitled to
immunity from suits arising out of their
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“Can You Sue International Organizations? The Supreme Court Decides to Weigh
In”
Just Security
Kristina Daugirdas
June 1, 2018
The International Finance Corporation (IFC)
might sound like an ordinary private
business, but it’s not. It’s an international
organization that’s part of the World Bank.
The IFC has all of the standard accoutrements
of an international organization. It was
created
by treaty;
it
has
member
countries, 184 of them; and it has grand
ambitions to improve the world “by
encouraging the growth of productive private
enterprise in member countries.”

construction, rendering the water useless for
irrigation. The plant’s cooling system
discharges thermal pollution into the sea,
killing off marine life. And the open-air
conveyor system that transports coal to feed
the plant disperses coal dust and ash into the
air along its route.
Although the power plant is the immediate
source of the problem, the plaintiffs sued the
IFC in federal district court in Washington,
D.C, where the IFC is headquartered. The
IFC had loaned $450 million for the
construction and operation of the plant—
roughly 10 percent of its total cost.
Consistent with IFC policy, the loan
agreement
had
incorporated
an
Environmental and Social Action Plan that
should have prevented the harms the
plaintiffs endured. But the IFC didn’t take
any steps to ensure compliance with that
plan. Indeed, the IFC’s own ombudsperson
criticized the deficient supervision of the
project. So the plaintiffs filed a suit against
the IFC for negligence and other torts.

The
IFC,
like
other
international
organizations, is also very difficult to sue in
U.S. courts because it has comprehensive
immunities from suit. But that may change:
last week, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a case, Jam v. IFC, that may pare
back those immunities. The implications
would be significant—not just for the IFC,
but for international organizations across the
board.
The statutory question
The plaintiffs in Jam include farmers and
fishermen whose lives and livelihoods were
harmed by the construction of the coal-fired
Tata Mundra Power Plant in Gujarat, India.
According to their complaint, salt
contaminated the local groundwater during

The question raised by the case is whether the
IFC’s immunities preclude the lawsuit from
going forward. In the United States,
international organizations’ immunities stem
from two sources: treaties and the
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International Organizations Immunities Act
(IOIA), a statute enacted in 1945. Once the
president designates particular individual
organizations by executive order, they enjoy
the immunities set out in the IOIA. The key
text on immunity provides:
International organizations . . . shall enjoy the
same immunity from suit and every form of
judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments, except to the extent that such
organizations may expressly waive their
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings
or by the terms of any contract.

deciding that the IOIA measures immunity
with reference to the FSIA could create real
problems for international organizations
operating in the United States. But no matter
how the case is resolved, it’s unlikely to spur
international organizations to make the kinds
of changes that are genuinely needed—
developing robust alternative mechanisms
for resolving claims by individuals who are
adversely affected by what international
organizations do.
When do international organizations engage
in commercial activities?

Thus, the IOIA itself doesn’t directly specify
the scope of organizations’ immunities. It
instead cross-references the immunities of
foreign governments. But that presents a
puzzle. Do international organizations get the
immunity that foreign states had in 1945
when the IOIA was adopted? Or, instead, do
they enjoy the immunity that foreign states
receive today, which is more limited and
governed by the 1976 Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA)?

If the Supreme Court interprets the IOIA to
confer absolute immunity, then the suit
against the IFC can proceed only if the IFC
has waived its immunity. If the Supreme
Court goes the other way, then determining
whether the IFC (and other international
organizations) can be sued becomes quite
complicated. The answer turns in part on the
question of what counts as a commercial
activity of an international organization. In a
throwaway line in its opinion in Jam, the
D.C. Circuit wrote that if the commercial
activities exception applied to the IFC, “the
organization would never retain immunity
since its operations are solely ‘commercial,’
i.e., the IFC does not undertake any
‘sovereign’ activities.” But it’s not so clear
that the IFC’s immunity could be wiped away
so quickly.

The D.C. Circuit has taken the former
position; the Third Circuit has taken the
latter, creating a genuine circuit split. The
difference matters: in 1945 foreign states
generally had absolute immunity from suit.
Under the FSIA, however, foreign states are
(as a rough cut) immune for their sovereign
or governmental acts, but not immune with
respect to their commercial activities.

The Supreme Court has said that to determine
whether an act is commercial for purposes of
the FSIA, the key question is “whether the
particular actions that the foreign state
performs (whatever the motive behind them)

Set aside for now whether the D.C. Circuit or
the Third Circuit has the better claim on the
merits. In this post, I’d like to get a handle on
what’s at stake in the lawsuit. As a first cut,
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are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in ‘trade or traffic or
commerce.’” At first blush, the IFC’s work
indeed looks commercial—its main activity
is lending to private actors, and a slew of
banks in the private sector do exactly that.

Even if the IOIA does not confer immunity
for commercial activities, an international
organization’s treaty might. But figuring out
the effect that a treat might have on
immunities is more complicated than it might
at first appear. Even apart from interpreting
the treaty language about immunity, courts
will have to decide whether that language is
self-executing; whether the treaty language
overrides conflicting statutory provisions
pursuant to the last-in-time rule; and whether
the treaty should influence the interpretation
of the IOIA pursuant to the Charming
Betsy rule, which instructs courts to interpret
statutes to avoid conflicts with international
law.

But a lot depends on the level of generality at
which a particular activity is described.
Repaying a bank loan sounds like a “garden
variety” commercial act, but the Second
Circuit has held that repaying a loan from the
International Monetary Fund is a sovereign
act because of the particular way that the IMF
and its loans are structured. Only states can
be members of the IMF and borrow from it;
the IMF’s lending is “part of a larger
regulatory enterprise intended to preserve
stability in the international monetary system
and foster orderly economic growth.” If
repaying an IMF loan isn’t a commercial
activity, neither is making such a loan. The
analogy to the IFC’s activities is obvious.

It’s difficult to generalize about how this
analysis would come out because the content
of treaty provisions that address the
immunities of international organizations
vary considerably. The treaty that governs
the immunity of the United Nations is quite
sweeping: It provides that the United Nations
“shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its
immunity.” The Charter of the Organization
of American States, like that of a number of
other organizations, is somewhat narrower. It
says that each organization “shall enjoy in the
territory of each Member such legal capacity,
privileges, and immunities as are necessary
for the exercise of its functions and the
accomplishment of its purposes,” but it
doesn’t specify exactly how much immunity
is “necessary.” Still other charters are silent
on immunity, like the one governing World
Organization for Animal Health.

Likewise, hiring an employee might initially
appear to be an obviously commercial act,
but the executive branch has long taken the
position that employing international civil
servants is not a commercial activity, and a
number of court decisions have adopted this
reasoning. The bottom line is that there’s a lot
of room to debate what’s commercial and
what’s sovereign—and a conclusion that
international organizations lack immunity for
their commercial acts is only an interim step
in the analysis.
What about treaties?
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The upshot is that some organizations, like
the United Nations, can make a treaty-based
claim that their immunity remains absolute
regardless of how the IOIA is interpreted.
Other organizations can’t. An adverse
decision from the Supreme Court will be
especially consequential for this latter group.

Alternative
disputes

mechanisms

for

resolving

Stepping back, there are two main rationales
for providing immunity to international
organizations. First, immunity shields the
organization from member states that seek to
undermine or influence the organization by
subjecting it or its officials to lawsuits. This
risk is real. The International Court of Justice,
for example, affirmed the immunity of a UN
Special Rapporteur on judicial independence
after that rapporteur was sued for libel by
individuals and companies who were
incensed by comments the rapporteur made
to the press. Second, immunity from
employment-related lawsuits helps assure
that international organizations can be
genuinely international—and can develop
employment policies that are suitable for an
international workforce.

Consider again the World Organization for
Animal Health, which is known by its
historical French acronym OIE. Its work
focuses on preventing animal diseases—and
thereby facilitating international trade in
animals and animal products. President
Barack Obama designated OIE pursuant to
the IOIA right at the end of his term. Six
months later, the OIE announced that it
would establish a liaison office in College
Station, Texas. The extension of immunity
and the establishment of the office appear
closely connected. Indeed, the OIE’s press
release regarding the Texas office opens with
a reference to the executive order in its very
first sentence.

Although there are good reasons for
according immunity to international
organizations, that immunity often comes at
a heavy price: it can leave individuals who
are harmed by an international organization
without recourse. The plaintiffs in the case
against the IFC are alleging serious harm.
Another recent high-profile example
involves the United Nations. UN
peacekeepers in Haiti unintentionally
introduced cholera to the country in the wake
of the 2010 earthquake. The cholera epidemic
there has killed more than 9,000 individuals
and sickened hundreds of thousands. The
United Nations denied a claim for
compensation and an apology that the victims
submitted directly to the organization, and
successfully invoked immunity to shut down

If the Supreme Court interprets the IOIA as
conferring limited immunities, what will the
OIE do? At a minimum, it will face
considerable legal uncertainty. OIE might
find itself on the receiving end of a lawsuit by
a disgruntled employee, but unsure whether
courts will find the commercial-activities
exception to apply or not. The OIE might
maintain the office in College Station, that
risk notwithstanding. It could try to bolster its
immunity through a new international
agreement or a new statutory provision (good
luck with that). Or it could decide that the
legal risk is too great and shut down the
office.
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a lawsuit filed in U.S. courts. In December
2016, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon issued a long-delayed apology and
announced the establishment of a new $400
million program to benefit Haitian victims.
But a year and a half later, the program has
not delivered much, largely because UN
member states have supplied only $7.5
million, a tiny fraction of what Ban had
promised.

and expressly remedial approach to assessing
and addressing project impacts raised by the
complainants.” The case remains open, and
CAO is continuing to monitor IFC’s response
to its findings.
There are other examples of such alternative
mechanisms that allow individuals who have
been harmed by international organizations
to challenge at least certain kinds of actions
by the organizations. The UN Security
Council
created
an Office
of
the
Ombudsperson that allows individuals and
entities subject to the ISIL and al-Qaeda
sanctions regime to challenge their listings.
The Human Rights Advisory Panel was
established to hear human rights claims
against the UN Administration in Kosovo.

The plaintiffs in the case against the IFC do
have some recourse. In 1999, IFC established
an
Office
of
the
Compliance
Officer/Ombudsman (CAO) and empowered
it to hear complaints by people affected by
projects financed by IFC “in a manner that is
fair, constructive, and objective.” In 2011,
the Association for the Struggle for
Fishworkers’ Rights filed a complaint with
the CAO about the Tata Mundra plant,
arguing that that the IFC had violated its own
economic and social policies in connection
with that project. CAO proceeded with a
formal
investigation.
After
CAO
produced reports that substantiated a number
of the Association’s claims, CAO produced
an Action Plan that contemplated a number
of environmental, economic, and health
studies, and indicated that “appropriate
mitigation measures will be developed” in
consultation with certain experts if those
studies indicated an “adverse impact.” Since
then, CAO has continued to monitor
implementation of this action plan and
subsequent developments. CAO’s most
recent monitoring report, dated February
2017, described progress on completing
some of these studies, but emphasized “an
outstanding need for a rapid, participatory

One solution might be to make the immunity
of international organizations contingent on
the development of such mechanisms. (The
European Court of Human Rights did that
in Waite and Kennedy v. Germany.) But
crafting an effective rule is very difficult.
If any alternative mechanism suffices to
assure immunity from suit, international
organizations might be tempted to develop
minimalist procedures that offer nothing
meaningful to injured individuals. If, on the
other hand, national courts recognized
immunity only when they deem the
alternative mechanism adequate, there’s a
risk of recreating the problems that justify
immunity in the first place: Courts might
issue decisions that evaluate alternatives
based on parochial standards, yielding
inconsistent decisions from one jurisdiction
to the next, and potentially subjecting
organizations to undue influence of
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individual member states outside of the
organization’s
formal
governance
mechanisms.
Suppose the IFC’s immunity from suits like
the current one depended on the availability
of a good-enough alternative mechanism.
Would—and should—the CAO qualify?
Reasonable minds could disagree. The
plaintiffs presumably aren’t satisfied by the
CAO process. At the same time, the oversight
process can’t be dismissed as pure window
dressing. The CAO seems to be taking the
Association’s complaints seriously, and
appears willing to publicly criticize the IFC
and to maintain pressure over time.
Returning to the statutory question in Jam v.
IFC, then, there are two take-away points.
First, interpreting the IOIA to confer
immunities only for governmental acts would
create considerable legal uncertainty for
international organizations across the board.
Second, neither interpretation of the IOIA
that’s on offer would do much to
systematically advance the development of
serious alternative dispute settlement
mechanisms. The presence or absence of
such mechanisms is irrelevant if the IOIA
confers absolute immunity—and is likewise
irrelevant if the IOIA confers immunity only
for sovereign or governmental acts. The push
to
develop—and
to
improve—such
alternative mechanisms will have to come
from elsewhere
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